Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the running of the ninety-day limitations period under rule 25(a)(1) is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party's death.”
103 citation events (73 in the last 25 years) across 41 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: West v. Bam! Pizza Management, Inc. (nmd, 2025-03-19) · Strongest negative: Adams v. Dish Network LLC (nmd, 2023-08-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Adams v. Dish Network LLC
D.N.M. · 2023 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the ninety-day limitation period does not start running until the non-party personal representative of the decedent’s estate is served). 4 prejudice[d]” if the motion for extension of time is granted because they are going to be unable to depose or observe Mr. Dillon.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) West v. Bam! Pizza Management, Inc.
D.N.M. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the service required by rule 25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate, must be service pursuant to fed. r. civ. p. 4
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Mid-Century Insurance Company v. American Legion Post 25 (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Colo. · 2021 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ecause the personal representative of decedent's estate did not receive service of any purported suggestion of death, the ninety-day limitations period did not begin to run.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Burgos-Yantín v. Municipality of Díaz (2×) also: Cited "see"
D.P.R. · 2010 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the running of the ninety-day limitations period under rule 25(a)(1) is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party's death.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Inglis v. Buena Vista University
N.D. Iowa · 2002 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the service required by rule 25(a)(1) on non-parties, specifically 1030 the successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate, must be served pursuant to fed.r.civ.p. 4
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Brian Barlow v. George Ground, Officer 9129 L.O. Oberlies, Officer 1706 A. Tucker, Officer 9363 Ray Shay, Officer 3269 (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
9th Cir. · 1994 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the service required by rule 25(a)(1) on non-parties, specifically-the successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate, must be served pursuant to fed.r.civ.p. 4
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joshua Duane Butler v. Kevin Branscum, in his individual capacity
E.D. Okla. · 2026 · confidence medium
Notably, however, there is no indication on the docket in this case that service of a statement noting Mr. Butler’s death was ever made upon his successor(s) or representative. “[T]he service required by Rule 25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party’s estate, must be service pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.” Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gale v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
D.N.M. · 2025 · confidence medium
Second, the “suggestion of death must be served in accordance with Rule 25(a)(1).”1 Id. at 837.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Benavides v. Coca-Cola Southwest Beverages LLC
S.D. Tex. · 2024 · confidence medium
Additionally, the Court gives notice that upon proper proof of service of the suggestion of death on the personal representative of decedent-plaintiff’s estate or other proper party, the 90 day Rule 25 deadline will commence. 11 Id. (citing Fariss, 769 F.2d at 962 (“In some instances, it may prove more difficult to determine whom to serve, but it is generally appropriate to require the serving party to shoulder that burden, rather than permitting the absence of notice to decedent's representative to lead to forfeiture of the action.”)). 12 Id. (citing Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trout v. United Parcel Service Inc.
W.D. Tex. · 2024 · confidence medium
Counsel’s construction would open the door to a tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden of locating the representative of the estate within 90 days.”). 7 See Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (“While service of a suggestion of death on counsel will satisfy the requirements of Rule 25(a)(1) for service of parties to the litigation, the service required by Rule 25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party’s estate, must be service pursuant to Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marcus v. American Contract Bridge League
1st Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
See Silas, 55 F.4th at 876; Sampson v. ASC Indus., 780 F.3d 679, 681-82 (5th Cir. 2015); Atkins v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. - 18 - 2008); Barlow, 39 F.3d at 234 ; Gilmore v. Lockard, 936 F.3d 857 , 866 (9th Cir. 2019); Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990); Bass v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45 , 50 n.12 (3d Cir. 1989); Farris v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 , 962 (4th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. Chin
D. Kan. · 2023 · confidence medium
P. 25(a)(3). 6 See Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (“While service of a suggestion of death on counsel will satisfy the requirement of Rule 25(a)(1) for service of parties to the litigation, the service required by Rule 25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate, must be served pursuant to Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Klein v. Jameson
D. Utah · 2023 · confidence medium
Since then, “the Receiver has filed an action [in state court] to appoint a personal representative” to Mr. Jameson’s estate.20 14 Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 1990). 15 June Status Report 2. 16 October Status Report 1. 17 Grandbouche, 913 F.2d at 836–37. 18 Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Yaple v. Jakel Trucking LLC
D. Kan. · 2022 · confidence medium
P. 25(a)(3); Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990). 5 See Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hafen v. Wade (3×)
D. Utah · 2022 · confidence medium
Utah Nov. 19, 2020) (“It is well-settled in the Tenth Circuit that notice of a Rule 25 motion to substitute must be served on ‘the successors or representatives of the deceased parties’ estate’ pursuant to Rule 4, not on the deceased’s former or current counsel.” (quoting Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990))). 10 ECF No. 41 at 3. 11 Red Lion Renewables, LLC v. Haff, No. 5-19-CV-01113-DAE, 2020 WL 13199006 , at *1 (W.D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kotler v. Jubert
2d Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Recall that, in Unicorn Tales, we held that a “party is given 90 days from the time when it learns from 14 See Sampson v. ASC Indus., 780 F.3d 679, 682-83 (5th Cir. 2015) (deceased plaintiff’s personal representative attempting to revive case because she did not receive personal service of the statement of death); Atkins v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 (4th Cir. 1985) (same).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Premier Sleep Solutions v. Sound Sleep Medical
D. Utah · 2020 · confidence medium
Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bolus v. Carnicella, Esquire
M.D. Penn. · 2020 · confidence medium
The Tenth Circuit holds that “[m]ere reference to a party’s death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution.” Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Kaldawy v. Gold Serv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Quinlivan v. Saul
E.D. Wash. · 2019 · confidence medium
First, it is not captioned as a suggestion of 13 death and the “mere reference to a party’s death in court proceedings or pleadings 14 is not sufficient.” Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 1990). 15 More importantly, the Motion’s intended purpose is not to alert the decedent’s 16 successor or representative “ ‘to the consequences of death to a pending suit, 17 signaling the need for action to preserve the claim if so desired.’ ” Barlow, 39 F.3d 18 at 233 (quoting Fariss, 769 F.2d at 962 ). 19 Even if the Motion were construed as a suggestion of death, it is …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hoffman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
Fed. Cl. · 2019 · confidence medium
Id. at 3– 4 (citing Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990); Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir. 1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) KOB Inc. v. Brand (In re Brand)
Bankr. C.D. Cal. · 2016 · confidence medium
Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir.1990) (“The running of the ninety-day limitations period under Rule 25(a)(1) is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party’s death.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keva Sampson v. ASC Industries
5th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that even though the attorney for the decedent’s estate was noticed, the successor or representatives of the deceased-party’s estate were required to be noticed as well). *682 In Atkins v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 869 (7th Cir.2008), a case with similar facts as those of the instant appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that a notice of death filed by a deceased-plaintiffs attorney but not served on the deceased-plaintiffs estate did not suffice to start the ninety-day clock.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wardell Giles v. Gary Campbell (2×) also: Cited "see"
3rd Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Barlow, 39 F.3d at 233-34 (”[W]e hold that the 90 day period provided by Rule 25(a)(1) will not be triggered against Barlow’s estate until the appropriate representative of the estate is served a suggestion of death in the manner provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.”); Grandbouche, 913 F.2d at 836-37 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that service of the suggestion of death on counsel for the deceased plaintiff was insufficient because Rule 25 required personal service on the estate, as a nonparty, and so the ninety-day limit in Rule 25(a)(3) had not begun to run); Rende v. Kay, 415 …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Butler v. Anderson (In Re C.R. Stone Concrete Contractors, Inc.)
Bankr. D. Mass. · 2011 · confidence medium
Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 1990). 58 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Timeless Investments, Inc.
E.D. Cal. · 2010 · confidence medium
The 90 day time period is not triggered “unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party’s death,” and the “mere reference to a party’s death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient....” Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir.1990); Colon, 2009 U.S. Dist.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lightfoot v. District of Columbia
D.D.C. · 2009 · confidence medium
Circuit have concluded that the “ninety-day period under Rule 25(a)(1) is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party’s death.” Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lightfoot v. Dc
D.D.C. · 2009 · confidence medium
Circuit have concluded that the “ninety-day period under Rule 25(a)(1) is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party’s death.” Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Atkins, William O. v. City of Chicago
7th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1994); Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 (4th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grass Valley Terrace v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2006 · confidence medium
E.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that “the running of the ninety-day limitations period under Rule 25(a)(1) is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party’s death.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kasting v. American Family Mutual Insurance
D. Kan. · 2000 · confidence medium
Grandbouche, 913 F.2d at 837; Fehrenbacher, 759 F.Supp. at 1518 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ripple v. Wold (2×)
S.D. · 1998 · confidence medium
R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1), both the suggestion of death and the motion to substitute parties must be personally served upon "persons not parties”— that term has been construed to mean “specifi cally the successors or representatives of the deceased party’s estate.” Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F.Supp. 1516, 1518 (D.Kan. 1991) (quoting Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Ripple v. Wold (4×)
S.D. · 1998 · confidence medium
WHETHER THE NINETY-DAY LIMITATION PERIOD WAS INVOKED BY WOLDS' "SUGGESTION OF DEATH UPON THE RECORD" IN THE ABSENCE OF PERSONAL SERVICE UPON RIPPLES' REPRESENTATIVES. [¶ 12.] According to SDCL 15-6-25(a)(1), [6] both the suggestion of death and the motion to substitute parties must be personally served upon "persons not parties"—that term has been construed to mean "specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate." Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F.Supp. 1516, 1518 (D.Kan.1991) (citing Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rothschild v. Board of Educ. of City of Buffalo
W.D.N.Y. · 1991 · confidence medium
Although the plaintiffs have yet to indicate a desire to proceed against Reville’s estate to the extent that their personal-capacity claims survive his death, see Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir.1990) (ninety-day limitations period contained in Rule 25(a)(1) is not triggered until formal suggestion of death is made on the record), the court will rule on those claims. 4 .
discussed Cited "see" Coleman v. Ghebremehari
S.D. Ill. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The running of the ninety- day limitations period under Rule 25(a)(1) is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party’s death.
cited Cited "see" Lucas v. Santander Bank, N.A.
S.D.W. Va · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited "see" Evalee Younts v. Fremont Cty.
8th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
Id.; see Grandboucke v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835 , 836 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding the 90-day limitation time “is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party’s death”).
discussed Cited "see" Younts v. Fremont County, Iowa
8th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
Id.; see Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding the 90-day limitation time "is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party's death"). 10 Regardless of the proceedings below, our court has not received a formal suggestion of death or a motion for substitution; thus, we have no authority to substitute a proper party for Younts.
discussed Cited "see" Hawes v. Johnson & Johnson
D.N.J. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
In Blair , the Third Circuit affirmed the district court, which held that mere reference to a party’s death in either court proceedings or pleadings is insufficient to trigger the 90 day time period for filing a Rule 25(a) motion for substitution. 787 F.2d at 580; see Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir.1990); Kaldawy v. Gold Serv.
cited Cited "see" Hilsabeck v. Lane Co.
D. Kan. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grandbouche, 913 F.2d at 837; Fehrenbacher, 759 F.Supp. at 1518 .
cited Cited "see" Brian Roberts v. Larry Thompson and G. Cameron, and Other Persons Whose Names Are Not Yet Known
10th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Miller Bros.
discussed Cited "see" Kissic v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co.
Ala. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grandbouche v. Lovell supra; Kaldawy supra. We further note that the record does not show whether Judi Kissic's attorney also represented the personal representative of Ronnie Kissic's estate, or whether the motion for joinder filed by Judi Kissic was served on the personal representative of Ronnie Kissic's estate in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4, if a personal representative was ever appointed.
discussed Cited "see" Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush
D. Kan. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grandeboucke, 913 F.2d at 837 (non-parties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party’s estate, must be served pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4). [Rule 25] provides that the suggestion of the death upon the record is made “by service of a statement of the fact of death as provide herein for the service of the motion [for substitution],” i.e. by service upon parties to the action as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons; and such service may be made in any judicial district.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Biglari v. University of Nebraska Lincoln
D. Neb. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See, e.g., Ransom v. Brennan; Giles v. Campbell, 698 F.3d at 153 (“Campbell's executrix, representing his estate, is a nonparty to Giles's lawsuit and, thus, must have been served pursuant to Rule 4.”); see also Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that Rule 25 requires service “on nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate....”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." ELALEM v. CNI ADVANTAGE, INC
D.N.J. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Feb. 27, 2015) (citing Giles, 698 F.3d at 157 ); see also Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that, under Rule 25, the service required “on nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party’s estate, must be service pursuant to Fed.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Leighton v. Bennett
S.D. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (failure to serve the personal representative is insufficient to trigger 90-day period).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Leighton v. Bennett
S.D. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell , 913 F.2d 835 , 837 (10th Cir. 1990) (failure to serve the personal representative is insufficient to trigger 90-day period).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Breen v. Mineta
D.D.C. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
P. 25(a)(3); see also Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Schwister v. Schoenecker
Wis. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Kan. 2000); see also Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 1990). 22 Rende, 415 F.2d at 986 . 23 See, e.g., Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he rule [25(a)] seeks 'to assure the parties to the action and other concerned persons of notice of the death so that they may take appropriate action to make substitution for the deceased party.'" (citation omitted)); Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he present Rule 25 was designed 'to inform all interested persons of the death so that they may take appropriate action.'" (quoting …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Stoddard v. Smith
Utah · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, eg., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir.1990); Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir.1985); Hilsabeck v. Lane Co., 168 F.R.D. 313 (D.Kan.1996); Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F.Supp. 1516 (D.Kan.1991). 5 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John E. Grandbouche John Voss, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Grandbouche
v.
Larry Lovell Kenneth Batson Vernon Pixley Kathleen Budd Alan Dougan Dave Black Tim Fortune Nick Difalco John Ottinger Bob Ely, All Special Agents for the Internal Revenue Service Steve Simmer Bob Glenn, Inspectors for the Internal Revenue Service Larry Hyatt, Chief of Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation Division
89-1359.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Sep 6, 1990.
913 F.2d 835

913 F.2d 835

17 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1042

John E. GRANDBOUCHE; John Voss, Personal Representative of
the Estate of John Grandbouche, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Larry LOVELL; Kenneth Batson; Vernon Pixley; Kathleen
Budd; Alan Dougan; Dave Black; Tim Fortune; Nick
Difalco; John Ottinger; Bob Ely, all special agents for
the Internal Revenue Service; Steve Simmer; Bob Glenn,
Inspectors for the Internal Revenue Service; Larry Hyatt,
Chief of Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation
Division, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-1359.

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

Sept. 6, 1990.

Jennifer A. Greene and William A. Cohan, Cohan & Greene, Denver, Colo., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Shirley D. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary R. Allen, Kenneth L. Greene, and Howard M. Soloman, Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Michael J. Norton, U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., of Counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

[*~835]1

Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order dismissing this action for failure to file a timely motion for substitution pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1).[1] The district court initially dismissed this action when plaintiff Grandbouche failed to comply with a discovery order. See Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1464 (10th Cir.1987). While the appeal of that decision was before this court, plaintiff Grandbouche died. See id. at 1465. This court, after requesting that the parties file supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the death of plaintiff Grandbouche on the instant action, ultimately determined that the action survived plaintiff's death, vacated the district court's order of dismissal, and remanded the action to the district court. Id. at 1465, 1467.

2

On September 5, 1989, defendants filed with the district court a motion to dismiss this action for failure to file a timely motion to substitute a proper party for the deceased plaintiff. Immediately thereafter the personal representative of decedent's estate filed a motion to substitute himself as a party-plaintiff in this action. The district court denied the motion for substitution and granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal.

3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) provides that

4

[i]f a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons, and may be served in any judicial district. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.

5

Prior to its amendment in 1963, Rule 25(a)(1) required a court to dismiss an action if no motion for substitution had been filed within two years of the death of a party. See, e.g., Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 984 (D.C.Cir.1969). In order to alleviate the inequities caused by the inflexibility of this rule, see id. at 984, Rule 25(a)(1) was amended to require a motion for substitution to be filed within ninety days from the time a suggestion of death is filed in the district court and properly served. See United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir.1974); see also 7C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1955 (2d ed. 1986).

6

Defendants assert that a sufficient suggestion of death was made under Rule 25(a)(1) in the appellate proceedings addressing the effect of plaintiff's death on this action.

7

The suggestion of the decedent's death was spread on the record approximately two years earlier by this Court's order requiring supplemental briefs, the supplemental brief of the defendants, this Court's decision in Grandbouche I, [825 F.2d 1463], and the docket entry thereof. Each of these documents was entered in the record of the case and was served on counsel for the estate. Under these circumstances, the purpose of requiring that a party's death be suggested on the record was clearly satisfied.

8

Appellees' Brief at 9. We disagree.

[*836]9

The running of the ninety-day limitations period under Rule 25(a)(1) is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party's death. See Miller Bros., 505 F.2d at 1034-35. Mere reference to a party's death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution. See, e.g., Kaldawy v. Gold Serv. Movers, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 475, 477 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (court's order noting plaintiff's death and placing case on suspended calendar, which was mailed to counsel for all parties, including decedent's counsel, insufficient to trigger the ninety-day limitations period); Tolliver v. Leach, 126 F.R.D. 529, 530-31 (W.D.Mich.1989) (defense counsel's statement concerning defendant's death, made on record during discovery conference, insufficient to trigger limitations period); Gronowicz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 624, 626-27 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (letter from party's attorney to court notifying court of party's death insufficient suggestion of death to trigger limitations period).

[*~837]10

Further, a suggestion of death must be served in accordance with Rule 25(a)(1). See Miller Bros., 505 F.2d at 1034-35. Defendants argue that the requirement of service was satisfied in the instant case during the initial appellate proceedings because the supplemental briefs and this court's order were served on the attorneys for the parties, including decedent's attorney who is also the attorney for decedent's estate. While service of a suggestion of death on counsel will satisfy the requirement of Rule 25(a)(1) for service of parties to the litigation, the service required by Rule 25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate, must be service pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. See Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir.1985) (to satisfy Rule 25(a)(1), motion for substitution or suggestion of death must be personally served on nonparty representative of deceased, rather than deceased's attorney); see also 7C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1955 (2d ed. 1986).

[*837]11

In the instant case, because the personal representative of decedent's estate did not receive service of any purported suggestion of death, the ninety-day limitations period did not begin to run. See Miller Bros., 505 F.2d at 1034-35. Plaintiffs' motion for substitution was thus timely filed.

[*~836]12

The order of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado denying plaintiffs' motion for substitution and granting defendants' motion to dismiss is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument