green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
56.0 score
“he skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants ... from the criminal milieu, is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim or ordinary citizen witness.”
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985
2005
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
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examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Cardenas v. Hernandez
when examining informant evidence used to support a claim of probable cause for a warrant . . . the skepticism and careful scrutiny . . . is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Brown
he skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants ... from the criminal milieu, is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim or ordinary citizen witness.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Andrew Clay v. Coolidge Conlee, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of St. Francis County, St. Francis County Sheriff's Department
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
he skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants, sometimes anonymous, from the criminal milieu, is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim____
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stephanie Baldyga v. City and County of Denver, Marc-Luca Conley, and Kodi Olson
See id. (rejecting argument that arguable probable cause was lacking because an identification by an eyewitness had “several issues”); Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding that “[e]vidence is not necessarily insufficient merely because the witness’ testimony has been contradictory and the explanations therefor difficult of belief,” and holding that inconsistent statements from two possible child victims of sexual assault were sufficient to supply probable cause) (citations omitted); see also Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1995)…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
RiseWell LLC d/b/a RiseWell v. Happy Tooth Products, LLC; Wallsburg Farms, Inc.; and Does 1-15
Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Scott v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma
That Rule grants a district court “broad discretion in deciding whether to sever issues for trial.” Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ptselnikov v. Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company
Colo. June 7, 2012) (citing Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Blackmore v. Carlson
They are present in almost any trial in which liability and damages are at issue. 7 Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985). 8 Cutright v. Geico Cas.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
SANDERS v. MULLANEY
June 10, 2021) (citing Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (10th Cir. 1985)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ramirez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir.1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
VOORHIS v. GINKEL
June 10, 2021) (citing Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (10th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Taylor v. Szewc
The Tenth Circuit stated that: In Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985), we examined whether discrepancies in the statements of two young boys regarding an alleged sexual assault was enough to vitiate probable cause, and concluded that “[t]he existence of inconsistencies in their statements” did not vitiate probable cause because they did not “undermine the solid core of the children’s statements regarding the . . . assault.” After all, “[t]he standard of probable cause does not require indubitable or necessarily convincing evidence, but only so much reaso…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rossi v. University of Utah
BY THE COURT: rtéd States District Judge > Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985). * Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957 , 964 (10th Cir. 1993). > Notably, Defendant does not object to introduction of such evidence as part of their case in chief.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stella v. Davis County
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that a court may bifurcate a proceeding for the trial of separate issues “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Courts have “broad discretion in deciding whether to sever issues for trial.” Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
McKinney v. Wulfeck
Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lefebre v. Christensen
Nevertheless, the court has broad discretion in decisions relating to bifurcation, see Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985), and finds that Defendant has carried his burden to demonstrate that bifurcation is appropriate.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Montes v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Courts have “broad discretion in deciding whether to sever issues for trial[,] and the exercise of that discretion will be set aside only if clearly abused.” Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
RICHARDSON v. ORIOLO
“The skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants . . . is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim.” Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 818 (quoting Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Carraro v. Allstate Insurance Company
Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Moses-El v. City and County of Denver
In fact, in Easton, we held that inconsistent statements from two potential victims of sexual assault (one who was three years old and the other who was five years old) still sufficiently supplied probable cause. 776 F.2d at 1450–51 (“Evidence is not necessarily insufficient merely because the witness’ testimony has been contradictory and the explanations therefor difficult of belief.” (citation 26 We also note that in resolving whether probable cause exists, “the skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants, sometimes anonymous, from the criminal milie…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jain v. Kumar
Analysis 1 Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985). 2 Byrne v. Yale Univ., 2020 WL 5258998 , at *13 (D.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
McFarlin v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Roosevelt
Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Candi Walz v. Brian Randall
See Wesley, 779 F.3d at 424 (accusation by a seven-year-old); United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 624 (6th Cir. 2006) (accusation by a three-year-old); Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985) (accusations by three- and five-year-olds); Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990) (accusation by a four-year-old); Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1428 (11th Cir. 1998) (accusation by a three-year-old); see probable cause.” (cleaned up)); see also Thiel v. Korte, 954 F.3d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[Officers’] subjective intentions play no role in resolvi…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bistline v. Jeffs
Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir.1985).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Dentsply Sirona Inc. v. Edge Endo, LLC
Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Li v. Lewis
Utah 2007). 2 See Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985). 3 Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957 , 964 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted). 4 See, e.g., Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great N. Ry.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vanmeter v. Briggs
The Tenth Circuit has held that district courts have “broad discretion in deciding whether to sever issues for trial and the exercise of that discretion will be set aside only if clearly abused.” Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Donahue v. Wihongi
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Courts may also apply less “skepticism and careful scrutiny” to the 16 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983) (explaining reasonable suspicion can arise where an anonymous tip has sufficient indicia of reliability); Adams, 407 U.S. at 147 (“[W]e reject [the] argument that reasonable [suspicion] for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person.”); Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224 (1965) (citizen-witness’s tip relevant to probable cause inquiry). 17 Whether reasonable suspicion exists…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. BNSF Railway Company
Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Carter v. Davis
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
“The standard of probable cause does not require indubitable or necessarily convincing evidence, but only so much ‘reasonably trustworthy information’ as ‘to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [arrestee 7 Bradley does not contend that Underwood made any false statements in her affidavit. has] committed . . . an offense.” Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985); see also Shed v. Okla.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hardman v. Roosevelt City
“The standard of probable cause does not require indubitable or necessarily convincing evidence, but only so much reasonably trustworthy information as to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense.” Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shed v. OK Dept. of Human Services
In Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985), we examined whether discrepancies in the statements of two young boys regarding an alleged sexual assault was enough to vitiate probable cause, and concluded that “[t]he existence of inconsistencies in their statements” did not vitiate probable cause because they did not “undermine the solid core of the children’s statements regarding the . . . assault.” After all, “[t]he standard of probable cause does not require indubitable or necessarily convincing evidence, but only so much reasonably 7 trustworthy information…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Oldershaw v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc.
Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985); Coffeyville Res.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hartz v. Campbell
See Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Identification by a single eyewitness who lacks an apparent grudge against the accused person supplies probable cause for arrest.”); Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (“When information is received from a putative victim or an eyewitness, probable cause exists, unless the circumstances raise doubt as to the person’s veracity[.]” (citation omitted)); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir.1999) (“A law enforcement officer is entitled to rely on an eyewitness identification to establish adequ…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hopper v. Fenton
Accordingly, we held in Easton that discrepancies in the statements of two young boys regarding an alleged sexual assault did not vitiate probable cause: the inconsistencies did “nothing to undermine the solid core of the children’s statements regarding the ... assault.” Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Palmieri v. Clark County
During the call, the informant provided the dispatcher with his name and ...continued identified citizen informant is presumed to be reliable") (quoting Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006)); Ewing ix City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding an identified witness "was a citizen witness, not an informant, and such witnesses are generally presumed reliable"); United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (observing that "ifihe courts have traditionally viewed information drawn from an ordinary witness or crime victim with considerably …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Palmieri v. Clark County
During the call, the informant provided the dispatcher with his name and ...continued identified citizen informant is presumed to be reliabla') (quoting Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006)); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding an identified witness "was a citizen witness, not an informant, and such witnesses are generally presumed reliable"); United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (observing that "[t]he courts have traditionally viewed information drawn from an ordinary witness or crime victim with considerably …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
PALMIERI VS. CLARK CO.
During the call, the informant provided the dispatcher with his name and ...continued identified citizen informant is presumed to be reliabla') (quoting Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006)); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding an identified witness "was a citizen witness, not an informant, and such witnesses are generally presumed reliable"); United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (observing that "[t]he courts have traditionally viewed information drawn from an ordinary witness or crime victim with considerably …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Manning
Warrants that rely on evidence provided by confidential informants are generally viewed with “skepticism and careful scruti *407 ny.” Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Richard Wesley v. Alison Campbell
The Shaw court examined Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1440-41 (11th Cir.1998); Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir.1990); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1456 (8th Cir.1987); and Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gomez v. Martin
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Nevertheless, we cannot agree with Mr. Gomez that if these facts had been included in Martin’s affidavit, they would have materially affected the probable cause analysis. “[T]he skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants ... is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim or ordinary citizen witness.” Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Barham v. Town of Greybull Wyoming
Cf. Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (10th Cir.1985); see also Messersehmidt v. Millender, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1245 , 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012) (“Where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner....”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sterling Construction Management, LLC v. Steadfast Insurance
Courts have “broad discretion in deciding whether to sever issues for trial.” Easton v. City of Boulder, Colo., 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Green v. Missouri
This is because information furnished by a victim is generally considered to be reliable, and the "skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants. . . is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim." Clay, 815 F.2d at 1168 (citing Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stoot v. City of Everett
The officer also interviewed the apartment manager, learning that Easton was a loner with few friends who “had been observed in the past staring at the children playing in the common area of the apartment complex.” Id. at 1444 (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stoot v. City of Everett
The officer also interviewed the apartment manager, learning that Easton was a loner with few friends who “had been observed in the past staring at the children playing in the common area of the apartment complex.” Id. at 1444 (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stoot v. City of Everett
The officer also interviewed the apartment manager, learning that Easton was a loner with few friends who “had been observed in the past staring at the children playing in the common area of the apartment complex.” Id. at 1444 (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Loy
See United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1581 (4th Cir.1993)(“Corroboration of apparently innocent details of an informant’s report tends to indicate that other aspects of the report are also correct.”); Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.1985)(“the skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants ... is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an ... ordinary citizen witness.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Munday v. Johnson
Moreover, “the skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants, sometimes anonymous, from the criminal milieu, is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim or ordinary citizen witness.” Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.1985).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Copening
Exercising the significant “skepticism and careful scrutiny” required in the anonymous-informant context, see Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.1985), we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, the anonymous caller’s tip, relayed by dispatch to the officers, bore “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.” J.L., 529 *1248 U.S. at 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Virginia Harmon, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Brandon Scott Harmon
v.
The Billings Bench Water Users Association and the City of Billings
v.
The Billings Bench Water Users Association and the City of Billings
84-4136.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Nov 22, 1985.
Published
Virginia HARMON, individually and as personal representative
of the Estate of Brandon Scott Harmon, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The BILLINGS BENCH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION and the City of
Billings, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 84-4136.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Nov. 22, 1985.
Donald W. Molloy, Anderson, Edwards & Molloy, Billings, Mont., for plaintiff-appellant.
Steven Harmon, Anderson Law Firm, Billings, Mont., for defendants-appellees.
ORDER
Before HUG, FARRIS, and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges.
[*~1441]1
Billings Bench Water Users Association brings an emergency motion urging us to withdraw and reconsider our published opinion of July 19, 1985, 765 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.1985), wherein we addressed a district court disposition granting summary judgment against the mother of a five-year-old who drowned in an irrigation ditch. We affirmed in part but reversed and remanded for trial on theories of attractive nuisance and negligence.
[*~1445]2
Two months after our opinion was filed, the Montana Supreme Court decided a case which cited our opinion and which abolished attractive nuisance with regard to artificial bodies of water such as irrigation ditches. Limberhand v. Big Ditch Company, et al., --- Mont. ----, 706 P.2d 491, 42 St.Rep. 1460 (decided September 26, 1985).
[*~1449]3
In Harmon we remanded on theories of both attractive nuisance and negligence. Limberhand abolishes attractive nuisance by subsuming it within negligence. The district court will follow the rule of law enunciated in Limberhand v. Big Ditch Company, et al., by the Supreme Court of Montana to the extent that it differs from the rule of law set forth in our opinion.
[*~1450]4
We deny the motion to withdraw the opinion.