green
Positive treatment
26.7 score
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 42 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Davtyan v. Holder, Jr.
We are “confined to the reasoning given by the agency, and we will not independently search the record for alternative bases to affirm.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “[I]f our review is to have any meaning, it must be based on the Board’s own articulation of its reasons for denying relief, not on our assumptions about what the Board considered and decided.” Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir.1993) (unrelated jurisdictional determination superseded by statute, as stated in Escalera v. INS, 222 F.3d 753, 756 (10th Cir.2000)) (quotation omitted) III.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Bhattarai v. Holder, Jr.
(7×)
also: Cited "see"
We will not “affirm on the theory that the Board necessarily considered whatever the petitioner asserted” because “this would free the Board of the obligation to articulate a reasoned basis for its decisions, eliminating any guaranty of rationality and foreclosing meaningful review.” Turri v. I.N.S., 997 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Escalera v. I.N.S., 222 F.3d 753, 756 (10th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ariko v. Gonzalez
Sufficient Rationale by the Agency Petitioner contends that there was no diseernable rationale for the BIA to conclude that Mr. Ariko had “failed to set forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that [was] compliant” with [the BIA’s] decision in Lozada. *31 While the BIA is not required to provide a lengthy analysis of its decisions, it is required to “announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Turri v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 997 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir.1993); Mic…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Khosrow Hadjimehdigholi v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Thus, while we may review the Board's determination for procedural regularity, to make sure it actually considered all the relevant hardship factors, we may not "second-guess the weight, if any, to be given any factor." Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hadjimedigholi v. INS
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Thus, while we may review the Board’s determination for procedural regularity, to make sure it actually considered all the relevant hardship factors, we may not “second-guess the weight, if any, to be given any factor.” Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 1993).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jimenez-Santillano v. INS
See Hadjimehdigholi v. INS, 49 F.3d 642, 647 (10th Cir. 1995); Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fidel Jimenez-Santillano v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
See Hadjimehdigholi v. INS, 49 F.3d 642, 647 (10th Cir.1995); Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir.1993). 10 The INA provides two parallel statutory schemes regulating aliens' ability to enter or remain in this country.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Luna-Rodriguez v. INS
Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1993).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ahmed v. INS
Hadjimehdigholi v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 49 F.3d 642, 647 (10th Cir.1995); Turri v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Xuan Hiep Le v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. at 1311 (motion to reopen); Padilla-Agustin v. INS, 21 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.1994)(motion to reconsider).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kayode Adewale Tayo v. Immigration & Naturalization
Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir.1993).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Daniel B. Salameda and Angelita C. Salameda v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(4×)
A number of decisions by federal courts of appeals hold (none to the contrary) that the Board, in considering whether "extreme hardship" has been shown, must consider the alien's "community assistance." Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir.1993); Zamora-Garcia v. INS, 737 F.2d 488, 495 (5th Cir.1984); Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir.1984); Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chukwudi Joseph Okafor v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
(2×)
INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985); Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir.1993).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Mehdi Basham v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Abdi Dulane v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“We review the denial of a motion to reopen under an abuse of discretion standard.” Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Noemi Saenz-Herrera v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
The first two requirements, seven years' continuous residence and good moral character, are factual questions that we review for substantial evidence....The third requirement, that deportation would result in extreme hardship, is a discretionary matter that we review only for an abuse of discretion. 5 Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir.1993) (citations and footnote omitted). 2 We now turn to discussion of the Board's determination regarding petitioner's moral character. 3 6 The Board determined that petitioner did not fall into any of the specific classes enumerated in 1101(f).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mohammad Taghi Daneshmand v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
INS v. Doherty, 112 S.Ct. 719, 725 (1992); Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir.1993).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ahmed Tijani Habib v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir.1993). 3 In this case, the first two elements are not in dispute.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Juana (Haro) Amaya v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, American Immigration Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiae
As concerns the scope of our review of the BIA’s determination of extreme hardship, it was described in Turri v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir.1993) as being “limited.” In that same case, we said, that “[s]o long as the Board considers all of the relevant factors, this Court cannot second guess the weight, if any, to be given any factor.” 3 Id. at 1308-09 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chukwudi Joseph Okafor v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir.1993). 4 On appeal, petitioner contends that the BIA's ruling was erroneous because the Board 1) failed to consider the relevant factors, 2) made conclusory findings, 3) failed to consider petitioner's specific circumstances, and 4) disregarded evidence of economic hardship that would result if petitioner were returned to Nigeria.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Siriphen Panrit v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(5×)
also: Cited "see"
Turri, 997 F.2d at 1309; Becerra-Jiminez, 829 F.2d at 1000 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Vahid Keramati v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pak-Sang John Chung v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. 4 We recently stated the standards and legal principles controlling our review of a Board decision that a petitioner has failed to establish "extreme hardship." See Panrit v. INS, No.93-9554, 1994 WL 88080 (10th Cir. Mar.21, 1994); Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rogelio Gomez-Arauz v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
(2×)
Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Llana-Castellon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
We have reviewed the denial of motions to reopen and not only required the BIA to consider new evidence together with previous evidence, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir.1993), but also required the INS to consider new evidence concerning persecution, Motamedi v. INS, 713 F.2d 575, 576-77 (10th Cir.1983).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
de la Llana-Castellon v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
We have reviewed the denial of motions to reopen and not only required the BIA to consider new evidence together with previous evidence, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir.1993), but also required the INS to consider new evidence concerning persecution, Motamedi v. INS, 713 F.2d 575, 576-77 (10th Cir.1983).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Timothy Monday Agbonma v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
Turri v. I.N.S., 997 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Benjamin J. Diaz-Juarez
(2×)
See United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir.1992) (finding no reasonable suspicion even though the agents observed that the car appeared to be "heavily loaded" and "kind of floated" over bumps in the road), amended by 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.1993) (amendments not relevant to discussion); see also United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d 244, 246 (9th Cir.1995) (finding no reasonable suspicion even though the agent observed that the truck appeared "heavily ladened based on the way it reacted to bumps").
discussed
Cited "see"
Johnnie Louis McAlpine v. United States of America and Bureau of Indian Affairs
See Turri v. I.N.S., 997 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that as long as the administrative agency “considers all the relevant factors, this court cannot second-guess the weight, if any, to be given any factor” where no weight prescribed in the law).
discussed
Cited "see"
McAlpine v. United States
See Turri v. I.N.S., 997 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that as long as the administrative agency “considers all the relevant factors, this court cannot second-guess the weight, if any, to be given any factor” where no weight prescribed in the law).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Richcreek
See United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir.1992), modified, 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.1993); State v. Jarzab, 123 Ariz. 308, 311 , 599 P.2d 761, 764 (1979).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Richcreek
See United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir.1992), modified, 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.1993).
cited
Cited "see"
Mosayeb Davari v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
See Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Jerry Bobby Reeves
See U.S. v. Rodriquez, 976 F.2d 592, 596 (9th Cir.1992), amended, 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.1993); see also Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d at 1419 . 6 Thus, we conclude that the search in question violated the Fourth Amendment.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Elizabeth Gonzalez-Rincon
(2×)
See United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592 (9th Cir.1992), amended, 997 F.2d 1306 (1993). 15 We review de novo whether a border detention is based on reasonable suspicion.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Ivan Sigmond-Ballesteros
In reviewing a determination of reasonable suspicion, we “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of [the] case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 , 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir.1992), amended by 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that an officer may not detain a motorist without a …
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
L-O-G
See, e.g., Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1993); Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1987); Prapavat v. INS, 662 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens
Compare United States v. Franco-Munoz, 952 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 509 U.S. 911 (1993) (reasonable suspicion upheld where heavily-laden vehicle driven by male of Hispanic appearance was traveling in area known for alien smuggling) with U nited States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1993) (similar fact pattern held insufficient to support reason able suspicion).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Laura Renata Rubio-Rubio, Also Known as Laura Renata Woods v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
See, e.g., Turn v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306 (1993); Panrit v. INS, 19 F.3d 544 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Juan Barragan
"An officer may make an investigatory stop if he is aware of specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity." Id.; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir.1992), amended, 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.1993). "[T]raffic violations constitute criminal conduct which is sufficient to support a brief investigatory stop." United States v. Baker, 850 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.1988). 5 At 8:30 a.m. on July 28, 1991, Barragan was driving north in a white…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Cyriacus Chigozie Ohaya v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
See also Turri v. INS 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir.1993). 9 Our review of the record satisfies us that the BIA examiner has considered all of the factors 2 and arguments raised by the petitioner, and we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion. 10 Accordingly, the decision denying Mr. Ohaya's petition to reopen is AFFIRMED. 1 This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 2 In his first…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Ramiro RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellee
v.
Ramiro RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellee
91-50243.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jul 14, 1993.
Hug, Pregerson, Poole.
Cited by 22 opinions | Published
The opinion filed October 5,1992, slip opinion 11929, and appearing at 976 F.2d 592 (9th Cir.1992), is amended as follows:
1. At slip op. at 11936, in the first sentence of the fourth full paragraph, at 976 F.2d at 595, in the first sentence of the last full paragraph, at slip op. at 11937, in the first sentence of the second full paragraph, and at 976 F.2d at 596, in the first sentence of the second full paragraph, change “16 year-old Ford” to “14 year-old Ford.”
2. At slip op. at 11937, in the last sentence of the first full paragraph, and at 976 F.2d at 596, in the last sentence of the first full paragraph, change the pin cite to Sokolow from “490 U.S. at 1 [109 S.Ct. at 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d at 1 (1989) ]” to “490 U.S. at 10 [109 S.Ct. at 1587].”
3. At the end of the first full paragraph appearing at slip op. at 11937 and at 976 F.2d at 596, insert the following footnote:
1 Our holding is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s statement in Sokolow that “the fact that these factors [cited by the agent as reasonable suspicion] may be set forth in a ‘profile’ does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent.” 490 U.S. at 10, 109 S.Ct. at 1587. We hold only that the presence of a set of factors held to be sufficient in the specific factual context of one case may be inadequáte in another case to show reasonable, individualized suspicion. This holding is supported by Ninth Circuit cases in which virtually identical factors cited by agents sometimes establish reasonable suspicion and sometimes do not, depending upon the unique facts of each case. Compare United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir.1991) with United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136, 94 S.Ct. 881, 38 L.Ed.2d 762 (1974). See also, Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (in evaluating whether factors support reasonable suspicion, the reviewing court must consider “the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture”) (quotation omitted).
With these amendments, the panel has voted unanimously to deny the petition for rehearing.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc. An active judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. The matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonre-cused active judges in favor of en banc consideration. Fed.R.App.P. 35.
The petition for rehearing is denied, and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.