Church Of Scientology Flag Serv., Org., Inc. v. City Of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1993). · Go Syfert
Church Of Scientology Flag Serv., Org., Inc. v. City Of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we review the factual findings underlying a district court's determination regarding 'prevailing party' status for clear error. ... whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a 'prevailing party' is a legal question reviewed de novo.”
73 citation events (34 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Missouri (ca8, 1997-10-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Missouri
8th Cir. · 1997 · signal: accord · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we review the factual findings underlying a district court's determination regarding 'prevailing party' status for clear error. ... whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a 'prevailing party' is a legal question reviewed de novo.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beach Blitz Co. v. City of Miami Beach, Florida (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
“Whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a ‘prevailing party’ is a legal question reviewed de novo.” Id. at 1513. 12 USCA11 Case: 19-11380 Date Filed: 09/21/2021 Page: 13 of 41 We review the “determination that a plaintiff’s case was so frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, as to justify an award of fees under” 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for abuse of discretion.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dexter Laney v. BBB Logistics, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Id. at 1513.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jefferson County Board of Education v. Bryan M.
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Id. at 1513. ■ In order to be considered a “prevailing party” for IDEA purposes, “ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.
cited Cited as authority (rule) April Aaron-Brush v. Attorney General State of Alabama
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
“Whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a ‘prevailing party’ is a legal question reviewed de novo.” Id. at 1513.
cited Cited as authority (rule) TEC SERV, LLC v. Michael Alan Crabb
11th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
“Whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a ‘prevailing party 1 is a legal question reviewed de novo.” Id. at 1513.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Outdoor Systems, Inc v. City of Clawson
Mich. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Bailey v Mississippi, 407 F3d 684, 687 (CA 5, 2005); Palmetto Properties, Inc v DuPage Co, 375 F3d 542, 547 (CA 7, 2004); Richard S v California Dep’t of Developmental Services, 317 F3d 1080, 1086 (CA 9, 2003); Christina A ex rel Jennifer A v Bloomberg, 315 F3d 990, 992 (CA 8, 2003); Truesdell v Philadelphia Housing Auth, 290 F3d 159 , 163 (CA 3, 2002); Smyth v Rivero, 282 F3d 268 , 274 (CA 4, 2002); Church of Scientology Flag Service Org, Inc v City of Clearwater, 2 F3d 1509, 1513 (CA 11, 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paramijit S. Virdi v. DeKalb County School Dist. (2×)
11th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
“We review the factual findings underlying a district court’s determination regarding ‘prevailing party’ status for clear error.” Church of Scientology Flag Serv. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir.1993).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. West Palm Beach, City of (3×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Cullens v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489 , 1494-95 & n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (discussing question of whether dicta in Farrar eliminated the catalyst test; leaving question open because plaintiffs could not show that they met the catalyst test); Scientology II, 2 F.3d at 1513-14 (implicitly holding that the catalyst test survived Farrar by applying it after the opinion in Farrar was issued). 3 Because the catalyst test remains viable and because the district court did not address evidence tending to show that Appellants were catalysts for the City’s changes to the Original Ordinan…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. West Palm Beach, City of (5×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Cullens v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489 , 1494-95 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing question of whether dicta in Farrar eliminated the catalyst test; leaving question open because plaintiffs could not show that they met the catalyst test); Scientology II, 2 F.3d at 1513-14 (implicitly holding that the catalyst test survived Farrar by applying it after the opinion in Farrar was issued).3 Because the catalyst test remains viable and because the district court did not address evidence tending to show that Appellants were catalysts for the City's changes to the Original Ordinance, w…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Virginia Society for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell (3×) also: Cited "see"
D. W.Va. · 1998 · confidence medium
Plaintiffs look for support in the Eleventh Circuit statement in Church of Scientology Flag Serv., Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir.1993): "Even if the challenged provision is clarified against the plaintiff's interests, he has succeeded in materially altering the legal relationship in manner that confers some benefit, namely, the certainty of clearly stated legal norms that bind him." Id. at 1514, quoted in (Mem.Supp.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Head v. Medford
11th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
“Whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a ‘prevailing party’ is a legal question reviewed de novo.” Church of Scientology, 2 F.3d at 1513.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. Donald Nixon William Moss Alvin Mahaffey, Jr., Birmingham Fire Fighters Association 117 Birmingham Association of City Employees, Intervenors v. George Seibels, Individually and as Mayor of the City of Birmingham, John W. Martin Major Florence Ida McGruder Sam Coar, Birmingham Fire Fighters Association 117 Birmingham Association of City Employees Billy Gray, Intervenors v. City of Birmingham George C. Seibels, Jr. Mayor of Birmingham Jefferson County Personnel Board, United States of America, Birmingham Fire Fighters Association 117, Intervenors, Robert K. Wilks James A. Bennett Floyd E. Click James D. Morgan Joel Alan Day, Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellants v. Jefferson County, City of Birmingham and George G. Seibels
11th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
That ruling will result in "some action" by the City that is beneficial to the Wilks class, see Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761 , 107 S.Ct. at 2676 , and effectively means that the Wilks class has succeeded on a "significant issue in [the] litigation which achieves some of the benefit [it] sought in bringing suit." City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d at 1513 (internal quote marks omitted). 182 That we have not granted the identical relief originally sought by the class--complete elimination of all goals--is not dispositive.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Branch v. Seibels
11th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
That ruling will result in “some action” by the City that is beneficial to the Wilks class, see Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761 , 107 S.Ct. at 2676 , and effectively means that the Wilks class has succeeded on a “significant issue in [the] litigation which achieves some of the benefit [it] sought in bringing suit.” City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d at 1513 (internal quote marks omitted).
discussed Cited "see" Iliana Garrido v. Interim Secretary, Florida Agency For Health Care Administration (2×)
11th Cir. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 1512- 13.
discussed Cited "see" DocMagic, Inc. v. Mortgage Partnership of America, L.L.C. (2×)
8th Cir. · 2013 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509 , 1512–13 (11th Cir.1993) ("We review the factual findings underlying a district court's determination regarding 'prevailing party' status for clear error . . . .
discussed Cited "see" Coalition for the Abolition v. City of Atlanta
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Church Scientology Flag Serv., Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater (“Church of Scientology II”), 2 F.3d 1509 , 1511 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that we vacated a district court’s order concluding that a former municipal ordinance was facially unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement because it analyzed only the prior ordinance, which had been repealed and replaced by a currently effective ordinance).
discussed Cited "see" Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta (2×)
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Church Scientology Flag Serv., Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater ("Church of Scientology II"), 2 F.3d 1509 , 1511 (11th Cir.1993) (explaining that we vacated a district court's order concluding that a former municipal ordinance was facially unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement because it analyzed only the prior ordinance, which had been repealed and replaced by a currently effective ordinance).
discussed Cited "see" Jenkins v. Missouri
8th Cir. · 1997 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509 , 1512-13 (11th Cir.1993) ("We review the factual findings underlying a district court's determination regarding 'prevailing party' status for clear error....
discussed Cited "see" Johnson v. Mortham (2×)
N.D. Fla. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Church of Scientology Flag Service, Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509, 1514 (11th Cir, 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 807 , 115 S.Ct. 54 , 130 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Covenant Media of California, L.LC. v. City of Huntington Park
C.D. Cal. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Whether Plaintiffs Motion To Enjoin Enforcement Of The Prior Sign Ordinance Is Moot As noted, “[t]he complete repeal of a challenged statute naturally renders a request for an injunction against application of that statute moot.” Rembert, supra, 62 F.3d at 940 ; see also Church of Scientology Flag Service, Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir.1993) (vacating a district court’s order enjoining a former municipal ordinance on the basis that it was facially unconstitutional because it analyzed only the prior ordinance, which had been repealed and replaced by a new o…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. City of Atlanta Department of Aviation
N.D. Ga. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See e.g., Church of Scientology Flag Service, Org., Inc., v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509, 1514 (11th Cir.1993) (plaintiff did not fail to qualify as prevailing party where defendant ceased some of its challenged conduct while persisting in other challenged conduct); cf. Markham v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, et al, 901 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir.1990) (where preliminary injunction merely preserved status quo, plaintiff was not a prevailing party).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Church of Scientology Flag Service, Org., Inc.
v.
City of Clearwater, Thomas Bustin, City Attorney of the City of Clearwater, Lucille Williams, City Clerk of the City of Clearwater
91-3760.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Sep 30, 1993.
2 F.3d 1509

2 F.3d 1509

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE, ORG., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CLEARWATER, Thomas Bustin, City Attorney of the City
of Clearwater, Lucille Williams, City Clerk of the
City of Clearwater, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-3760.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

Sept. 30, 1993.

Eric M. Lieberman, Edward Copeland, Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C., New York City, Paul B. Johnson, Johnson & Johnson, Tampa, FL, for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank Kowalski, Chief Asst. City Atty., M.A. Galbraith, Jr., Alan S. Zimmet, Covert & Zimmet, Clearwater, FL, Lawrence R. Velvel, Windham, NH, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before ANDERSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

[*~1509]1

Appellant Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. ("Scientology") challenges the district court's order denying its petition for attorneys' fees in its civil rights action brought against the appellee, City of Clearwater, Florida (the "City"). The district court's ruling was based on its determination that Scientology was not a "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988.[1] Because we hold that Scientology has met the threshold test for prevailing party status, we vacate the district court's order.

I. BACKGROUND

2

In January, 1984, Scientology filed an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 to enjoin the enforcement of Clearwater Ordinance No. 3091-83 (the "1983 Ordinance"). The 1983 Ordinance sought to regulate the solicitation of charitable contributions by imposing, inter alia, reporting and record-keeping requirements and prohibiting fraudulent representations. The district court conducted a hearing on a motion for permanent injunction and directed counsel to file post-hearing memoranda by March 16, 1984.

3

On March 15, 1984, the City enacted Emergency Ordinance No. 3479-84 (the "1984 Ordinance"), which repealed the 1983 Ordinance in part, but retained many of its provisions. Thereafter, the district court ruled on Scientology's pending motion to enjoin the repealed 1983 Ordinance. The district court found the 1983 Ordinance facially unconstitutional in its entirety and enjoined its enforcement permanently. On appeal, we vacated that order as moot, reasoning that only the 1984 Ordinance remained in effect. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116, 106 S.Ct. 1973, 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986).

4

On remand, the district court found the 1984 Ordinance to be constitutional in its entirety.[2] Thereupon, Scientology petitioned for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 on the ground that its earlier litigation triggered the City's decision to repeal portions of the offending 1983 Ordinance.

5

Scientology claims to have "prevailed" on allegations that the 1983 Ordinance discriminated against religious organizations, such as itself, that do not conduct regular prayer meetings. The 1983 Ordinance exempted organizations that solicit funds from "members," defined as "any person regularly attending or participating in a charitable organization." 1983 Ord. Sec. 100.01(5). To be eligible for the exemption, the 1983 Ordinance required organizations to record and disclose the names of members. Scientology alleged that the exemption had been included at the request of mainline denominations in Clearwater and that the principal purpose of the ordinance was to drive Scientology out of Clearwater. Scientology alleged discrimination in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, unwarranted governmental entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, both in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a denial of Equal Protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As a result of these challenges to the limited membership exemption and its disclosure requirement, the provision was repealed by the 1984 Ordinance.

[*~1510]6

Scientology also challenged a provision granting discretion to the City Attorney, upon receipt of ten citizen complaints, to investigate a charitable organization. Reasoning that only "controversial organizations" such as itself would likely be subject to complaints, Scientology argued that the investigative authority was merely a ruse by which to justify city harassment, unbridled by limits on official discretion. The 1984 Ordinance amended the provision by requiring the City Attorney to investigate upon receipt of ten complaints.[3]

7

The 1983 Ordinance, like the 1984 version, required charitable groups to obtain a city permit to solicit funds, imposed a penalty for solicitation without a permit, and authorized judicial review of a decision denying a permit application. Scientology charged that the 1984 Ordinance was overly vague because it did not state whether the penalty could be invoked against an organization that solicited without a permit pending judicial review; if the penalty would have applied in such circumstances, Scientology argued, it would have constituted an improper prior restraint of religious speech. The 1984 Ordinance attempted to pretermit the prior restraint claim by allowing solicitation to continue pending judicial review.

8

The 1984 Ordinance also eliminated a provision requiring disclosure concerning the tax deductibility of contributions, which Scientology had challenged as discriminatory on its face and as applied. The new ordinance repealed an exemption for organizations soliciting from fewer than twenty members, which Scientology challenged on vagueness grounds, and also clarified other allegedly vague provisions. However, the bulk of the record-keeping and regulatory provisions remained intact.

9

The district court denied Scientology's fee request, ruling that it had not "prevailed" because, inter alia, its rights were not vindicated as a result of its lawsuit. Church of Scientology Flag Servs. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 773 F.Supp. 321 (M.D.Fla.1991).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[*~1511]10

A plaintiff must be a "prevailing party" to recover an attorney's fee under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). We review the factual findings underlying a district court's determination regarding "prevailing party" status for clear error. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Fields v. City of Tarpon Springs, 721 F.2d 318, 321 n. 7 (11th Cir.1983); Romberg v. Nichols, 970 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir.1992); see also Perket v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 905 F.2d 129, 132 (6th Cir.1990) ("insofar as the district court based its prevailing party determination on a finding that Perket's lawsuit was the catalyst for the reinstatement of his disability benefits, such a finding is a factual conclusion subject to review for clear error"). Whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a "prevailing party" is a legal question reviewed de novo. Cf. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir.1978) (analysis has legal as well as factual component). Once a district court has determined that a party has "prevailed," its award of attorneys' fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Markham v. International Association of Bridge, etc., 901 F.2d 1022, n. 5 at 1026 (11th Cir.1990); Taylor v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 810 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir.1987); Solomon v. City of Gainesville, 796 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir.1986). The scope of the district court's discretion to deny fees to a prevailing party, however, is "exceedingly narrow." Maloney v. Marietta, 822 F.2d 1023, 1025 (11th Cir.1987).

III. ANALYSIS

11

It is well-settled that a plaintiff is a prevailing party and thus ordinarily entitled to a fee award of "some kind" if the plaintiff has succeeded on "any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 (footnotes omitted), followed, Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493-94, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989).

12

[A]t a minimum, to be considered a prevailing party within the meaning of Sec. 1988 the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant ... The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry [therefore] must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute. Where such a change has occurred, the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award under Hensley, not to the availability of a fee award vel non....

13

Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. at 1494.

14

Scientology has met the threshold requirement of "prevailing party" status. It is undisputed that the suit brought by Scientology caused the City to amend the 1983 Ordinance and it is clear that the amendment significantly affected the parties' legal relationship. The 1984 Ordinance abandoned several challenged provisions, including the limited membership exclusion and the provision providing for unfettered City Attorney investigative and prosecutorial discretion. These successes, while partial only, are neither technical nor de minimis. Id. (citations omitted).

[*~1512]15

Scientology prevailed on its asserted right not to be treated differently from other religious organizations. The gravamen of its challenge was not that the government may not regulate religious organizations, but that it may not do so in a discriminatory manner that favors one religion over another. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1683, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982). That right was plainly vindicated by the repeal of the challenged limited membership exemption, an action which Clearwater conceded at the time was caused by Scientology's articulation of alleged constitutional infirmities. See Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 279 (critical inquiry is whether the suit "prompt[ed] defendants to take action to meet plaintiff's claim....").

16

The same conclusion applies with similar force to a challenge based upon alleged vagueness. Even if a challenged provision is clarified against the plaintiff's interests, he has succeeded in materially altering the legal relationship in a manner that confers some benefit, namely, the certainty of clearly stated legal norms that bind him. In this case, some of the provisions were clarified in Scientology's favor, while others were repealed entirely. Cf. Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 792, 109 S.Ct. at 1494 (dictum) (successful challenge of provision as vague might not alone be sufficient to constitute plaintiff as prevailing, especially if provision had never been enforced).

17

Moreover, it is inappropriate to deny "prevailing party" status merely because Scientology's pleadings in challenging the amended 1984 Ordinance alleged the same or similar constitutional defects as its earlier action. Scientology's challenges were addressed to new features of the amended ordinance, as well as old features carried over from the 1983 Ordinance. The fact that Scientology may (or may not) ultimately prevail in those challenges has little do with the question of whether it prevailed in challenging the repealed provisions of the 1983 Ordinance. Scientology did not fail when Clearwater ceased some of its challenged discriminatory conduct merely because the city persisted in other challenged conduct. For this reason, the fact that Scientology challenges the 1984 Ordinance as invalid is irrelevant. As discussed above, there was a material change in the legal relationship between the parties which benefitted Scientology, and the fact that Scientology continues to challenge that relationship as modified does not mean that it did not "prevail" as a threshold matter.

IV. CONCLUSION

18

Scientology's challenge to the 1983 Ordinance resulted in a material alteration of its legal relationship with the City. It has therefore prevailed for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The district court's order denying the fee award is vacated and the case remanded for a determination of the amount of attorneys' fees to which Scientology as prevailing party is entitled.

[*~1513]19

VACATED and REMANDED.

1

As amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, provides in pertinent part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

2

That order is the subject of a separate appeal, Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir.1993)

3

Although the language of this provision of the 1984 Ordinance appears somewhat ambiguous, the City concedes that it mandates an investigation upon the receipt of ten complaints, whereas the 1983 Ordinance merely conferred discretion to investigate upon receipt of ten complaints