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Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987
2006
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Maxwell v. Pacione
those hours may be reduced by the court where documentation of the hours is 16 inadequate.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Erickson Productions Inc v. Kraig R Kast
the district court is in the best position to determine in the first instance the number of 13 hours reasonably expended in furtherance of the successful aspects of a litigation and the amount 14 which would reasonably compensate the attorney.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
JAMES SHAYLER V. 1310 PCH, LLC
the district court is in the best position to determine in the first instance the number of hours reasonably expended in furtherance of the successful aspects of a litigation and the amount which would reasonably compensate the attorney.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Rivera v. Crema Coffee Company LLC
in 3 determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate prevailing in 4 the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and 5 reputation.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ines Ruiz Rios, et al. v. Lux Interior and Renovation LLC, et al.
In determining the reasonably hourly rate, the 10 Court is not guided by the hours charged by the prevailing party's attorney but is rather 11 “guided by the rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys 12 of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 13 F.2d 1205 , 1210–11 (9th Cir. 1986), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 808 F.2d 1373 14 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 , 896 n.11 (1984)). 15 The number of hours considered in the Lodestar calculus is not limited to those 16 hours expended up to…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Daniel Alvarez v. Los Angeles County et al.
Hours Expended 4 In analyzing the reasonableness of hours expended, the Court must examine 5 detailed time records to determine whether the hours claimed are adequately 6 documented and whether any of them are unnecessary, duplicative, or excessive. 7 Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hensley 8 v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 433–34 (1983)), op. am. on denial of reh’g, 808 F.2d 1373 9 (9th Cir. 1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. 12 N Park Victoria LLC
In determining the hourly rate, the Court must 10 “consider[] the experience, skill and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” Chalmers v. Los 11 Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 808 F.2d 1373 12 (9th Cir. 1987). 13 In the instant case, Plaintiff requests $4,640.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs, including: (1) 14 $650.00 in attorney’s fees for attorney Mark Potter; (2) $1,170.00 in attorney’s fees for attorney 15 Russell Handy; (3) $900 in attorney’s fees for attorney Amanda Seabock; (4) $1,040 in attorney’s 16 fees for atto…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Personal Web Technologies, LLC
“This calculation 19 provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.” 20 Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 ). 21 The reasonable hourly rate is determined by “the rate prevailing in the community for similar 22 work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of 23 Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 24 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886 , 895 n.11 (1984)).
discussed
Cited "see"
PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC v. Twitch Interactive, Inc.
See Reply 4–5. 4 In awarding fees, a reasonable hourly rate is determined by “the rate prevailing in the 5 community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and 6 reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205 , 1210–11 (9th Cir. 1986), amended 7 on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886 , 895 n.11 8 (1984)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Personal Web Technologies, LLC
See Reply 4–5. 4 In awarding fees, a reasonable hourly rate is determined by “the rate prevailing in the 5 community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and 6 reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205 , 1210–11 (9th Cir. 1986), amended 7 on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886 , 895 n.11 8 (1984)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Cordwell v. Celebrity Yacht Group LLC
See Chalmers City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on denial of reh'g, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). (“Those hours may be reduced by the court where documentation of the hours is inadequate; if the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; [or] if the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.”).
cited
Cited "see"
Josue Romero v. Provide Commerce, Inc.
See id. at 942 (quoting McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Medina v. Metropolitan Interpreters & Translators, Inc.
See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir.1986), amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987). , In large part, Metropolitan does not challenge the total amount of time spent by Plaintiffs’ counsel in. prosecuting this action.
discussed
Cited "see"
Ingram v. Oroudjian
See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987) (“The district court is in the best position to determine in the first instance the number of hours reasonably expended in furtherance of the successful aspects of a litigation and the amount which would reasonably compensate the attorney.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Bloom v. City of Scottsdale
See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir.1985) (plaintiff who testified as to anguish, embarrassment, anxiety and humiliation established compensable psychological harm) amended, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited "see"
Ronald P. Brady, an Individual Robert W. Brady, an Individual Karl R. Schlak, an Individual Terrain, Inc., a North Dakota Corporation Erling O. Schlak, an Individual Gerner, Inc., a North Dakota Corporation Henry Jessen, an Individual Evelyn Jessen, an Individual Triple J Farms, a Wyoming Corporation Allen D. Larson, an Individual Vincent Lombardo, an Individual v. Bennett Little, an Individual Bencal, Inc., a California Corporation Harold O. Wright, an Individual Dairy Fresh Products Co., a California Corporation Demler Farms, Inc., a California Corporation, Ronald P. Brady v. Bennett Little, an Individual, and Harold O. Wright, Vito Asaro, an Individual, Counter-Claimant-Appellee v. Bennett Little, an Individual, Counter-Defendants, and Harold O. Wright, an Individual, Counter-Defendant-Appellant. Ronald P. Brady, an Individual Robert W. Brady, an Individual Karl R. Schlak, an Individual Terrain, Inc., a North Dakota Corporation Erling O. Schlak, an Individual Gerner, Inc., a North Dakota Corporation Henry Jessen, an Individual Evelyn Jessen, an Individual Triple J Farms, a Wyoming Corporation Allen D. Larson, an Individual Vincent Lombardo, an Individual v. Bennett Little, an Individual Bencal, Inc., a California Corporation Harold O. Wright, an Individual Dairy Fresh Products Co., a California Corporation Demler Farms, Inc., a California Corporation
See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1213 (9th Cir.1986), amended, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987). 16 The investors also argue that the district court erred by denying their request for prejudgment interest.
cited
Cited "see"
Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, Cal.
See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir.1986), modified, 808 F.2d 1373 (1987).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In re: West Coast Real Estate & Mortgage Inc.
See also Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 23 1205, 1213 (9th Cir. 1986), amended by 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 24 1987) (vacating fee award when the order contained no 25 explanation of how the court arrived at the award).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Lucas v. White
See also id. at 1382, n. 6 (fact that Bivens damages claims were "extinguished” did not significantly reduce fees to which plaintiffs were entitled under EAJA because plaintiffs' Bivens theory was “a subsidiary part of their case”). 4 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Julie CHALMERS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant
82-6112, 83-6092 and 83-6535.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Feb 2, 1987.
Marcia Haber Kamine, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for the defendant-appellant., John B. Murdock, Santa Monica, Gal., for the plaintiff-appellee.
Wallace, Tang, Skopil.
Cited by 40 opinions | Published
Citer courts: N.D. California (2) · Ninth Circuit (1)
ORDER
The opinion filed August 15, 1986, published at 796 F.2d 1205, is amended as follows:
At page 1212, footnote 4 is amended to read as follows:
There is much confusion in the case law concerning contingent fees and contingent adjustments. See, e.g., LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (discussing circumstances justifying enhanced awards under Equal Access for Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 841 n. 16 (9th Cir.1982) (an enhanced fee due to the contingent nature of a fee arrangement may be justified; however, award should not automatically be increased because of risks associated with contingent fee arrangement); Hamner v. Rios, 769 F.2d at 1407 (the existence of a contingent fee arrangement is an element to consider in analyzing a fee petition); Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d at 1185 n. 3 (same). Despite the confusion in the case law, it should be noted that contingent adjustments are not the same as a contingency fee arrangement. Contingency fee arrangements, like the one at issue in this case, are arrangements where an attorney’s fee is based on a percentage of the amount recovered by his client. Contingency adjustments are a percentage increase over and above the amount obtained by multiplying hours expended by hourly rate; contingency adjustments are specifically designed to reflect the risk that no fee may be obtained. Blum, 465 U.S. at 903 n. *, 104 S.Ct. at 1551 n. * (Brennan, J., concurring). In discussing possible bases for an enhanced award, the Supreme Court has made reference to contingent adjustments, not contingent fee contracts. Chalmers’ counsel therefore misconstrued the significance of his contingent fee arrangement with his client when he argues that this arrangement provides an independent rationale for application of a multiplier.
The panel constituted above has voted to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Fed.R.App.P. 35(b).
The petition for rehearing is denied, and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.