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Circuit Split
Quoted verbatim 4×
48.5 score
“a 'dry shave,' without more, is simply not the kind of 'injury' that is cognizable under section 1997e(e).”
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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discussed
Vacated
Goodwin v. Madison
By enacting this section, Congress chose to 48 “preclude[] some actions for money damages[,]” Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion vacated by 197 F.3d 1059 , opinion reinstated in part by 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000), and “to enforce prisoners’ constitutional rights through suits for declaratory and injunctive relief[,]” id. at 1289, and nominal damages, Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307-09 (11th Cir. 2015).
discussed
Vacated
Holloman v. Maine
Oliver v. Keller , 289 F.3d 623 , 627 (9th Cir. 2002) ; see also Alexander v. Tippah Cty., Miss. , 351 F.3d 626 , 631 (5th Cir. 2003) ; Harris v. Garner , 190 F.3d 1279 , 1286 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated by 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), reinstated in part on reh'g en banc , 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) ; Liner v. Goord , 196 F.3d 132 , 135 (2d Cir. 1999).
discussed
Vacated
Holloman v. Clarke
Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Alexander v. Tippah Cty., Miss., 351 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2003); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated by 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), reinstated in part on reh’g en banc, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000); Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999).
discussed
Vacated
Whitfield v. Thompson
No 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action “may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury[J” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir.2002)(stating that “to avoid dismissal under § 1997e(e), a prisoner’s claims for emotional or mental injury must be accompanied by allegations of physical injuries that are greater than de minimis ”); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir.1999) (finding th…
discussed
Vacated
Eric D. Oliver v. Jerry Keller, Sheriff Kyle Edwards Dave Swiekert
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
The Eleventh Circuit has explicitly adopted the Siglar de minimis approach, see Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.1999), vacated by Harris v. Garner, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir.1999), reinstated in part on reh’g by Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc), reasoning that an interpretation that “any allegation of physical injury is sufficient ... would undermine the statute’s essential purpose — ‘to curtail frivolous and abusive prisoner litigation.’ ” 4 Id. (emphasis in original).
discussed
Cited "but see"
Mattei v. Dunbar
But see Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1997e(e) precludes claims for punitive damages absent physical injury), vacated in part and reinstated in part, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
discussed
Cited "but see"
Brown v. Sudduth
See, e.g., Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that § 1997e(e) does not bar recovery for nominal and punitive damages); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251-52 (3d Cir.2000) (same); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir.2003) (same); Munn v. Toney, 433 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir.2006) (same); Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir.1998) (same); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 880-81 (10th Cir.2001) (same); but see Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1282 , 1287-88 & n. 9 (11th Cir.1999), vacated & reh’g en banc granted by 197 F.3d 1059 , reinstat…
discussed
Cited "but see"
Tyrone Calhoun v. George E. Detella
(2×)
See Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir.2002) (nominal and punitive damages available for deprivation-of-property claim); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir.2002) (compensatory, nominal, or punitive damages available if premised on alleged unconstitutional conditions of pretrial confinement, and not emotional or mental distress suffered); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309 , 314 n. 3 & 323 (3d Cir.2001) (nominal and punitive damages available for violation of inmates’ newly recognized right to medical privacy); but cf. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1282 , 1287-88 & n. 9 (§ 19…
discussed
Cited "but see"
Calhoun, Tyrone v. DeTella, George
(2×)
See Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2002) (nominal and punitive damages available for deprivation-of-property claim); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 2002) (compensatory, nominal, or puni- tive damages available if premised on alleged unconsti- tutional conditions of pretrial confinement, and not emo- tional or mental distress suffered); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309 , 314 n.3 & 323 (3d Cir. 2001) (nominal and punitive damages available for violation of inmates’ newly recog- nized right to medical privacy); but cf. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1282 , 1287-88 & n…
discussed
Cited "but see"
Thompson v. Carter
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
But see Hams, 190 F.3d at 1286-87 (holding that claims to compensatory and punitive damages were correctly dismissed because plaintiffs “allegations of physical injury were not serious enough to satisfy the physical injury requirement of section 1997e(e)”).
discussed
Cited "but see"
Thompson v. Carter
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
But see Harris, 190 F.3d at 1286-87 (holding that claims to compensatory and punitive damages were correctly dismissed because plaintiff's "allegations of physical injury were not serious enough to satisfy the physical injury requirement of section 1997e(e)").
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Victor Dontavious Stallworth v. Wilkins
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
a 'dry shave,' without more, is simply not the kind of 'injury' that is cognizable under section 1997e(e).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bowden v. Snider
Physical Injury The defendants next argue Bowden cannot recover compensatory damages because he did not suffer physical injuries that were more than de minimis. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) bars prisoners from bringing civil actions “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury[.]” To satisfy the statute, “the physical injury must be more than de minimis, but need not be significant.” Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wright v. Logan (INMATE 1)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Allen v. Cunningham (INMATE 2)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marshall v. Henline (INMATE 1)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pollock v. Brown
Thompson v. Smith, 805 F. App’x 893 , 901 (11th Cir. 2020) (to be deemed a physical injury, the injury must be more than de minimis although it need not be significant) (quotations omitted) (citing and quoting Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.) vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mann v. Crumpton (INMATE 1)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner's civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (‘reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies’ before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA's amendments to § 1997e(a), ‘[a]n inmate incarcerated in a stat…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Conrad L. Hoever v. R. Marks
(2×)
And second, it says, the use of the past-tense “suffered” demonstrates that § 1997e(e) “‘constitutes a limitation on a damages remedy only.’” Id. at 7–8 (quoting Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999) (mem.), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 , 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tedder v. Pride Enterprises Incorporated, Corporate Office
See Al-Amin, 637 F.3d at 1198 (punitive); Harris v. Garner (Harris I), 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (compensatory), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hall v. Phillips
The Eleventh Circuit has explained a “physical injury” is one that is not simply de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Flagg v. Moore (INMATE 1)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Flagg v. Trawick (INMATE 2)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), “[a]n inmate 17 incarcerated in…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Simpson v. Guess
The PLRA does not define “physical injury,” but the Eleventh Circuit has explained it is one that is not simply de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)). 5 Plaintiff seeks only compensatory damages.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matson v. Doe
See AlBAmin, 637 F.3d at 1198 (punitive); Harris v. Garner (Harris I), 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (compensatory), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Parker v. Henline (INMATE 2)(CONSENT)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wade v. Valenza (INMATE 1)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Thomas A. Furman v. Daniel Cherry
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
We have said that to avoid section 1997e(e)’s bar on the recovery of monetary damages, a prisoner’s alleged “physical injury must be more than de minimis, but need not be significant.” Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999), op. reinstated in part on reh’g, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Logan v. Clemmons
The PLRA does not define “physical injury,” but the Eleventh Circuit has explained a physical injury is one that is not simply 7 Even if Defendant Spradley did not know Inmate Harris passed a knife to Inmate Banks, Plaintiff alleges facts that, if true, would permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude Spradley was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety when he ignored Inmate Banks’s initial attack on Plaintiff. de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Williams v. Galloway
See Al-Amin, 637 F.3d at 1198 (punitive); Harris v. Garner (Harris I), 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (compensatory), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ellis v. Henline (INMATE 1)(CONSENT)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Palmer v. Hampton
See Al-Amin, 637 F.3d at 1198 (punitive); Harris v. Garner (Harris I), 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (compensatory), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Yvelan Pierre v. D. Padgett
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
A prisoner must also establish a “physical injury,” meaning an injury that is more than de minimis. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307 ; Harris, 190 F.3d at 1286.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Zink v. Colobani
A physical injury is one that is not simply de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” See Thompson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 551 F. App’x 555, 557 (11th Cir. 2014); Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lewis v. Adams, Jr.
Exhaustion is a “pre-condition to suit” that must be enforced even if the available administrative remedies are either “futile or inadequate.” Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1999), aff’d in part and vacated and remanded on other grounds by Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970 (2000) (en banc); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA”).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Matthew John Thompson v. B. Smith
(6×)
also: Cited "see"
Under the statute, for Mr. Thompson to be entitled to compensatory or punitive damages, he must show that he suffered a “physical injury.” Subsection 1997e(e) does not define what constitutes a “physical injury,” see id., but this Court has determined the required “physical injury” must be more than “de minimis,” although it “need not be significant.” Harris v. Garner (“Harris I”), 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), and reinstated in relevant part on reh’g , 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Har…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cobb v. Slaughter
A physical injury is one that is not simply de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” See Thompson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 551 F. App’x 555 , 557 (11th Cir. 2014); Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Paris v. Sergeant J. Herring
See Al-Amin, 637 F.3d at 1198 (punitive); Harris v. Garner (Harris I), 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (compensatory), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Alton v. Robinson
See Al-Amin, 637 F.3d at 1198 (punitive); Harris v. Garner (Harris I), 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (compensatory), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MCGUIRE v. WHITE
To allege an injury, the PLRA requires dismissal for lack of an allegation of a physical injury sufficient to exceed the de minimis injury threshold. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). “[G]reater than de minimis has not been clearly defined,” but the injury “need not be significant.” Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.), vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 , 972, 985 (11th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sims v. Figueroa
See Al–Amin, 24 637 F.3d at 1198 (punitive); Harris v. Garner (Harris I), 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (compensatory), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Milledge v. Tucker
The PLRA does not define “physical injury.” The Eleventh Circuit has explained a physical injury is one that is not simply de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” See Thompson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 551 F. App’x 555 , 557 (11th Cir. 2014); Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Burgess v. Jones
The PLRA does not define “physical injury.” The Eleventh Circuit has explained a physical injury is one that is not simply de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” Dixon v. Toole, 225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Collins v. Henline (INMATE 1)
See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fred Dalton Brooks v. Warden
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
See Al-Amin, 637 F.3d at 1198 (punitive); Harris v. Garner (Harris I), 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (compensatory), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir.1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
James Alexander Logan v. Edward Hall
Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (11th Cir.), vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir.1999), reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 , 972, 985 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Day v. Vaughn
Appx. 489, 491 (11th Cir.2009) ("[PJursuant to § 1997e(e), a prisoner bringing a § 1983 action must demonstrate physical injury ... in order to recover compensatory or punitive damages for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody.” (emphasis added)); Frazier v. McDonough, 264 Fed.Appx. 812 , 815 (11th Cir.2008) (Finding claims for compensatory and punitive damages barred where plaintiff alleged mental and emotional injuries, but no physical injury); Napier, 314 F.3d at 534 (same); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir.2007) (concluding that the PLRA precluded recovery o…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Harris
v.
Garner
v.
Garner
18-13957.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Sep 30, 1999.
190 F.3d 1279
Cited by 91 opinions | Published
Citer courts: S.D. Georgia (1)
Frederick Lamar HARRIS, Danny Chadwick, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Wayne GARNER, Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, A.G. Thomas, Director of Facilities Division of the Georgia Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 98-8899.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 6, 1999.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (No. 5:97-CV-79-4); Hugh
v.
Wayne GARNER, Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, A.G. Thomas, Director of Facilities Division of the Georgia Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 98-8899.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 6, 1999.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (No. 5:97-CV-79-4); Hugh
Lawson, Judge.
(Opinion September 30, 1999, 190 F.3d 1279, 11th Cir., 1999)
Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:
A member of this court in active service having requested a poll on the suggestions of rehearing en banc and a majority of the judges in this court in active service having voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc, IT IS ORDERED that the above cause shall be reheard by this court en banc. The previous panel's opinion is hereby VACATED.