In Re: James Knittle Hesser & Doris Marie Hesser, Debtors. William N. Webb, Tr. v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., a New York Corp., 984 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1993). · Go Syfert
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In Re: James Knittle Hesser & Doris Marie Hesser, Debtors. William N. Webb, Tr. v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., a New York Corp., 984 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“interpretation and application of the bankruptcy code . . . is subject to de novo review”
187 citation events (123 in the last 25 years) across 48 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jason Winick v. Rosemarie Pelfrey Revocable Trust (bap10, 2025-09-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Jason Winick v. Rosemarie Pelfrey Revocable Trust
10th Cir. BAP · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
interpretation and application of the bankruptcy code . . . is subject to de novo review
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Curt Ranta v. Marc Krigsman
10th Cir. BAP · 2025 · confidence medium
P. 8003, 8005. 27 Order Allowing Appeal to Proceed in Part [BAP ECF No. 26] at 2. 28 29 In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1993). 30 In re Liehr, 439 B.R. 179, 182 (10th Cir. BAP 2010) (citing Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991)). 6 BAP Appeal No. 24-21 Docket No. 65 Filed: 09/03/2025 Page: 7 of 23 to the Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of § 522(o) and apply the same standard as the Bankruptcy Court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pacer Construction Holdings Corporation v. Pelletier
S.D. Cal. · 2020 · confidence medium
To determine the 25 prevailing market rates, courts should consider “the fees that private attorneys of an 26 27 2 The Court’s citations to documents refer to the pagination assigned by the document’s author, rather 28 1 ability and reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients 2 for legal work of similar complexity.” Davis v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536 , 3 1545 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 4 (9th Cir. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kardell v. Lane County
D. Or. · 2019 · confidence medium
The question is at what point such additional research becomes unnecessary. 17 – OPINION AND ORDER (vacated on other grounds in Davis v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 984 F.2d 345, 345 (9th Cir. 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter of Larson C. Locklin, Debtor. Jacob C. Pongetti, Trustee for the Estate of Larson Locklin v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation
5th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Webb v. GMAC (In re Hesser), 984 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1993); GMAC v. Busenlehner (In re Busenlehner), 918 F.2d 928 , 929 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 949 , 111 S.Ct. 2251 , 114 L.Ed.2d 492 (1991). 8 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) unempl.ins.rep. (Cch) P 22,142 in Re Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc., Debtor. Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission
10th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1993); Virginia Beach Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Wood, 901 F.2d 849 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fink v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Beasley)
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 1995 · confidence medium
On the other hand, in In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 348-49 (10th Cir.1993), and in In re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d 928 , 930-31 (11th Cir.1990), ce rt. denied, Moister v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 500 U.S. 949 , 111 S.Ct. 2251 , 114 L.Ed.2d 492 (1991), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that state law relation-back periods are applicable under a section 547 analysis.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spears v. Oklahoma Highway Credit Union (In re Barragree)
W.D. Okla. · 1993 · confidence medium
The Tenth Circuit has held that “the Bankruptcy Code adopts state law to determine the date of perfection under § 547(e)(1)(B).” Webb v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Hesser), 984 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Long v. Joe Romania Chevrolet, Inc. (In Re Loken)
Bankr. D. Or. · 1993 · confidence medium
In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1993); see also In re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d 928 , 930 (11th Cir.1990), reh’g den., 924 F.2d 1067 , cert. den., — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2251 , 114 L.Ed.2d 492 (1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Larson C. LOCKLIN, Debtor. Jacob C. PONGETTI, Trustee for the Estate of Larson Locklin v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION
unknown court · confidence medium
Webb v. GMAC (In re Hesser), 984 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1993); GMAC v. Busenlehner (In re Busenlehner), 918 F.2d 928 , 929 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 949 , 111 S.Ct. 2251 , 114 L.Ed.2d 492 (1991). 8 We also note that, in 1994, Congress amended § 547(c)(3)(B) to provide a grace period of 20 days rather than 10 (this amendment is effective in cases commenced on or after October 22, 1994).
discussed Cited "see" DuBose v. Hilton Grand Vacations Club, LLC
D. Nev. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 . 27 Regarding whether the fee is fixed or contingent, counsel points out that their fee is fixed, 1 City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 , 1549 (9th Cir. 1992) vacated in part on other 2 grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that Supreme Court’s case in City of 3 Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 , (1992), “represents an outright rejection of contingency as a 4 factor relevant to the establishment of a reasonable fee”).
cited Cited "see" Self Storage Advisors, LLC v. SE Boise Boat & RV Storage LLC
D. Idaho · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992) vacated on other grounds by, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
cited Cited "see" Las Vegas Skydiving Adventures LLC v. Groupon, Inc.
D. Nev. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 23 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993). 1 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Campbell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2×)
D. Idaho · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 , 1548–49 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Kries v. San Diego, City of
S.D. Cal. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See 26 Davis v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 , 1543 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in 27 1 part, 984 F.2d 345 , 345 (9th Cir. 1993); Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. CV 12- 2 02546-PHX-DGC, 2018 WL 6448395 , at *6 (D.
cited Cited "see" Bruser v. Bank of Hawaii
D. Haw. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
cited Cited "see" McGuire v. Allegro Acceptance Corp
D. Nev. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536 , 1549 (9th Cir. 1992), 20 vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
cited Cited "see" Reyes v. Tanaka
D. Haw. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 , 1544 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 ).
discussed Cited "see" Independent Living Center of Southern California v. David Maxwell-Jolly
C.D. Cal. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F. 2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds by 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a party may not recover fees for time spent on purely clerical work) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 , 288 n.10 (1989)): accord Christian Research Inst. v. Alnor, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1322 (2008) (approving, as a matter of California law, that a court may deny a fee request for “hours claimed for clerical work”); Ridgeway v. Wal- Mart Stores Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 975, 991 (N.D.
cited Cited "see" Gonzalez v. Allied Collection Services, Inc.
D. Nev. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco., 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir. 19 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
cited Cited "see" R & R Partners, Inc. v. Humble TV, LLC
D. Nev. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536 , 1549 (9th Cir. 1992), 11 vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
cited Cited "see" Bundorf v. Jewell
D. Nev. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cty. of S.F. , 976 F.2d 1536 , 1549 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds , 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
cited Cited "see" Ridgeway v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
N.D. Cal. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds by 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
discussed Cited "see" Cleopatra DeLeon v. Greg Abbott
5th Cir. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
Two of our sister circuits have disallowed fees for such tasks, In Davis v. San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, vacated in part, and remanded, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit held that time expended on “press conferences and public relations” was compensable only when it “is directly and intimately related to the successful representation of a client.” Id, at 1545; see id. (media-related time compensable only when prevailing party demonstrated that it “contribute[d], directly and substantially, to the attainment of [its] litigation goal”).
cited Cited "see" Isom v. JDA Software Inc.
D. Ariz. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536 , 1543 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds by 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
discussed Cited "see" Souryavong v. Lackawanna County
M.D. Penn. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cty. of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536 , 1545 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993) (“[P]re-vailing civil rights counsel are entitled to compensation for the same tasks as a private attorney”).
discussed Cited "see" Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
S.D. Cal. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993) (“It is simply not reasonable for a lawyer to bill, at her regular hourly rate, for tasks that a non-attorney employed by her could perform at a much lower cost.”).
cited Cited "see" I.T. ex rel. Renee T. v. Department of Education
D. Haw. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993). .
cited Cited "see" Family Pac v. Robert Ferguson
9th Cir. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir.1992), opinion vacated in part on other grounds on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
cited Cited "see" Martin Gonzalez, Sr. v. City of Maywood
9th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds on denial ofrh’g by 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
cited Cited "see" Sharon Black v. City and County of Honolulu
9th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 , 1548-49 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993) (order).
discussed Cited "see" Gilster v. Primebank
N.D. Iowa · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in non-relevant part on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993) (rejecting the defendant’s “assertions that [plaintiffs’] counsel billed excessive hours for time spent in co-counsel meetings ... [because plaintiffs’] counsel presented comprehensive and persuasive evidence ... of the efficient and essential nature of their co-counsel meetings.”).
cited Cited "see" Tom Stull v. Michael Fox
9th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 , 1541-42 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Pierce v. County of Orange
C.D. Cal. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1556 (9th Cir.1992) (affirming that “out-of-pocket” expenses like “travel, courier and copying costs” are reimbursable), vacated in other part by 984 F.2d 345 , 345 (9th Cir.1993); see also Grove v. Wells Fargo Fin.
discussed Cited "see" Resurrection Bay Conservation Alliance v. City of Seward
9th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 , 1546 n. 4 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has deemed irrelevant to a § 1988 attorney fees claim the fixed or contingent nature of the fee and has cast “doubt on the relevance of a case’s 'desirability' to the fee calculation”), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993) (order).
cited Cited "see" Robinson v. Plourde
D. Haw. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
cited Cited "see" World Triathalon Corp. v. Dunbar
D. Haw. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev.
Nev. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 , 1546 n. 4 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has deemed irrelevant to a § 1988 attorney fees claim the fixed or contingent nature of the fee and has cast "doubt on the relevance of a case's `desireability' to the fee calculation" (citing Dague, 505 U.S. at 563 , 112 S.Ct. 2638 )), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
discussed Cited "see" Cuzze v. University & Community College System
Nev. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 , 1546 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has deemed irrelevant to a § 1988 attorney fee's claim the fixed or contingent nature of the fee and has cast “doubt on the relevance of a case’s ‘desireability’ to the fee calculation” (citing Dague, 505 U.S. at 563 )), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
discussed Cited "see" Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Gutierrez
D. Or. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir.1992) (purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal or lawyer’s rate), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (1993).
discussed Cited "see" Cortes v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
C.D. Cal. · 2005 · signal: accord · confidence high
“Affidavits of the plaintiff’s] attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other eases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiff’s] attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir.1990); accord Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1547 (9th Cir.1992) (declarations of prevailing market rate in relevant community are sufficient to establish appropriate rate for lodestar purposes), vacated in part on oth…
discussed Cited "see" Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Keala (2×)
D. Haw. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir.1992), vacated on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993) (“It simply is not reasonable for a lawyer to bill, at her regular hourly rate, for tasks that a non-attorney employed by her could perform at a much lower cost.”).
discussed Cited "see" Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wornick
S.D. Cal. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1544 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds by 984 F.2d 345 (1993); Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal.3d 621, 639 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 754 , 652 P.2d 985 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" Sorenson v. Concannon
D. Or. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1542 (9th Cir.1992)(district court did not abuse discretion in basing fee award in part on reconstructed time records), vacated in part, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
examined Cited "see" Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Co. (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1548-49 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993); Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 543 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that district court abused its discretion in applying downward multiplier to lodestar amount based on contingency agreement); see also City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566-67 , 112 S.Ct. 2638 , 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992) (holding that federal fee-shifting statutes do not allow for upward adjustments to lodestar amount based on contingency agreement).
discussed Cited "see" Moss v. Associated Press
C.D. Cal. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1544 (9th Cir.1992) (“time spent by counsel in establishing the right to a fee award is compensable”), modified, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
cited Cited "see" In Re Vann
D. Kan. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Webb v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Hesser), 984 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1993).
cited Cited "see" Long v. Joe Romania Chevrolet, Inc. (In Re Loken)
9th Cir. BAP · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See, In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 349 (10th Cir.1993); In re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d 928 , 931 (11th Cir.1990).
cited Cited "see" Gates v. Rowland
9th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1544 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
cited Cited "see" Jay Lee Gates, John Ronald Bertram v. James Rowland and His Successor in Office James H. Gomez, Directorof the California Department of Correction Nadim Khoury, M.D., Assistant Deputy Director--Cdc Health Services Eddie Ylst and His Successor in Office Steve Cambra, Warden (Interim)--California Medical Facility Kenneth Shepard, M.D., Chief Deputy Warden for Cmf Clinical Services Nicholas Poulos, M.D., and His Successor in Office George R. Gay, Chief Physician and Surgeon (Acting) Cmf Paul Morentz, M.D., Chief Psychiatrist--Cmf Outpatient Psychiatric Program H. Benton, M.D., and His Successor in Office A.R. Rotella, M.D., Chief Psychiatrists--Northern Reception Center D. Michael O'connor, M.D., and His Successor in Office William Mayer, Director of the California Department of Mental Health Douglas G. Arnold and His Successor in Office Clyde Murrey, Acting Deputy Director for State Hospitals Dmh and Sylvia Blount, R.N., Executive Director--Dmh Vacaville Psychiatric Program, Jay Lee Gates, and George Deukmejian, Governor v. James Rowland, Director, Jay Lee Gates v. George Deukmejian Ron Shinn James Rowland Nadim Khoury, M.D. Assistant Deputy Director--Cdc Health Services Eddie Ylst Kenneth Shepard, Chief Deputy Warden for Cmf Clinical Services
9th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1544 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re: James Knittle HESSER and Doris Marie Hesser, Debtors. William N. WEBB, Trustee, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, a New York Corporation, Defendant/Appellant
91-6342.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Jan 19, 1993.
984 F.2d 345
Anthony L. Jackson, of Broekett, Jackson & Spaeth, Oklahoma City, OK, for plaintiff/ appellee., James A. Pardo, of King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA (John J. Love and James H. Bellingham, of McClelland, Collins, Bailey, Bailey & Bellingham, Oklahoma City, OK, with him on the brief), for defendant/appellant., Douglas G. Eason, of Fuller, Tubb & Pomeroy, Oklahoma City, OK, for amicus curiae Oklahoma Credit Union League., Thomas G. Marsh, of Marsh, Sutton & Shacklett, Tulsa, OK, for amicus curiae Oklahoma Auto. Dealers’ Ass’n.
Moore, Seth, Campos.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published
CAMPOS, District Judge.

In this appeal we are required to construe 11 U.S.C. § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code to determine the applicable method and timing of the perfection of a security interest for purposes of preferences in[*347] bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court entered judgment for the Trustee and, on appeal, the District Court affirmed. It held that the ten-day grace period provided in §§ 547(c)(3) and (e)(2) overrides § 547(e)(1) which directs that the date and method of perfection is as provided in state statutes. We disagree and reverse.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The relevant facts are undisputed. On April 16, 1990, James and Doris Hesser (the “Debtors”) purchased a new 1990 Toyota and received possession the same day. At the same time, they entered into a Retail Installment Sale Contract and Security Agreement with Northcutt Chevrolet-Buick Company (“Northcutt”). On the same day, Northcutt, as required by Oklahoma law, executed a Lien Entry Form and sent it to the motor license agent. Oklahoma law provides that when a Lien Entry Form is presented to the Oklahoma Tax Commission or its agent within fifteen days after execution of the Lien Entry Form, the perfection of the security interest relates back to the date of the execution of the security agreement. Okla.Stat.Ann. 47 § 1110.A.2 (1981 & Supp.1991). Pursuant to the Oklahoma statute, the Lien Entry Form was delivered to the Commission or its agent on May 1, 1990, the fifteenth day after execution of the Lien Entry Form. The security interest in the truck was thus perfected, according to Oklahoma law, as of April 16, 1990, the date of the execution of the security agreement.

Northcutt then assigned the Retail Installment Sale Contract to General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”). On May 18, 1990 the Debtors filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Plaintiff/appellee Webb was appointed trustee of the Debtors’ estate (“Trustee”). On October 26, 1990, the Trustee sought to set aside the transfer of the security interest to GMAC as a preference pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The Trustee argued that GMAC’s security interest in the Debtors’ truck can and should be set aside pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The only contested element regarding the avoidance was whether the transfer of the security interest to GMAC was “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2). The Trustee maintained that the definition of “when a transfer is made” is contained in 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) which provides, in pertinent part, that a transfer takes effect within ten days of the transfer or perfection of the transfer. [1] He argued that GMAC’s security interest was perfected on May 1, 1990, more than ten days after the execution of the security agreement, and that the creation of the debt therefore occurred prior to, and not contemporaneously with, the transfer of the security interest. Thus, the Trustee argued the transfer was “for or on account of an antecedent debt” and the elements necessary for the Trustee to avoid the transfer are satisfied.

GMAC responded that, according to § 547(e)(1)(B), the proper date of perfection was April 16, 1990, as provided by state law. Therefore, the transfer was contemporaneous with the creation of the debt and there was no transfer “for or on account of an antecedent debt.” Furthermore, because GMAC’s security interest was perfected on April 16, 1990, GMAC claimed protection under § 547(c)(3), which provides, in pertinent part, that a trustee may not avoid a transfer of a security interest in property acquired by the debtor if the security interest secures new value, is given to enable the debtor to acquire the prop[*348] erty, and is perfected on or before ten days after the debtor receives possession of such property. [2] Because GMAC’s security interest in the truck was perfected on April 16, which is on or before ten days after the debtor received possession of the truck, GMAC argues that the transfer cannot be avoided by the Trustee.

On April 12, 1991, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered that GMAC’s lien be avoided in favor of the Trustee. On appeal to the United States District Court, the District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court.

II. ANALYSIS

This appeal raises a question concerning the interpretation and application of the Bankruptcy Code, which is subject to de novo review by this Court. In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 904 F.2d 588 (11th Cir.1990). The sole issue in dispute is the appropriate timing and method of the perfection of a security interest provided for in § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that the Bankruptcy Code adopts state law to determine the date of perfection under § 547(e)(1)(B). In Re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d 928 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2251, 114 L.Ed.2d 492 (1991).

Sections 547(e)(1)(A) and (B) provide for the means of determining the date of perfection of a transfer for purposes of preference actions. Subsection (A) applies to the perfection of a transfer of real property other than fixtures. Subsection (B) applies to the perfection of a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property and provides:

For purposes of this section a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee, (emphasis added)

Thus, in order to determine the date of perfection, it is necessary to determine when the perfected security interest can beat a judicial lien in a priority battle. In Re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d at 930. This determination is made by reference to state law. Id.) see also E.F. Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826, 830 (10th Cir.1974) (“the time of transfer is determined by federal law, but state law determines the perfection of the right”).

After the date of perfection is determined, the time of the transfer must be ascertained and must fit within the ten-day grace period provided in § 547(e)(2). This grace period is the period of time in which an unperfected security interest takes precedence over other creditors, including the trustee in bankruptcy. [3] Thus § 547(e) provides for a two-step process: first, determine the date of perfection according to state law pursuant to §§ 547(e)(1)(A) or (B), and second, determine the time of transfer pursuant to § 547(e)(2).

Because under Oklahoma law GMAC’s security interest was perfected on April 16, April 16 is also the date that GMAC’s security interest was perfected for purposes of § 547 because it is the date on[*349] which “a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior” to the secured creditor, GMAC. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B). Because the date of the perfection coincides with the date on which the security interest was granted, the transfer of the security interest was not “for or on account of an antecedent debt,” 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2), and also was “perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor receive[d] possession of the property.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B). Therefore, because the Trustee cannot meet all the elements necessary to avoid the transfer pursuant to § 547(b) and furthermore, GMAC can claim protection under § 547(c)(3), the transfer cannot be avoided by the Trustee.

We agree with the Busenlehner court that this conclusion is supported by the policies underlying preference law:

The goal of the drafters of this provision of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act was to bring preference law ‘more into conformity with commercial practices and the Uniform Commercial Law.’ S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 5873. Creditors are encouraged by our legal system to secure their loans. The general message to creditors is that should they follow state commercial law their secured loans will be protected in bankruptcy.... The creditor, moreover, [lends] the money in the expectation the creditor’s compliance with state law [is] sufficient to protect the loan. Debtors should not be given the ability to surprise and upset established commercial practices by filing for bankruptcy and avoiding this otherwise acceptable security interest.

In Re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d at 931.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the District Court. We remand to the District Court with instructions to remand to the Bankruptcy Court to enter judgment in favor of GMAC.

1

. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) provides:

(e)(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made—
(A)at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such transfer is not perfected at the later of—
(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee.
2

. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) provides:

(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer—
(3) of a security interest in property acquired by the debtor—
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was—
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor receives possession of such property.
3

. The District Court relied on In re Hamilton, 892 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir.1990). However, the issue addressed in Hamilton is different than the issue presented in the present case. The issue in Hamilton was the conflict between the 20-day grace period in Texas and the ten-day grace period in § 547; the case did not deal with the date of perfection. The debtor in Hamilton signed a promissory note on March 2nd, took possession of the car on March 8th and the lien was perfected on March 19th. There was no dispute as to the date of perfection.