green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 8×
77.2 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2003 ·
…this benefit-segregation requirement obviously assumes that benefits may already be payable during the period the plan is determining whether is a qdro.
at p. 422
⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2010 ·
…whether a state court's order meets the statutory requirements to be a qdro, and therefore is enforceable against the pension plan, is a matter determined in the first instance by the pension plan administrator, and, if necessary, by a court of competent jurisdiction.
at p. 421
⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2003 ·
…while the plan is making this determination, it must segregate the benefits that would be due to the alternate payee under the terms of the dro during the first 18 months that those benefits would be payable if the dro is ultimately deemed a qdro.
at p. 421
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000
2013
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited "but see"
Padgett v. Little
(12×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
(See Files, supra, 428 F.3d at pp. 484, 488; Hogan v. Raytheon, Co. (8th Cir. 2002) 302 F.3d 854, 856 ; Patton, supra, 326 F.3d at p. 1150 ; Tise, supra, 234 F.3d at pp. 418, 423, fn. 6; but see Torres, supra, 60 P.3d at p. 805 [Hawaii Supreme Court].) In Tise, supra, 234 F.3d 415 , the Ninth Circuit expressly had left open the questions of whether a plan participant’s retirement cut off the former spouse’s right to obtain a QDRO with regard to statutory surviving spouse benefits (id. at p. 423, fn. 6), whether such order could be entered nunc pro tunc (id. at p. 426, fn. 10), and whether …
examined
Cited "but see"
In Re Marriage of Padgett
(13×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
(See Files, supra, 428 F.3d at pp. 484, 488; Hogan v. Raytheon, Co. (8th Cir. 2002) 302 F.3d 854, 856 ; Patton, supra, 326 F.3d at p. 1150 ; Tise, supra, 234 F.3d at pp. 418, 423, fn. 6; but see Torres, supra, 60 P.3d at p. 805 [Hawaii Supreme Court].) In Tise, supra, 234 F.3d 415 , the Ninth Circuit expressly had left open the questions of whether a plan participant's retirement cut off the former spouse's right to obtain a QDRO with regard to statutory surviving spouse benefits ( id. at p. 423, fn. 6), whether such order could be entered nunc pro tunc ( id. at p. 426, fn. 10), and whether a …
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Nicholls
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
he evident 9 purpose of the 18month period was to provide a time in which any 10 defect in the original could be cured.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls
(4×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
he evident purpose of the 18-month period was to provide a time in which any defect in the original could be cured.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
MacK v. Kuckenmeister
(5×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
whether a state court's order meets the statutory requirements to be a qdro, and therefore is enforceable against the pension plan, is a matter determined in the first instance by the pension plan administrator, and, if necessary, by a court of competent jurisdiction.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Mack ex rel. Palace Jewelry & Loan Co. v. Kuckenmeister ex rel. Estate of Mack
(5×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
whether a state court's order meets the statutory requirements to be a qdro, and therefore is enforceable against the pension plan, is a matter determined in the first instance by the pension plan administrator, and, if necessary, by a court of competent jurisdiction.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Torres v. Torres
(37×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
while the plan is making this determination, it must segregate the benefits that would be due to the alternate payee under the terms of the dro during the first 18 months that those benefits would be payable if the dro is ultimately deemed a qdro.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Minnesota Life Insurance Company v. Walker
the amount of fees to be awarded in an interpleader action is committed to the 8 sound discretion of the district court
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Minnesota Life Insurance Company v. Stephen McAtee
the amount of fees to be awarded in an 9 interpleader action is committed to the sound discretion of the district court
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Vernon Harris v. Maricopa County Superior Court
the burden of establishing entitle- ment to an attorney's fees award lies solely with the claim- ant.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Farmers New World Life Insurance Company v. Advanced Surgical Care, LLC; Advanced Surgical Care GI Diagnostics, LLC; and Estate of Marinus Koning, by and through its Affiant Patricia O. O’Neill
“The amount of fees to be awarded in an interpleader action is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Trustees of Directors Guild of America– Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Unum Life Insurance Company of America v. Smith
(2×)
While it has not resolved this question directly, the Ninth Circuit has advised that “awards [in interpleader actions] are properly limited to those fees that are incurred in filing the action and pursuing the plan’s release from liability, not in litigating the merits of the adverse claimants’ positions.” Tise, 234 F.3d at 426. (emphasis in original).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Columbus Life Insurance Company v. Yee
ECF No. 40-1 ¶ 5; Tise, 234 F.3d at 426. 19 A. Attorney’s Fees 20 “When it sets a fee, the district court must first determine the presumptive lodestar figure 21 by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable 22 hourly rate.” Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993). 23 1.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jackson National Life Insurance Company v. Lim
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Tise, 234 F.3d at 427. 10 As a general matter, a court will award fees from the proceeds whenever: (1) the party 11 seeking fees is an “a disinterested stakeholder, (2) who had conceded liability, (3) has deposited 12 the funds into court, and (4) has sought a discharge from liability.” Septembertide Publ'g v. Stein 13 & Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675 , 683 (2d Cir. 1989). 14 Based on the record before the Court, it appears that Plaintiff has met all of the criteria for 15 being awarded attorneys’ fees.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Securian Life Insurance Company v. Gillis
(2×)
Request for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 27 Next, Securian asks for an award of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in 1 Schirmer Stevedoring Co., Ltd. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d 188, 195 (9th Cir. 1962). 2 Generally, “[t]he amount of fees to be awarded in an interpleader action is committed to 3 the sound discretion of the district court.” Trustees of Directors Guild of America–Producer 4 Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States of America for the use of Terry Bedford Concerete Construction, Inc. v. Argonaut Insurance Company
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Tise, 234 F.3d at 427. 7 As a general matter, a court will award fees from the proceeds whenever: “(1) the party 8 seeking fees is a disinterested stakeholder; (2) who had conceded liability; (3) has deposited the funds 9 into court; and (4) has sought a discharge from liability.” Septembertide Publ'g v. Stein & Day, Inc., 10 884 F.2d 675 , 683 (2d Cir. 1989).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States of America for the use of Terry Bedford Concerete Construction, Inc. v. Argonaut Insurance Company
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Tise, 234 F.3d at 427. 25 As a general matter, a court will award fees from the proceeds whenever: “(1) the party 26 seeking fees is a disinterested stakeholder; (2) who had conceded liability; (3) has deposited the funds 27 into court; and (4) has sought a discharge from liability.” Septembertide Publ'g v. Stein & Day, Inc., 28 884 F.2d 675 , 683 (2d Cir. 1989).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v. The Estate of Susan Smith
MacPherson-Pomeroy, 2023 WL 21 5722632, at *2 (quoting Tise, 234 F.3d at 427). 22 As one court in this district has noted, “[a]s a general matter, a court will award fees from 23 the proceeds whenever: ‘(1) the party seeking fees is a disinterested stakeholder; (2) who had 24 conceded liability; (3) has deposited the funds into court; and (4) has sought a discharge from 25 liability.’ ” Wells Fargo, 2009 WL 211386 , at *2 (quoting Septembertide Publ’g v. Stein & Day, 26 Inc., 884 F.2d 675 , 683 (2d Cir.1989).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MacPherson-Pomeroy v. North American Company for Life and Health Insurance
(2×)
Cal. Nov. 13, 2014) 24 (citing Tise, 234 F.3d at 427).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MacPherson-Pomeroy v. North American Company for Life and Health Insurance
(2×)
Cal. Nov. 13, 2014) 24 (citing Tise, 234 F.3d at 427).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
American General Life Insurance Company v. Bushman
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
Tise, 234 F.3d at 427. 18 As a general matter, a court will award fees from the proceeds whenever: “(1) the party 19 seeking fees is a disinterested stakeholder; (2) who had conceded liability; (3) has deposited the 20 funds into court; and (4) has sought a discharge from liability.” Septembertide Publ’g v. Stein & 21 Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675 , 683 (2d Cir. 1989).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Kowalski
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Tise, 234 F.3d at 425.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Daniel Neri Ibarra Cabrera
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“In an interpleader action, the broad rule is reasonableness.” Trs. of Dirs. 25 Guild, 234 F.3d at 426. 26 In support of its request, Hartford described the work performed by counsel to include: 27 drafting the interpleader complaint, locating the defendants and serving the complaint, 28 corresponding and communicating with the remaining defendants in this action regarding 8 Case 5:22-cv-00169-MEMF-MAR Document 32 Filed 06/21/22 Page 9 of 10 Page ID #:132 1 information requests, court filings, preparing the stipulation for fund disbursement, and the instant 2 Motion.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Delaware Life Insurance Company v. Covenant Living Communities and Services
(2×)
Cal. 2019) (quoting Tise, 234 F.3d at 427).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Primerica Life Insurance Company v. Mendoza
“Generally, courts have discretion to award attorney fees to a 16 disinterested stakeholder in an interpleader action.” Abex Corp. v. Ski’s Enterprises, Inc., 17 748 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1984). 18 “The amount of fees to be awarded in an interpleader action is committed to the 19 sound discretion of the district court.” Trustees of Directors Guild of America–Producer 20 Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
U.S. Bank National Association v. Beck
Attorney’s fee awards for the interpleader plaintiff are “properly limited to those fees that are incurred in filing the action and pursuing the [stakeholder’s] release from liability, not in litigating the merits of the adverse claimants’ positions.” Tise, 234 F.3d at 426.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Wyo Tech Investment Group LLC
(2×)
This is because “the attorneys’ 6 fees are paid from the interpleaded fund itself, [and] there is an important policy interest in 7 seeing that the fee award does not deplete the fund at the expense of the party who is 8 ultimately deemed entitled to it.” Trustees of Directors Guild of Am.-Producer Pension 9 Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415 , 427 (9th Cir. 2000). “[A]ttorneys’ fee awards are 10 [thus] properly limited to those fees that are incurred in filing the action and pursuing the 11 [interpleader’s] release from liability, not in litigating the merits of the adverse clai…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Principal Life Insurance Company v. Calloway
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“The 6 amount of fees to be awarded in an interpleader action is committed to the sound discretion of the 7 district court.” Tise, 234 F.3d at 426.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
American National Insurance Company v. Leslie Gorman
Guild, 234 F. 3d at 426-27).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cachet Financial Services v. C&J Associates, Inc.
(2×)
Title Co, 2014 WL 13 6390275, at *4 (citing Tise at 426-27). 14 III.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
American National Insurance Company v. Leslie Gorman
Guild, 234 F. 3d at 426-427).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United of Omaha Life Insurance Company v. Marks
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Schirmer Stevedoring Co. v. 22 Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d 188, 194 (9th Cir. 1962). 23 Because attorney’s fees paid to the “disinterested” interpleader plaintiff “are paid from 24 the interpleaded fund itself, there is an important policy interest in seeing that the fee award does 25 26 27 3 The breakdown of United’s fee request is as follows: $400 represents the filing fee, $125 28 represents the cost for service of process upon Wilmington, and $6,358.50 represents United’s attorney’s 1 not deplete the fund at the expense of the party who is ultimately deemed entit…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Field v. USA
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
STANDARD OF LAW 24 “The amount of fees to be awarded in an interpleader action is committed to the sound 25 discretion of the district court.” Trustees of Directors Guild of America-Producer Pension 26 Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company v. Ruckman
Genworth’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs 6 “The amount of fees to be awarded in an interpleader action is committed to the sound 7 discretion of the district court.” Trustees of Directors Guild of America–Producer Pension 8 Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
IN RE: 1563 28th Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94122
Peak 8 Foreclosure states that it has expended $9,371.33 in costs and attorney’s fees but does not explain 9 how it incurred those fees or what they were for.40 As the Ninth Circuit stated, “at least counsel 10 should identify the general subject matter of his time expenditures.” Tise, 234 F.3d at 427.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re the Marriage of Larimore
(2×)
Indeed, a “QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest.” Tise, 234 F.3d at 421. “‘[T]he QDRO provisions of ERISA do not suggest that [the alternate payee] has no interest in the plan[ ] until she obtains a QDRO, they merely prevent her from enforcing that interest until the QDRO is obtained.’ [Citations omitted.]” 234 F.3d at 421.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Patricia Jones (formerly Akers) v. W. Va. Public Employees Retirement System, etc.
(5×)
also: Cited "see"
In deciding whether the decedent’s selection of a designated beneficiary could trump the state orders recognizing his former wife’s right to his pension plan proceeds for a substantial child support arrearage, the appellate court surveyed the scheme of ERISA to observe that “whether an alternate payee has an interest in a participant’s pension plan is a matter decided-by a state court according, to the state’s domestic relations law.” Id. at 421.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marriage of Rush CA3
(Trustees of Directors Guild of America v. Tise, supra, 234 F.3d at p. 421; In re Gendreau (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d 815 , 818 [right to QDRO established under state law at time of divorce decree].) Here, the DRO was clearly intended by David and Virginia, and by the family court in 1995, to effectively transfer the entire community 10 share of the disputed property to Virginia.4 The family court’s ruling on qualification was erroneous.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Van Dusseldorp v. Kim Lean Ho
(4×)
“Interpleader is a valuable procedural device for ERISA plans ... [that] are confronted with conflicting ... claims upon the proceeds of . [the deceased’s] benefit plan.” Tise, 234 F.3d at 426.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Sandra D. T. Griffin v. David L. Griffin, c/o Kimberly Cowser-Griffin, etc.
(4×)
“State family law can ... create enforceable interests in the proceeds of an ERISA plan, so long as those interests are articulated in accord with the QDRO provision’s requirements.” Tise, 234 F.3d at 420; see also Turner v. Turner, 47 Va.App. 76, 79 , 622 S.E.2d 263, 265 (2005) (this Court agreed with wife that the “QDRO simply was an administrative mechanism to effectuate the intent and purpose of the final decree’s award”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gail Michelman v. Lincoln National Life Insuranc
Cf. Tise, 234 F.3d at 426.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Allianz Life Ins. v. Agorio
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Request for Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees “The amount of fees to be awarded in an interpleader action is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Trustees of Directors Guild of America-Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir.2000).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Harris v. Maricopa County Superior Court
(4×)
That is because here as in cases involving attorneys fees generally, “[t]he burden of establishing entitlement to an attorneys fees award lies solely with the claimant.” 1 Trustees of Directors Guild of America-Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 427 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 437 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Carmona v. Carmona
(6×)
also: Cited "see"
In Tise, we addressed the question whether an otherwise valid QDRO assigning other ERISA benefits (i.e., not QJSA benefits) can issue after the death of the plan participant. 234 F.3d at 415.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Owens v. Automotive MacHinist
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
In family law cases, state courts are authorized to “create enforceable interests in the proceeds of an ERISA plan, so long as those interests [comply] with the QDRO provi- sion[s].” Tise, 234 F.3d at 420.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Owens v. Automotive MacHinists Pension Trust
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
In family law cases, state courts are authorized to "create enforceable interests in the proceeds of an ERISA plan, so long as those interests [comply] with the QDRO provision[s]." Tise, 234 F.3d at 420.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Langston v. Wilson McShane Corp.
(2×)
Tise stands for the proposition that “[ERISA] necessarily permits an alternate payee who has obtained a state law DRO before the plan participant’s retirement, death, or other benefit-triggering event to perfect the DRO into a QDRO thereafter.” 234 F.3d at 422.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Trustees of the Directors Guild of America-Producer Pension Benefits Plans, a Collectively Bargained, Joint-Trusteed Labor-Management Trust
v.
Suzanne R. Tise, an Individual, Cybele Tise-Myers, an Individual Chloe Tise-Myers, an Individual, and Yvonne Curry, an Individual, Trustees of the Directors Guild of America-Producer Pension Benefits Plans, a Collectively Bargained, Joint-Trusteed Labor-Management Trust v. Suzanne R. Tise, an Individual, Cybele Tise-Myers, an Individual Chloe Tise-Myers, an Individual, and Yvonne Curry, an Individual
v.
Suzanne R. Tise, an Individual, Cybele Tise-Myers, an Individual Chloe Tise-Myers, an Individual, and Yvonne Curry, an Individual, Trustees of the Directors Guild of America-Producer Pension Benefits Plans, a Collectively Bargained, Joint-Trusteed Labor-Management Trust v. Suzanne R. Tise, an Individual, Cybele Tise-Myers, an Individual Chloe Tise-Myers, an Individual, and Yvonne Curry, an Individual
96-16799.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Dec 6, 2000.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
234 F.3d 415 (9th Cir. 2000)
TRUSTEES OF THE DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA-PRODUCER PENSION BENEFITS PLANS, a collectively bargained, joint-trusteed labor-management trust, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SUZANNE R. TISE, an individual, Defendant-Appellee,
CYBELE TISE-MYERS, an individual; CHLOE TISE-MYERS, an individual, Defendants,
and
YVONNE CURRY, an individual, Defendant-Appellant.
TRUSTEES OF THE DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA-PRODUCER PENSION BENEFITS PLANS, a collectively bargained, joint-trusteed labor-management trust, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SUZANNE R. TISE, an individual, Defendant-Appellee,
CYBELE TISE-MYERS, an individual; CHLOE TISE-MYERS, an individual, Defendants,
and
YVONNE CURRY, an individual, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 96-16799, 96-16994
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Argued and Submitted July 6, 2000
Filed December 6, 2000
NOTE: SEE AMENDED OPINION AT 255 F.3D 661