Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
124 citation events (41 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Mancina v. McDermott (ohsd, 2022-03-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mancina v. McDermott
S.D. Ohio · 2022 · confidence medium
Assurance Co., 791 F.2d at 63).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Village Plaza Holdings, LLC (2×)
E.D. Mich. · 2020 · confidence medium
In Evans, a state court action had been filed against an attorney for malpractice. 791 F.2d at 62.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Historic Basket, LLC v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company
S.D. Ohio · 2020 · confidence medium
Assurance Co., 791 F.2d at 63.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Westfield Insurance v. Arnold
E.D. Ky. · 2016 · confidence medium
The Act “confers discretion on courts,; not rights on litigants,” and the “propriety of issuing a declaratory judgment may depend on equitable considerations.” American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 64 (6th Cir.1986)(citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 , 106 S.Ct. 423 , 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) PERSLEY v. Lee
E.D. Ky. · 2011 · confidence medium
Evans, 791 F.2d at 63.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance v. Creech
E.D. Ky. · 2006 · confidence medium
The Sixth Circuit has held that a state court civil action on indemnity issues is usually “a better and more effective remedy than a declaratory judgment action in federal court.” Combs Contracting, 236 F.Supp.2d at 746 (citing Allstate, 913 F.2d at 278 ; Manley, 791 F.2d at 462-63 ; American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir.1986); Northern Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Combs Contracting Inc. (2×)
E.D. Ky. · 2002 · confidence medium
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 791 F.2d 460, 462-63 (6th Cir.1986) (describing a indemnity action after conclusion of the state court trial as “a superior alternative remedy”); American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir.1986) (describing “a traditional indemnity action” as “a more appropriate means of enforcement”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Northern Insurance of New York v. Addison Products, Inc.
E.D. Mich. · 2001 · confidence medium
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 791 F.2d 460, 462-63 (6th Cir.1986) (describing a indemnity action after conclusion of the state court trial as “a superior alternative remedy”); American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir.1986) (describing “a traditional indemnity action” as “a more appropriate means of enforcement”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pickelman v. Michigan State Police
E.D. Mich. · 2000 · confidence medium
Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Roumph, 211 F.3d 964, 968 (6th Cir.2000); see Allstate Insurance Co., 913 F.2d 273, 277 ; American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986). 2.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Scottsdale Ins Co v. Roumph
6th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir. 1986).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States Fire Insurance v. City of Warren (4×) also: Cited "see"
E.D. Mich. · 2000 · confidence medium
As in American Home, “the only basis of jurisdiction here is diversity jurisdiction.” 791 F.2d at 63.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scottsdale Insurance v. Roumph
E.D. Mich. · 1998 · confidence medium
As the court stated in American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986), “We question the need for such declaratory judgments in federal court when the only question is one of state law and when there is no suggestion that the state court is not in a position to define its own law in a fair and impartial manner.” With regard to the third Grand Trunk factor — whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” of for a res judicata advantage — while it appears that there may have ben a race to the federal court, this is not…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Guaranty National Insurance Company v. Gary W. Cain Rosalie Cain Robert L. McClelland American Employers Insurance Co. Commercial Union Insurance Co. And Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
6th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Co. v. Mercier, 913 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir.1990); American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986); Manley, Bennett, McDonald v. St.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Empire Indemnity Insurance v. Specialized Foster Care Services, Inc.
N.D. Ohio · 1995 · confidence medium
Co. v. Mercier, 913 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir.1990); Green, 825 F.2d at 1063 ; American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986); Grand Trunk W.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Home Insurance v. Perlberger
E.D. Pa. · 1995 · confidence medium
See Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 237-40 (4th Cir.1992); American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986). 4 In Mitcheson , tenants sued their landlord in state court for injuries allegedly caused by lead exposure on his property, and the landlord’s insurer, after agreeing to defend its insured, filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court claiming that the lead poisoning was an “occurrence” that was not covered by the policy.
cited Cited as authority (rule) American Economy Insurance v. Williams
D. Idaho · 1992 · confidence medium
Id. at 63 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Omaha Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Comer Bernard Johnson, Comer Burkehart Johnson, Diane E. Cross, Corky L. Cross and Matthew Moss
6th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
We noted in that case that the insurer’s action was “certainly part of a race for res judicata." Id. at 62.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allstate Insurance Company v. Dawn Mercier
6th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
See Grand Trunk, 746 F.2d at 327 (criteria and factors applied and district court directed to dismiss the action); American Home Assurance Co., 791 F.2d at 64 (same); Manley, Bennett, McDonald & Co., 791 F.2d at 463 (same); Allstate Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allstate Insurance v. Mercier
6th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
See Grand Trunk, 746 F.2d at 327 (criteria and factors applied and district court directed to dismiss the action); American Home Assurance Co., 791 F.2d at 64 (same); Manley, Bennett, McDonald & Co., 791 F.2d at 463 (same); Allstate Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allstate Insurance v. Best
D.S.C. · 1990 · confidence medium
The propriety of federal declaratory relief has also been questioned where the only questions arise out of state substantive law and it is not suggested “that the state court is not in a position to define its own law in a fair and impartial manner.” Carey v. East Detroit Jaycees, Inc., 660 F.Supp. 1577, 1578 (E.D.Mich.1987) (quoting American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Flynn
E.D. Pa. · 1988 · confidence medium
In deciding whether a case is appropriate for declaratory relief, a court will consider: (1) whether a declaratory judgment would settle the controversy; (2) whether declaratory relief would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; (3) whether the declaratory action has been initiated “to provide an arena for a race for res judicata,” American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986); (4) whether declaratory relief would create friction between the state and federal courts and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction; and (5) whether an alterna…
cited Cited as authority (rule) 45 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1716, 46 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,911 J.E. Davidson v. United States Department of Energy
6th Cir. · 1988 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986) (reviewing DJA claim); Wayne State University v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 632-33 (6th Cir.1978) (reviewing APA claim).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. City of Bridgman
W.D. Mich. · 1987 · confidence medium
American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William Allan Wright v. Judge Olga S. Peers
6th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Paul Fire-Marine Insurance Co., 791 F.2d 460, 462 (6th Cir. 1986); American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 64 (6th Cir. 1986); Grand Trunk Western Railroad v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323 (6th Cir. 1984). 6 Therefore, we affirm because a declaratory judgment is appropriate in this case.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Manley, Bennett, McDonald & Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Defendant-Third-Party v. John S. Albright, Third-Party-Defendants
3rd Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Thus, regardless of the District Court’s action, where the Court of Appeals is of the opinion that the case is an inappropriate one for declaratory judgment, it “should decline to advise the parties as to the law and refuse to decide the issues presented.” Grand Trunk Western R.R. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 325-26 (6th Cir.1984) (declining to give declaratory judgment of indemnity issues where underlying actions in litigation in state court); American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986).
cited Cited "see" Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotchkiss
E.D. Mich. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
Id. (quotation and citation omitted); see American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986). 2.
discussed Cited "see" Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Unisys Corp.
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 64 (6th Cir.1986) ("Where complex factual issues are present and the action parallels a state court action arising from the same facts and where alternative remedies are available, declaratory judgment is inappropriate."). "[D]eclaratory judgment actions seeking an advance opinion on indemnity issues are seldom helpful in resolving an ongoing action in another court." Manley, Bennett, McDonald & Co. v. St.
cited Cited "see" United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co.
W.D. Mich. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61 (6th Cir.1986); Manley, Bennett, McDonald & Co. v. St.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cardinal Health, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA
S.D. Ohio · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence medium
In Roumph, the Sixth Circuit explained this fourth factor in a way helpful here: The district court, however, pointed to a factor that supports its decision not to proceed—that “there are no reported decisions in Michigan or elsewhere construing the language of [the] ‘sexual misconduct’ endorsement.” The district court concluded from this factor that it would be inappropriate “to preempt the right of the state court to rule on a previously undetermined question of state law.” Omaha Property & Casualty, 923 F.2d at 448; see also American Home Assurance 17 Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Beverly Roumph, Individually and as Next Friend of Lavina Roumph Lavina Roumph
6th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
We see no indication of an attempt to delay by the insurance carrier through the declaratory action in federal court; and a prompt declaration of policy coverage would surely “serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue.” It is hard to perceive of “an alternative remedy that is better or more effective.” The district court, however, pointed to a factor that supports its decision not to proceed — that “there are no reported deci *969 sions in Michigan or elsewhere construing the language of [the] ‘sexual misconduct’ endorsement.” The district court conclu…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Tricil Resources, Inc. v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Insurance Company
6th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61 (6th Cir.1986).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Cenker v. Cenker
E.D. Mich. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also American Home Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
American Home Assurance Company, Cross-Appellee
v.
William S. Evans Katherine D. Evans, and Nbd Ann Arbor, National Assoc. As Independent Personal Representative of the Estate of Dr. Charles Merle Dixon, Deceased, Cross-Appellants
84-1671.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
May 27, 1986.
791 F.2d 61
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

791 F.2d 61

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.
William S. EVANS; Katherine D. Evans, and NBD Ann Arbor,
National Assoc. as Independent Personal Representative of
the Estate of Dr. Charles Merle Dixon, deceased,
Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 84-1671, 84-1700.

United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 14, 1986.
Decided May 27, 1986.

John P. Jacobs (argued), Stanley A. Prokop, Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk, & Pedersen, P.C., Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee.

Robert J. Harris (argued), Charles W. Borgsdorf, Hooper, Hathway, Price, Beuche and Wallace, Ann Arbor, Mich., for defendants-appellees, cross-appellants.

Before LIVELY, Chief Judge, MERRITT and JONES, Circuit Judges.

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

[*~61]1

This declaratory judgment action, seeking a jury trial on disputed factual issues as well as a determination of legal issues, arises from a prior state court action against a lawyer, William S. Evans, alleging malpractice and dishonest conduct of a client's affairs. Because we find that declaratory judgment was improvidently granted, we dismiss.

2

Shortly before the state malpractice trial was to begin, Evans' insurer, American Home Assurance, filed the instant declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that Evans' conduct, the same conduct under litigation in state court, fell within the policy's "dishonesty" exclusion to coverage.

3

The complaint in the state action was filed on July 1, 1981. At that time American Home took the position, based on the allegations in the complaint, that there was no coverage and hence refused to defend. In February of 1982, however, the complaint was amended to include allegations of negligence. American Home then notified Evans' personal counsel that it had hired a firm to conduct the defense, subject to a reservation of American Home's right to withdraw at a later date should it determine that there was no coverage. After receiving this information Evans' personal counsel obtained an eight-month adjournment of the trial date until November 8, 1982. The counsel provided by American Home then took over Evans' state court defense.

4

In October of 1982, shortly before the state court trial was to commence, American Home filed this declaratory judgment action in federal court rather than the state court and petitioned the state court to have the malpractice action stayed pending a determination of the coverage issue. That motion was denied and the state court action commenced, producing a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $698,981.00 plus interest.

5

After the state court judgment was entered this case came before the District Court on motions for partial summary judgment as to American Home's right to invoke the dishonesty exclusion and pecuniary limits of the policy, and as to the calculation of interest, costs, etc. Judge Joiner granted some of these motions and denied others, 589 F.Supp. 1276, declaring American Home to be liable in part for indemnity and declaring damages to be $300,000 plus applicable interest and costs, for a total of $423,164. Because we believe this case to be an inappropriate one for declaratory judgment[1] we reverse and dismiss the case.

6

In Grand Trunk Western Railroad v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323 (6th Cir.1984), this court discussed the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201 et seq.,[2] and the standard of review applicable to a District Court's decision to render a declaratory judgment. In that opinion, we held that entertainment of a declaratory judgment action is discretionary with the trial court, but that that discretion is reviewable on a de novo basis by the Court of Appeals, so that "if we disagree with the District Court's reasons for rendering a declaratory judgment ... we should decline to advise the parties as to the law and refuse to decide the issues presented." 746 F.2d at 325-26. In deciding whether a case is appropriate for declaratory judgment, the principal criteria are (1) whether the judgment would settle the controversy; (2) whether the declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of "procedural fencing" or "to provide an arena for a race for res judicata"; (4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective. 746 F.2d at 326.

[*~62]7

In Grand Trunk the defendant in an Illinois state court action filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration against a codefendant that the codefendant must defend and indemnify Grand Trunk under an indemnification agreement. Although the District Court gave a ruling on the issue, we reviewed de novo the question of suitability for declaratory relief. We declined and dismissed because we saw the case as an effort to play off the state and federal courts against each other and as a race for res judicata. The same is true in this case. This case is even more suitable for declining jurisdiction than Grand Trunk. Here complicated factual issues are raised on which the parties seek a jury trial, as well as a legal issue regarding the construction of the indemnification contract and an issue regarding Michigan law governing conflict of interest by insurance lawyers representing insureds under a reservation of rights.

8

This case is governed by our reasoning in Grand Trunk. Because of the multiple complex disputed factual issues in the case (for example, the questions of whether an actual conflict of interest existed as to the counsel hired for Evans by American Home and whether the jury verdict in the lengthy state trial was based on intentional wrongdoing rather than negligence), we think it unlikely that declaratory judgment would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal issues involved. And because the ordinary procedure for determining such questions is an action in indemnity for recovery of the policy proceeds,[3] it appears likely that this action is, if not "procedural fencing," certainly part of a race for res judicata. The availability of a traditional indemnity action as a more appropriate means of enforcement also argues against the grant of declaratory judgment in this case. Moreover, the only basis of jurisdiction here is diversity jurisdiction. We question the need for federal courts to issue declaratory judgments in such cases where a state court has already accepted jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit. We also question the need for such declaratory judgments in federal courts when the only question is one of state law and when there is no suggestion that the state court is not in a position to define its own law in a fair and impartial manner.

[*~63]9

The Declaratory Judgment Act allows the federal courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, to depart from their usual practice of refusing to issue advisory opinions. Where complex factual issues are present and the action parallels a state court action arising from the same facts and where alternative remedies are available, declaratory judgment is inappropriate. See Grand Trunk, supra, 746 F.2d at 326; City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.1975); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 435 (7th Cir.1967); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 490 F.2d 536 (3d Cir.1974). See also Green v. Mansour, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 423, 428; 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985) (Declaratory Judgment Act confers discretion on courts, not right on litigants so that "[t]he propriety of issuing a declaratory judgment may depend on equitable considerations ... and is also 'informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power'."). Accordingly, the District Court's order granting declaratory relief is vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for declaratory judgment.

1

Although there is some ambiguous language in Judge Joiner's opinion which might be read as an entry of a money judgment susceptible to levy, such a reading would make no sense in light of the case as a whole. Furthermore, the parties have consistently treated this as a pure declaratory judgment action at all stages in their briefs, at oral argument, and below. We accept that characterization

2

The Act provides that except in certain cases a federal court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party." Id

3

An action of this sort would apparently still be necessary even after a grant of declaratory judgment if the insurance company refuses to indemnify its insured or his assignee