green
Positive treatment
7.6 score
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990
2008
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Oglesby v. Smith
(Doc.1, p. 1.) To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert a separate claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, it fails as a matter of law as “courts must analyze claims of wrongful arrest . . . ‘under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.’” Hamm v. Powell, 893 F.2d 293, 294 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 273– 74 (1994) (plaintiff could not assert Fourteenth Amendment claim where at-issue conduct involved “pretrial deprivations of liberty” as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Howard v. City of Demopolis
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 , 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (holding that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process’ approach.”) (italics in original); Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 737 (11th Cir.2010) ("The Fourth Amendment’s [right to] freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures encompas…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Childress v. Walker
Indeed, “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Battista v. Lamberti, 571 F.Supp.2d 1286 , 1314 n. 2 (S.D.Fla. 2008); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994); Hamm v. Powell, 893 F.2d 293, 294 (11th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that false arrest claims under § 1983 are analyzed solely as unreasonable seizure claims under…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. Wright
See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994); Hamm v. Powell, 893 F.2d 293, 294 (11th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bailey v. Wictzack
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
That part of the opinion discussing official immunity was later stricken by the panel, however, on a petition for rehearing, as not necessary to disposition of the appeal. 893 F.2d at 294. 5 .As respondent notes, the governor of Florida may fill any vacancy in any state or county office or suspend any state or county officer for failing to perform his or her official duties or commission of a felony.
cited
Cited "see"
Brescher v. Pirez
See Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766 *374 (11th Cir.1989), modified on other grounds on reh'g in part, 893 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990).
cited
Cited "see"
Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County
See Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 770-71 (11th Cir.1989), aff'd on reh'g, 893 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.1990).
cited
Cited "see"
Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County
See Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 770-71 (11th Cir.1989), aff'd on reh’g, 893 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
Adams v. Lindsey
(2×)
See Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 771 (11th Cir.1989), modified on rehearing, 893 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Hamm v. Norred, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Fils v. City of Aventura
See, e.g., Hamm v. Powell, 893 F.2d 293, 294 (11th Cir.1990) ("courts must analyze claims of wrongful arrest and force under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard.”) (quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Battiste v. Lamberti
See, e.g., Hamm v. Powell, 893 F.2d 293 , 294 (11th Cir.1990) (“[Ujnder [Graham v. Connor ], the Supreme Court made clear that ... courts must analyze claims of wrongful arrest and force ‘under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.’ ") (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 387 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 ); Brandenburg v. Housing Auth. of Irvine, 253 F.3d 891, 900 (6th Cir.2001) (affirming summary judgment on substantive due process claim as being dúplica-tive of First Amendment retaliation claim).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Dowdell v. Chapman
However, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Eleventh Circuit have held that all claims “involving allegations of the use of excessive force in an arrest, an investigatory stop, or any other seizure, should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment” rather than under the substantive due process standard of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 381 (11th Cir.1996) (summarizing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)); see also Hamm v. Powell, 893 F.2d 293, 294 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 *5…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jay PALMER, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BRG OF GEORGIA, INC., a Georgia Corporation, D/B/A Bar/Bri, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
v.
BRG OF GEORGIA, INC., a Georgia Corporation, D/B/A Bar/Bri, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
87-8804.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jan 29, 1990.
John C. Butters, Atlanta, Ga., James Ponsoldt, Athens, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants., Trammell Newton, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Kevin E. Grady, Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
, Clark, Fitzpatrick, Hatchett.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS OF REHEARING IN BANC
Before HATCHETT and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and FITZPATRICK * , District Judge. BY THE COURT.Our opinion reported at 874 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir.1989) is amended by adding the following language on page 1424, right column, following the citation to Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 89 S.Ct. 927, 22 L.Ed.2d 148 (1969).
We agree with the district court that the modified agreement (1982) is not a market allocation agreement to which per se liability applies. First, the agreement is not a “naked agreement” between competitors to allocate the market. Second, HBJ and BRG are not horizontal competitors. HBJ’s affidavit states that it is no longer a competitor in the Georgia market. The appellants have failed to produce evidence to the contrary. In the absence of evidence other than the affidavit on this issue, we cannot conclude that HBJ is doing business in Georgia.
In all other respects, the opinion is reissued. Judge Clark adheres to his dissent.
The petitions for rehearing are denied and no member of this panel nor other judge in regular active service on the court having requested that the court be polled on rehearing in banc (Rule 35, Fed.R. App.P.; 11th Cir.R. 35-5) the suggestions of rehearing in banc are denied.