Wentz v. Maryland Cas. Co., 869 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Wentz v. Maryland Cas. Co., 869 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1989).
Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 88-5028Mar 15, 1989

Wentz v. Maryland Cas. Co.

Quick Summary

An employee who opposes age discrimination need not prove the discrimination occurred, only a good faith, reasonable belief that it was unlawful, to sustain an ADEA retaliation claim.

An employee sued his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging he was discharged for complaining about age-related mistreatment and for filing an EEOC charge. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, reasoning that because the age discrimination claim failed, the retaliation claim necessarily failed as well. The question presented is whether an employee may pursue retaliation despite losing the underlying discrimination claim. The court holds that the employee need not prove the conduct he opposed was actually discriminatory, only that he held a good faith, reasonable belief it was unlawful. The court reverses in part and remands on the complaint-based retaliation theory, affirms as to the EEOC-filing theory and the state law claims.

99 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Cited for
At page 1154Determining jurisdiction for ADEA retaliation claims31 citing cases“grew out of the discrimination charge he filed with the eeoc.”3 citing courts quote it · 27 listed here
  • Mischelle Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, 686 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2012).published 3 cites
    Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154 (8th Cir.1989), we have subsequently recognized that “retaliation claims are not reasonably related to underlying discrimination claims.” Wedow, 442 F.3d at 672 -73 (quoting Duncan v. Delta Consol.
  • Romero-Ostolaza v. Ridge, 370 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D.D.C. 2005).published
    Most courts before Morgan had “determined that a plaintiff is not required to exhaust ... administrative remedies with respect to claims of retaliation that occurred after the filing of an administrative complaint.” Marshall v. James, 276…
  • Cherry v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (E.D. Mo. 2003).published
    GTE Directories Corp., 61 F.3d 588 (8th Cir.1995) (considering *1099 retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act) (citing Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (8th Cir.1989)).
  • Marano v. Aircraft Braking Sys., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Ohio 2001).published
    To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the ADEA, Maraño must show that: “(1) he engaged in conduct protected under the ADEA; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action at the time of, or after, the protect…
  • Michael Sherman v. Marvin T. Runyon, Jr., 235 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2000).published 4 cites
    (retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act)
  • Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 1997).published 2 cites
    (retaliation claims brought under ADEA treated similarly to those brought under Title VII)
  • Melvin Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor, 90 F.3d 285 (8th Cir. 1996).published 2 cites
    (analogizing Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims and citing Womack as providing applicable analytical framework)
  • William Earl Evans v. Kansas City, 65 F.3d 98 (8th Cir. 1995).published
    Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (8th Cir.1989); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979 , 101 S.Ct. 1513 , 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981).
  • Wiehoff v. GTE Directories Corp., 61 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1995).published
    Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (8th Cir.1989); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn.1983).
  • O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1995).published 2 cites
    Id. at 1175 (citing Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154 (8th Cir.1989)).
Show 17 more citing cases
  • Hargett v. Valley Fed. Sav. Bank, 60 F.3d 754 (11th Cir. 1995).published 2 cites
    Id. at 1154.
  • Roland T. Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616 (10th Cir. 1994).published
    A retaliation claim does not require that the plaintiff prevail on the underlying claim of discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (d) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee who “has made a charge ... under this chap…
  • O'BRYAN v. KTIV Television, 868 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Iowa 1994).published
    Finally, KTIV seeks summary judgment on O’Bryan’s claims for retaliatory discharge. 31 “Proving retaliation claims under the ADEA follows the same general approach taken to similar claims brought under Title VII of thé Civil Rights Act of…
  • Evans v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Mo., 861 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Mo. 1994).published 2 cites
    Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (8th Cir.1989); McDaniel v. Temple Independent School Dist., 770 F.2d 1340, 1346 (5th Cir.1985).
  • Glass v. IDS Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Minn. 1991).published 2 cites
    Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154 (8th Cir.1989).
  • Cobb v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 1457 (E.D. Mo. 1990).published 2 cites
    Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (8th Cir.1989); McDaniel v. Temple Independent School Dist., 770 F.2d 1340, 1346 (5th Cir.1985).
  • Evans v. Pugh, 902 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1990).published 2 cites
    “(1) he engaged in conduct protected under the ADEA; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action at the time of, or after, the protected conduct occurred; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected ac…”
  • Mary Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2000).published 6 cites
    See id. at 1155 .
  • M. Margaret ADAMS v. WEST Publ'g Co., 25 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994).published
    (elements of prima facie case of retaliation)
  • Evans v. U of a Bd. of Trs., 715 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Ark. 1989).published
    See Wentz v. Maryland Casualty, Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (8th Cir.1989).
  • Shirley a. Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218 (8th Cir. 1994).published
    E.g., Anderson v. Block, 807 F.2d 145, 148 (8th Cir.1986) (citing Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir.1981)); see also Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154 (8th Cir.1989) (ADEA).
  • Adams v. West Publ'g Co., 812 F. Supp. 925 (D. Minn. 1993).published
    (the court analyzes ADEA retaliation claims in the same manner in which it analyzes claims brought under Title VII)
  • Robert Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1992).published
    (elements of the ADEA)
  • Margaret Nealon v. Michael P.W. Stone, 958 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1992).published
    (same; retaliation claim cognizable even if discrimination claim dismissed, and good faith reasonable belief that underlying challenged action violated law sufficient to establish prima facie case)
  • Darlene Berg v. Gregory Bruce Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 601., 112 F.3d 322 (8th Cir. 1997).published
  • Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of Corr., 153 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 1998).published
  • Graham v. Bryce Corp., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (E.D. Ark. 2004).published
At page 1155Defining protected activity under anti-discrimination laws10 citing cases“demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged action violated the law.”4 citing courts quote it
  • Michael Sherman v. Marvin T. Runyon, Jr., 235 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2000).published 4 cites
    See Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (8th Cir.1999) (discriminatory discharge under the Americans with Disabilities Act), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818 , 120 S.Ct. 59 , 145 L.Ed.2d 51 (1999); Wentz v. Maryland Casualty…
  • Smith v. DataCard Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Minn. 1998).published
    “Protected activity ‘includes opposing ongoing discriminatory treatment.’” Wiehoff, 61 F.3d at 598 (quoting Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir.1989)).
  • Reginelli v. Motion Indus., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Ark. 1997).published
    Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir.1989).
  • Melvin Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor, 90 F.3d 285 (8th Cir. 1996).published 2 cites
    Racial motivation was not an element of plaintiff's burden of proof. 9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his [or her] employees ... because he [or she] h…
  • Walker-Swinton v. Philander Smith Coll., No. 4:18-cv-00886 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2021).
    See Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1989).
  • Bumpass v. Verizon Wireless, No. 5:16-cv-00106 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 27, 2019).
    See Wentz 34 v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1989).
  • Ross v. Advance Am. Cash Advance Centers, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Ark. 2009).published
    See Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir.1989).
  • Lora Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2000).published 2 cites
    See Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1989).
  • Darrell KEMPCKE, Plaintiff—Appellant v. MONSANTO Co., Defendant—Appellee, 132 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 1998).published
  • Younie v. City of Hartley, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Iowa 2015).published
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Walter WENTZ
v.
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, a Maryland corporation, a division of American General Company, Inc.
No. 88-5028.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Mar 15, 1989.
Published opinion
C. Scott Massie, Wayzata, Minn., for appellant., Mary E. Stumo, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Arnold, Fagg, Wollman.
Cited by 38 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Walter Wentz sued his former employer, Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland), based on federal and state law claims stemming from Wentz’ discharge by Maryland. The district court granted summary judgment for Maryland, and Wentz appeals. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

In June 1980 Maryland hired Wentz, then age fifty-nine, as an insurance claims representative for its Milwaukee, Wisconsin, office. In 1982 Wentz accepted a promotion and permanent transfer to Maryland’s Minneapolis, Minnesota, office. During the following year, Maryland twice placed Wentz on probation for job performance problems. In December 1983 Wentz’ supervisors met to discuss Wentz’ deteriorating performance, and they considered demoting him.

On February 9, 1984, Wentz complained to the Minneapolis office manager that his supervisors were disrespectful to him, harassed him, and treated him differently[*1154] from younger employees. Wentz also told the manager that he had discussed his situation with an attorney, who had advised him to file an age discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC).

On February 15, 1984, Wentz filed an EEOC age discrimination charge against Maryland. The next day Maryland discharged Wentz, who was then sixty-two years old. During a staff meeting and in response to an employment agency’s later inquiry, Maryland identified the reason for Wentz’ discharge as the inability to perform his assigned job. Wentz was eveh-tually replaced by a younger employee.

Wentz then filed this action against Maryland claiming, among other things, age discrimination and retaliatory discharge in violation of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (the ADEA). Wentz also asserted breach of an oral employment contract and defamation under state law. The district court concluded Maryland had discharged Wentz for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (substandard work performance) that was not a pretext for discriminating against Wentz because of his age. On the strength of that ruling, the court also rejected Wentz’ retaliation claim. In addition, the district court determined Wentz had failed to establish essential elements of his state law causes of action. The court thus granted Maryland’s motion for summary judgment on all of Wentz’ claims.

Initially, Maryland argues we do not have jurisdiction to consider Wentz’ retaliation claim because he did not include a retaliation claim in the charge he filed with the EEOC. Wentz’ ADEA claims are cognizable, however, if the allegations in the judicial complaint are " 'like or reasonably related to’ ” the timely filed administrative charges. Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir.1988) (quoted citation omitted); see also id. at 545 n. 2; Anderson v. Block, 807 F.2d 145, 148 (8th Cir.1986) (Title VII). In this case, we conclude Wentz’ retaliation claim grew out of the discrimination charge he filed with the EEOC and, thus, is properly before this court.

On appeal, Wentz does not challenge the ruling against him on the merits of his age discrimination claim. He argues the district court nevertheless committed error in ruling that because Wentz had not prevailed on his age discrimination claim, he necessarily could not prevail on the retaliation claim. We find Wentz’ argument persuasive.

Wentz’ retaliation claim is based on his contentions that Maryland discharged him: (1) because he complained to his office manager about discriminatory treatment related to his age; and (2) because he filed a discrimination charge against Maryland with the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). With regard to Wentz’ first contention, the district court stated:

The [cjourt finds that Wentz did not engage in protected opposition to age discrimination in light of its ruling above that Maryland did not discriminate against Wentz on the basis of age. While Wentz’[ ] complaint may have been a legitimate reaction to allegedly rude conduct by [a supervisor], it could not constitute justifiable opposition to age discrimination, as Wentz was criticized and ultimately terminated because of his poor work performance, and not because of his age.

Wentz v. Maryland Casualty Co., No. 4-87-195, slip op. at 8 (D.Minn. Dec. 3, 1987) (emphasis added). Concerning Wentz’ second contention, the district court held Maryland had not retaliated against Wentz in light of the undisputed fact Wentz’ supervisors were unaware at the time of his discharge that Wentz had actually filed an administrative charge.

Proving retaliation claims under the ADEA follows the same general approach taken to similar claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir.1988). To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge in violation of the ADEA, Wentz must show: (1) he engaged in conduct protected under the ADEA; (2)[*1155] he was subjected to an adverse employment action at the time of, or after, the protected conduct occurred; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See id.; see also Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir.1980) (Title VII claim for retaliatory discharge), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981). Conduct protected under the ADEA includes opposing ongoing discriminatory treatment as well as participating in an ADEA proceeding by filing a formal charge with the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).

Contrary to the district court’s ruling, however, “[t]o prove that he engaged in protected activity, [Wentz] need not establish that the conduct he opposed was in fact [discriminatory].” Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir.1988) (race discrimination under Title VII); see Davis v. State Univ., 802 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir.1986) (age discrimination under Title VII); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir.1981) (race discrimination under Title VII), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976, 102 S.Ct. 1485, 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982). Instead, he must demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged action violated the law. Manoharan, 842 F.2d at 593; Sisco, 655 F.2d at 150.

We believe Wentz is not precluded as a matter of law from pursuing a retaliation claim even though his discrimination claim ultimately was unsuccessful. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings on Wentz’ retaliation claim. In so doing, we do not preclude summary judgment proceedings on whether Wentz had a good faith, reasonable belief that he was discharged for engaging in protected activity.

Our remand also is limited in one respect. We agree with the district court’s ruling on the aspect of Wentz’ retaliation claim based on Maryland’s reaction to his EEOC filing. Thus, on remand, Wentz may proceed on his retaliation claim only insofar as it relates to his contention that Maryland discharged him for opposing discriminatory treatment based on his age.

Finally, we have carefully reviewed Wentz’ arguments regarding his disputed state law claims for breach of an oral employment contract and defamation. Having done so, we do not disagree with the district court’s disposition of those claims, and we affirm the court’s decision to that extent.

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Concurrence

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge,

concurring.

I write separately only to emphasize that on remand Wentz must, in addition to establishing that he had a good faith, reasonable belief that he was discharged for engaging in protected activity, establish that Maryland’s relatiatory motive (assuming that Wentz can prove that it had one) was a “but for” cause of the adverse employment decision. See Davis v. State University of New York, 802 F.2d 638, 644-45 (2d Cir.1986) (Newman, J., concurring); Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1260 (2d Cir.1987) (panel statement on rehearing); Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 594-95 (2d Cir.1988).