green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
33.1 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2001 ·
…our analysis of the fairness issue infuses our disposition of the second vagueness concern, the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
at p. 804
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Robert C. Lahue, United States of America v. Dan Anderson, United States of America v. Ronald H. Lahue, the American Hospital Association Federation of American Health Systems Association of American Medical Colleges American Osteopathic Association Missouri Hospital Association National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Amici Curiae
our analysis of the fairness issue infuses our disposition of the second vagueness concern, the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. LaHue
our analysis of the fairness issue infuses our disposition of the second vagueness concern, the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Bushco v. Shurtleff
void-for-vagueness challenge to a state statute involves the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fabrizius v. United States Department of Agriculture
Put differently, “due process does not require that citizens be provided actual notice of all criminal rules and their meanings.” United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 804 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Vasarajs, 908 F.2d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 1990)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Lesh
As applied to Mr. Lesh, § 261.10(c) does not provide “sufficient guidance to law enforcement to dispel the fear of subjective enforcement.” United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 804 (10th Cir. 1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Kemp
United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 802 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Llantada
(2×)
Penal statutes, including conditions of supervised release, must be written so that “ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 802 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (“[W]e insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so th…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
John Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe
(2×)
No. 101-877 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4367-68 (“H.R.Rep.”)); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 799-800 (10th Cir.1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Griffin v. Bryant
See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. at 402-03 , 130 S.Ct. 2896 (“To satisfy due process, ‘a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discrimi natory enforcement.’ The void-for-vagueness doctrine embraces these requirements.” (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983))); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 802 (10th Cir.1997)(“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bazuaye
“When no authority from the Supreme Court or this circuit would compel a determination that there was error and there is contrary authority in other circuits, the error can rarely be plain.” United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1159 (10th Cir.2012) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2383 , 185 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2013) (quoting United States v. Baum, 555 F.3d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir.2009)). 1. “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manne…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.
See also United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir.1995); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 432 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1124 (6th Cir.1985); United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir.1978); United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15, 19 (10th Cir.1973); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.1966).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Taylor
(2×)
No. 996, H.D. 1, C.D. 1). [6] The United States Congress enacted NAGPRA, in pertinent part, to "repatriate Native American human remains, associated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony currently held or controlled by Federal agencies and museums." United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 800 (10th Cir.1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.
In fact, that decision broadly held “misdemeanor violations under § 703 are strict liability crimes.” Corrow, 119 F.3d at 805 (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Slayton
See United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 613 (5th Cir.2002) (stating that the offense of possessing migratory game birds exceeding the daily bag limit was regulatory in nature); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 806 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that a statute prohibiting the possession of protected eagle feathers was a regulatory act); Mertens, 64 P.3d at 637 (holding that fishing without a license is a regulatory offense). ¶24 Finally, as a general rule the commission of a strict liability crime results in a relatively minor penalty.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Muhammad v. Com.
But "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 , 94 S.Ct. 2547 , 41 L.Ed.2d 439 *564 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 267 Va. 573, 580-81 , 596 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2004); accord Gibson v. Mayor of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir.2004); Fuller v. Decatur Public School Board of Education School District 61, 251 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir.2001); Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1063-6…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Aid for Women v. Foulston
“In a facial challenge raising no First Amendment or other claim that the act reaches constitutionally protected conduct, the complainant ‘must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’ ” U.S. v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 803 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Hicks
Additionally, the Supreme Court stated in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974), that: “One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.” Accord Gibson v. Mayor of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2004); Fuller v. Decatur Public School Board of Education School District 61, 251 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2001); Joel v. Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1063-64 (6th Cir. 1999); Woodis v. Westark Community College, 160 F.3d 43…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jackson
The Tenth Circuit has recently held, in examining an allegation that another criminal statute was unconstitutionally vague: “ ‘[T]he void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the *1086 criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 802 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). “[V]agueness challenges to statute…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Saffo
Thus, according to Saffo, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (d)(2) offers no ascertainable standard for determining which pseudoephedrine distributors are innocent and which are not. “ ‘[T]he void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 802 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)).…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Day
Day argues ' that all of the charges against him depended on the government’s assertion that he had “reasonable cause to believe” the pseudoephedrine he sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, and that the standard of “reasonable cause to believe” that the chemical “will be used” for manufacturing a controlled substance renders 21 U.S.C. § 841 (d)(2) unconstitutionally vague. “ ‘[T]he void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. El-Hajjaoui
El-Hajjaoui argues that all of the charges against him depended on the government’s assertion that he had “reasonable cause to believe” the pseudoephedrine he sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, and that the standard of “reasonable cause to believe” that the chemical “will be used” for manufacturing a controlled substance renders 21 U.S.C. § 841 (d)(2) unconstitutionally vague. *1277 “ ‘[T]he void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is pro…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v. Chacon
No. 101-877, 101 Cong., 2d Sess.1990, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 4367, 4367-68; United States, v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 799-800 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 118 S.Ct. 1089 , 140 L.Ed.2d 146 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Robert W. Unser
We have addressed a similar issue in United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1089 , 140 L.Ed.2d 146 (1998), in the context of Migratory Bird Treaty Act misdemeanor violations carrying a potential fine up to $5,000 or imprisonment of not more than six months, or both.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Unser
We have addressed a similar issue in United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1089 (1998), in the context of Migratory Bird Treaty Act misdemeanor violations carrying a potential fine up to $5,000 or imprisonment of not more than six months, or both.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Hull
See United States v. Corrow , 119 F.3d 796 , 802 (10th Cir. 1997).
cited
Cited "see"
Cotter Corp. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co.
See United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir.1997) (noting that for strict liability crimes, proof of intent is not required).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Borrego
See United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 803 (10th Cir.1997).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. LaHue
See United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 804 (10th Cir.1997) (“Our analysis of the fairness issue infuses our disposition of the second vagueness concern, the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”), cer t. denied, 522 U.S. 1133 , 118 S.Ct. 1089 , 140 L.Ed.2d 146 (1998).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. David George Kramer
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 799-800 (10th Cir.1997)(eiting H.R.Rep.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Kramer
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 , 799- 800 (10th Cir. 1997)(citing H.R.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Zak
See, e.g., United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1133 , 118 S.Ct. 1089 , 140 L.Ed.2d 146 (1998) (“[I]t is not necessary to prove that a defendant violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with specific intent or guilty knowledge.” (citation omitted)). 5 *214 Congress has also consistently referred to misdemeanor violations under the MBTA as strict liability offenses.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Center for Biological Diversity v. Pirie
See, e.g., United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (1997) (holding that the MBTA is a “strict liability” statute); United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir.1995); United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431 , 435 n. 4 *175 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Wood, 437 F.2d 91 (9th Cir.1971).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Pourhassan
(2×)
United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1988) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) (“[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.”) (quoted in United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 803 (10th Cir.1997)); United States v. Day, 223 F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir.2000) (same). 3 Pourhassan hypothesizes that a literal reading of the statute implicates the rights of a category of individuals comprising manufacturer…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc.
See, e.g., United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir.1997) (affirming conviction of artifacts dealer under the MBTA for selling eagle, owl, and hawk feathers); United States v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636 (7th Cir.1990) (affirming conviction of homeowner under the MBTA for inadvertently poisoning two grackles and two doves with strychnine); United States v. Mackie, 681 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.1982) (MBTA and BGEPA prosecution of two defendants who “offered to sell and sold whole eagles and eagle parts to undercover agents”); United States v. Sandia, 6 F.Supp.2d 1278 (D.N.M.1997) (MBTA and BG…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States of America Ex Rel. William J. Schumer, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee
v.
Hughes Aircraft Company, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant
v.
Hughes Aircraft Company, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant
92-55759.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Aug 7, 1997.
Published
Citer courts: Tenth Circuit (1)
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. William J. SCHUMER,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 92-55759, 92-55857.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Aug. 7, 1997.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court. D.C. No. CV-89-0390-MRP.
Before: D.W. NELSON, REINHARDT, and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.
1
Under Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States ex rel. Schumer, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997), this case is remanded to the district court which shall order it dismissed. The matter of attorneys fees is left to the decision of the district court.