United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1998). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“nothing in... 922(g)(1)... requires the government to show that the unlawfully possessed firearm is operable.”
26 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Vaughn v. United States (alnd, 2024-04-25)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Vaughn v. United States
N.D. Ala. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
nothing in... 922(g)(1)... requires the government to show that the unlawfully possessed firearm is operable.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Alphonso McNealy
11th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1299-1300 (11th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Errol Nelson
3rd Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Such term does not include an antique firearm.”); United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.1998) (noting that the “government need not show that a firearm is operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1),” and that "every circuit addressing the issue has reached the same conclusion.”). 10 ."We review a district court's order denying a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of review.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. State (2×)
Md. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 577 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir.2009) ("We have repeatedly rejected the contention that a firearm needs to be operable in order to support a conviction...."); United States v. Abdul-Aziz, 486 F.3d 471, 477 (8th Cir.2007) ("[Section] 921(a)(3) does not necessarily require that a rifle be operable to be considered a firearm."); United States v. Gwyn, 481 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C.Cir.2007) ("We too agree that 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(3) includes `inoperable weapons' within the definition of `firearm.'"); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724 , 732 n. 3 (4th Cir.2006) ("[S…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Tennessee v. Guy Alvin Williamson
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See also United States v. Rivera, 415 F.3d 284, 285 (2nd Cir. 2005); United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Perez, 897 F.2d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that “[a]n inoperable firearm is nonetheless a firearm”); United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 891 (8th Cir. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Rather, it is enough that the gun was ‘designed to’ fire”) (citation omitted); United States v. Maddix, 96 F.3d 311, 316 (8th Cir.1996) *105 (“Title 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(3) does not require a firearm to be operable”); United States v. Morris, 904 F.2d 518, 519 (9th Cir.1990) (“The statute imposes no requirement that the gun be loaded or operable”) (citation omitted); United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.Fla.1998) (“[We] hold that the government was not required to show that the firearm was operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1)”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Calvin Lee Burrell
11th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
“For purposes of § 922(g)(1), a firearm is defined to include any weapon which will or is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joseph Edmund Williams, A/K/A Abdullah Shabazz, A/K/A Taharqa Abdullah Shabazz
4th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Although § 921(a)(3) does not require that the firearm be operable when the defendant possessed it, see United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam); United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489 , 491 n. 2 (4th Cir.1993), an operable firearm certainly meets the statutory definition. 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Williams
4th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Such term does not include an antique firearm.").3 A firearms expert testified that the bul- 3 Although § 921(a)(3) does not require that the firearm be operable when the defendant possessed it, see United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489 , 491 n.2 (4th Cir. 1993), an operable firearm certainly meets the statutory definition.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Pedro Rivera
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Although we have yet to answer the question, every other circuit to consider it has concluded that an inoperable weapon falls within § 921(a)(3)’s definition of a “firearm.” See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.1998); United States v. Maddix, 96 F.3d 311, 316 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Perez, 897 F.2d 751, 754 (5th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Brown, 117 F.3d 353, 354-56 (7th Cir.l997)a (holding that inoperable gun is “firearm” for purposes of Sentencing Guidelines, where § 921(a)(…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Crudup
R.I. · 2004 · confidence medium
In addition, nothing has been found in the legislative history indicating “that the unlawfully possessed firearm must be operable for purposes of the statute.” Adams, 137 F.3d at 1300.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Shaw
E.D.N.Y · 2003 · confidence medium
Although the Second Circuit has apparently not yet decided this issue, every circuit which has addressed this issue has concluded that based on the language of the statute the Government need not show that a firearm is operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1). *570 United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.1998) (“[T]he government was not required to show that the firearm was operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1)”); United States v. Maddix, 96 F.3d 311, 316 (8th Cir.1996) (“The law is clear that a weapon does not need to be operable to be a firearm.”); United States v. Morris,…
cited Cited "see" State v. Clark
Neb. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Jackson
unknown court · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding nothing in the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(1) or 921(a)(3) or legislative history indicates that an unlawfully possessed firearm must be operable for purposes of the statute); United States v. Maddix, 96 F.3d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(3) does not require a firearm to be operable); United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating “the law is clear that weapon does not need to be operable to be a firearm”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1182 , 130 L.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Fields
4th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1229 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489 , 491 n.2 (4th Cir. 1993).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Reddick v. United States
S.D. Ga. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Fla. Sept. 7, 2005) (finding that, even if firing pin had been removed from gun, it was still a firearm under § 921(a)(3)); see also United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting §§ 922(g)(1) and 921(a)(3) do not require the government to show a firearm is operable for purposes of § 922(g) and “that every circuit addressing the issue has reached the same conclusion[]”) (citing cases).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Armstrong v. Commonwealth
Va. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (reaching same conclusion with respect to federal felon in possession of a firearm statute and noting that all other federal circuits addressing the issue were in agreement); People v. Brown,_N.W.2d_,_(Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (“a handgun need not be currently operable in order to qualify as a ‘firearm’ ” under felon in possession statute); Thomas v. State, 36 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (felon in possession statute requires only proof of a device designed, made, or adapted to perform as a firearm, and not tha…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Luis Manuel Pea-Lora, United States of America v. Jorge Lorenzo-Hernandez, United States of America v. Thomas Lorenzo-P&eacuterez, United States of America v. Lorenzo Pea-Morfe
1st Cir. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hunter, 101 F.3d 82, 85 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Maddix, 96 F.3d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489 , 491 n.2 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ruiz, 986 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Pena-Lora
1st Cir. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1299-1300 (11th Cir.1998); United States v. Hunter, 101 F.3d 82, 85 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Maddix, 96 F.3d 311, 316 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489 , 491 n. 2 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. Ruiz, 986 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir.1990).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
David ADAMS, A.K.A. David B. Adams, Defendant-Appellant
96-4970.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Mar 26, 1998.
137 F.3d 1298
Kathleen M. Williams, Fed. Pub. Defender, Manuel L. Dobrinsky, Asst. Fed. Pub. Defender, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant., William A. Keefer, U.S. Atty., Alberto Jordan, Harriett R. Galvin, Assts. U.S. Attys., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Birch, Hull, Marcus, Per Curiam.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 79%
Citer courts: N.D. Alabama (1)
PER CURIAM:

Appellant David Adams was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Adams appeals his conviction on the ground that the government failed to produce any evidence that the firearm was operable: After review, we affirm.

FACTS

On January 13, 1996, Adams entered the Royal Pawn Shop in Miami, Florida with a Winchester 12 gauge pump shotgun. Adams testified that he went to the pawn shop to sell a VCR, but was approached by a stranger outside the pawn shop who asked Adams to pawn the shotgun. The stranger offered Adams half the proceeds of the sale and Adams agreed. Adams subsequently sold the shotgun to the attendant on duty at the pawn shop.

On February 16,1996, Adams was indicted by a federal grand jury and charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. [1] At trial, the government presented two witnesses: (1) Joel Valasquez, the pawn shop attendant; and (2) Detective Gregory George of the Metro-Dade Police Department. Both witnesses testified that Adams sold the firearm in issue, but neither witness testified that the firearm was operable.

At the close of the govémment’s case, Adams moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing, inter alia, that the government faded to produce any evidence that the firearm in question was operable. The district court denied Adams’s motion, stating “[tjhere is something to what you say, counsel. But I believe the law in this Circuit indicates that you do not have to show that the firearm is tested....”

DISCUSSION

Whether the government is required to show that a firearm is operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1) is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Our starting point is the language of the statute itself. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, -, 117 S.Ct. 921, 926, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997); United States v. McArthur, 108 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Fern, 117 F.3d 1298, 1305-06 (11th Cir.1997). Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, as follows:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting com-

[*1300] meree, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

For purposes of § 922(g)(1), a firearm is defined to include any weapon which will or is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive, as follows:

(a) As used in this chapter-
(3) The term “firearm” means (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an .explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm.

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). [2] Nothing in either § 922(g)(1) or § 921(a)(3) requires the government to show that the unlawfully possessed firearm is operable. Further, Adams fails to point to anything in the legislative history of § 922(g)(1)" which indicates that the unlawfully possessed firearm must be operable for purposes of the statute.

While this alone is sufficient to lead us to the conclusion that the government need not show that a firearm is operable for . purposes of § 922(g)(1), we also note that every circuit addressing the issue has reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Maddix, 96 F.3d 311, 316 (8th Cir.1996) (“Title 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) does not require a firearm to be operable.”); United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir.1994) (“[T]he law is clear that a weapon does not need to be operable to be a firearm.”); United States v. Morris, 904 F.2d 518, 519 (9th Cir.1990) (“The statute imposes no requirement that the gun be loaded or operable”) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 800 F.2d 895, 899 (9th Cir.1986)); United States v. Perez, 897 F.2d 751, 754 (5th Cir.1990) (“An inoperable firearm is nonetheless a firearm.”). We join these circuits and hold that the government was not required to show that the firearm was operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1). [3]

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Adams’s conviction under § 922(g)(1) is

AFFIRMED.

1

. The parties stipulated that Adams was convicted of a felony in Florida in October 1986, and that the shotgun was transported in interstate commerce.

2

. Adams also contends that the government failed "to show that the firearm met the statutory definition of a weapon that "may readily be converted to expel a projectile____” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). However, the statute defines a firearm as a weapon "which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The actual firearm' was in evidence and the pawn shop attendant testified that this firearm was a "Winchester blue 12 gauge shotgun.” This was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was designed to expel a projectile. See United States v. Reed, 114 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct 316, 139 L.Ed.2d 244 (1997); United States v. Munoz, 15 F.3d 395, 396 (5th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 996 (11th Cir.1985) (construing similarly worded Florida statute, the court stated that "[tjestimony by an experienced federal law en, forcement officer familiar with handguns that the defendant carried a .38 caliber pistol certainly authorized the jury to find that the defendant possessed a firearm, defined as a weapon 'designed to ..." expel a projectile.’ ”).

3

. Adams relies on United States v. Munoz, 15 F.3d 395 (5th Cir.1995), and United States v. Reed, 114 F.3d 1053 (10th Cir.1997), but neither case is applicable. Munoz did not address whether the firearm in issue had to be operable, but only whether the firearm met the statutory definition of a firearm. Munoz, 15 F.3d at 396. Reed addressed only whether & defendant must know that the firearm.he possesses meets the statutory definition of a firearm. Reed, 114 F.3d at 1056-58.