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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 2001 ·
…the congressional purpose behind the enactment of emtala supports the conclusion that this language only requires a hospital to provide indigent patients with a medical screening similar to one which they would provide any other patient
at p. 117
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discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Barbara Jackson v. East Bay Hospital
as long as a hospital applies the same screening procedures to indigent patients which it applies to paying patients, the hospital does not violate this section of the act.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Bernie Harry, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lisa Normil, Deceased v. Wayne Marchant, M.D., Ali Bazzi, M.D.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
the congressional purpose behind the enactment of emtala supports the conclusion that this language only requires a hospital to provide indigent patients with a medical screening similar to one which they would provide any other patient
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Bernie Harry v. Wayne Marchant
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
the congressional purpose behind the enactment of emtala supports the conclusion that this language only requires a hospital to provide indigent patients with a medical screening similar to one which they would provide any other patient
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Bernie Harry v. Wayne Marchant
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
the congressional purpose behind the enactment of emtala supports the conclusion that this language only requires a hospital to provide indigent patients with a medical screening similar to one which they would provide any other patient
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Erika Fulton v. Fayette Community Hospital, Inc. and Piedmont Healthcare, Inc.
Although EMTALA does not define “appropriate medical screening,” the Eleventh Circuit has stated that “this language only requires a hospital to provide indigent patients with a medical screening similar to one which they would provide any other patient.” Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Lisa Matthews v. Ascension St. Vincents Clay County Hospital
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
The stabilization requirement provides that “after a hospital determines that a person suffers from an ‘emergency medical con- dition’ it must provide whatever treatment, within its capabilities, is needed to stabilize the condition before transferring or discharg- ing the patient.” Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Hanks v. Ascension St. Vincent's Hospital
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
EMTALA “does not define ‘appropriate medical screening,’” but a hospital satisfies its statutory obligation by providing to an indigent patient a medical screening that is “similar to one which [the hospital] would provide any other [paying] patient.” Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (brackets added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
ESTATE OF MINNIE LEE TOMLINSON v. HOUSTON HEALTHCARE
Hosp., 78 F3d 139, 143 (III) (A) (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that EMTALA “does not impose any duty on a hospital requiring that the screening result in a correct diagnosis” and that “[i]nstead, questions related to diagnosis remain the exclusive province of local negligence and malpractice law”) (citations and punctuation omitted); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We reject [the appellant’s] argument that the ‘appropriateness’ of the screening should be determined by the adequacy in identifying the patient’s illness.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Smith v. Crisp Regional Hospital, Inc.
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
“As long as a hospital applies the same screening procedures to indigent patients which it applies to paying patients, the hospital does not violate this section of the Act.” Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (referring to the medical screening requirement set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)). 1 A second major obligation imposed on covered hospitals by the Act is set out in § 1395dd(b).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Baker v. Huntsville Hospital Association, Inc.
(2×)
An appropriate screening must be “calculated to identify critical medical conditions,” and the screening an indigent individual receives “must be similar to that which would be provided for any other patient with similar complaints.” Harry v. Marchant, 237 F.3d 1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Holcomb v Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994)).1 But, EMTALA is not a “substitute for a state malpractice claim,” and its screening requirement “is not intended to ensure each emergency room patient a correct diagnosis.” Id. (citation omitted). 1 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rusinowski v. Village of Hillside
Ctr., 328 F.3d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir.2003); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Torretti v. Main Line Hospitals, Inc.
See, e.g., Vickers, 78 F.3d at 141 ; Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253 , 1258 (9th Cir.1995); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C.Cir. 1991); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(l).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Benjamin Levi Johnson v. Health Central Hospital
As long as a hospital applies the same screening procedures to indigent patients which it applies to paying patients, the hospital does not violate this section of the Act.” Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Millan v. Hosp. San Pablo
See also, Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1995); Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hosp., 43 F.3d 519 , 522 (10th Cir.1994); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994); Baber, 977 F.2d at 879-80 ; Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 . 2 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sabeta v. Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc.
The Holcomb panel reasoned that "section 1395dd(a) is not designed to redress a negligent diagnosis by the hospital,” and that "no federal malpractice claims are created.” See 30 F.3d at 117.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kizzire v. Baptist Health System, Inc.
In addition, EMTALA prohibits a hospital from delaying medical screening or treatment in order to inquire about the individual's method of payment or insurance status. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). “[T]his language only requires a hospital to provide indigent patients with a medical screening similar to one which they would provide any other patient.” Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994) (“As the district court noted, no evidence suggests that Hu-mana treated Ms. Smith differently from other patients.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Tinius v. Carroll County Sheriff Department
Hosp., 43 F.3d 519 , 522 (10th Cir.1994); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Dollard v. Allen
Id.; Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marrero v. Hospital Hermanos Melendez, Inc.
See also, Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1995); Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hosp., 43 F.3d 519 , 522 (10th Cir.1994); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994); Baber, 977 F.2d at 879-80; Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 . 9 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kilroy v. Star Valley Medical Center
Therefore, the “appropriateness of the screening [is not to] be determined by its adequacy in identifying the patient’s illness,” Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994), or by its accuracy in diagnosis.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West
Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir.1996) (en banc) ("So far as we can tell, every court that has considered EMTALA has disclaimed any notion that it creates a general federal cause of action for medical malpractice in emergency rooms."); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994) ("Section 1395dd(a) is not designed to redress a negligent diagnosis by the hospital; no federal malpractice claims are created.").
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West
Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir.1996) (en banc) (“So far as we can tell, every court that has considered EMTALA has disclaimed any notion that it creates a general federal cause of action for medical malpractice in emergency rooms.”); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994) (“Section 1395dd(a) is not designed to redress a negligent diagnosis by the hospital; no federal malpractice claims are created.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bernie Harry, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lisa Normil, Deceased v. Wayne Marchant, M.D., Ali Bazzi, M.D.
(2×)
Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir.1996); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Godwin v. Memorial Medical Center
The goal “is to determine whether a patient with acute or severe symptoms has a life threatening or serious medical condition,” and the hospital must “develop a screening procedure designed to identify such critical conditions that exist in symptomatic patients and to apply that screening procedure uniformly to all patients with similar complaints.” Baber, 977 F.2d at 879. {48} The “ ‘appropriateness’ of the screening [is not to] be determined by its adequacy in identifying the patient’s illness,” Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994), or its accuracy in diagno…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jackson v. East Bay Hospital
But instances of negligence in the screening or diagnostic process, or of mere faulty screening, are not.”); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994) (“As long as a hospital applies the same screening procedures to indigent patients which it applies to paying patients, the hospital does not violate this section of the Act.”); Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 , 1041 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“[A] hospital fulfills the ‘appropriate medical screening’ requirement when it conforms in its treatment of a particular patient to its standard screening procedures.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Phillips v. Hillcrest Medical Center
Dist., 134 F.3d 319, 323 (5th Cir.1998); Summers, 91 F.3d at 1138 ; Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994); Scott v. Hutchinson Hosp., 959 F.Supp. 1351, 1357 (D.Kan.1997) (“A hospital satisfies the requirements of § 1395dd(a) if its standard screening procedure is applied uniformly to all patients in similar medical circumstances.”); Tank v. Chronister, 941 F.Supp. 969, 972 (D.Kan.1996) (quoting Vickers, 78 F.3d at 144 ) (“EMTALA is implicated only when individuals who are perceived to have the same medical condition receive disparate treatment_”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Brenord v. Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn and Queens, Inc.
Fisher, 989 F.Supp. at 449 (citing Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bernie Harry v. Wayne Marchant
Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1996); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Williamson v. Roth
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 144 (4th Cir.1996)(“EMTALA is implicated only when individuals who are perceived to have the same medical condition receive disparate treatment.”); Holcomb, 30 F.3d at 117 (11th Cir.1994)(holding that, as the district court noted, no evidence suggested that the claimant received disparate treatment from other patients and, thus, summary judgment was appropriate); Gardner v. Elmore Comm. Hosp., 64 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1202 (M.D.Ala.1999)(holding that summary judgment is proper if a plaintiff fails “to show the hospital treated [plaintiff] differently from other patien…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Feighery v. York Hospital
(2×)
Hosp., 78 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir.1996); Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192-93 ; Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1995); Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hosp., 43 F.3d 519 , 522 (10th Cir.1994); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994); Baber, 977 F.2d at 879-80; Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 ; Torres Nieves v. Hosp.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marshall Ex Rel. Marshall v. East Carroll Parish Hospital Service District
See Summers, 91 F.3d at 1138 (“An inappropriate screening examination is one that has a disparate impact on the plaintiff”); Vickers, 78 F.3d at 144 (emphasis in original) (“EMTALA is implicated only when individuals who are perceived to have the same medical condition receive disparate treatment”); Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192 (“The essence of this requirement is that there be some screening procedure, and that it be administered even-handedly.”); Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1258 (hospital did not fail to provide “appropriate medical screening examination” where there was no “evidence …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
FISHER BY FISHER v. New York Health and Hospitals Corp.
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Since it was not enacted to remedy negligent diagnosis, see, e.g., Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994), only refusals to follow regular screening procedures violate the statute.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jackson v. East Bay Hospital
Thus, plaintiff argues that the MICRA damages cap should not apply to EMTALA claims because EMTALA creates a cause of action that is not “based on professional negligence.” 4 It is well-established that EMTALA does not create a federal remedy for medical negligence, nor does it duplicate state-law medical malpractice claims; rather, EMTALA creates a separate cause of action which makes hospitals strictly liable for refusing “essential emergency care because of a patient’s inability to pay.” Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); Summe…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
C.M. v. Tomball Regional Hospital
Holcomb v. Humana Medical Corp., 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041; Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir.1990).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Roberts v. Galen Of Virginia
Hosp., 43 F.3d 519 , 522 (10th Cir.1994); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Roberts ex rel. Johnson v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.
Hosp., 43 F.3d 519 , 522 (10th Cir.1994); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Icenhour v. Burke
Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir. 1992); see also, Vickers v. Nash General Hospital Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1996); Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523 (10th Cir. 1994); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994); Green, 918 F. Supp. at 335 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harold Summers v. Baptist Medical Center Arkadelphia
(2×)
Several other circuits have also so held, Vickers v. Nash General Hospital, Inc., supra, 78 F.3d at 143 ; Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1423 , 134 L.Ed.2d 547 (1996); Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hospital, 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th Cir.1994); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994), and we now reaffirm this holding.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harold Summers v. Baptist Medical
Several other circuits have also so held, Vickers v. Nash General Hospital, Inc., supra, 78 F.3d at 143 ; Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (1st Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1423 (1996); Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hospital, 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994), and we now reaffirm this holding.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Franklin D. Vickers, of the Estate of Martin Wade Vickers v. Nash General Hospital, Incorporated James R. Hughes, M.D.
(2×)
Hosp., 43 F.3d 519 , 522 (10th Cir.1994) (EMTALA " 'is neither a malpractice nor a negligence statute.' ") (citation omitted); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994) (EMTALA "is not designed to redress a negligent diagnosis by the hospital; no federal malpractice claims are created.").
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vickers v. Nash General Hospit
Hosp., 43 F.3d 519 , 522 (10th Cir. 1994) (EMTALA"`is neither a malpractice nor a negligence statute.'") (citation omitted); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (EMTALA "is not designed to redress a negligent diagnosis by the hospital; no federal malpractice claims are created.").
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brodersen v. Sioux Valley Memorial Hospital
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994); Baber, 977 F.2d at 883.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Slabik v. Sorrentino
Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994).
discussed
Cited "see"
Benson v. BBH WBMC LLC
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Holcomb, 30 F.3d at 117 (holding that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the hospital knew the patient had a emergency medical condition where, at the time of discharge, the patient’s “vital signs had stabilized”); Cleland, 917 F.2d at 269 (while patient died about a day after four-hour ED admission, hospital was not aware of an emergency medical condition where complaints of abdominal cramps and vomiting were erroneously diagnosed as just the flu and, “to all appearances, the plaintiff’s condition was stable”).
examined
Cited "see"
Gardner v. Elmore Community Hosp.
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994).
discussed
Cited "see"
Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hospital
Accord Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994) ("[N]o federal malpractice claims are created."); Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 879 (4th Cir.1992) ("EMTALA does not impose on hospitals a national standard of care in screening patients."); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C.Cir.1991) ("[W]e cannot agree that [EMTALA] creates a sweeping federal cause of action with respect to what are traditional state-based claims of negligence or malpractice."); see also Collins v. DePaul Hospital, 963 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting languag…
discussed
Cited "see"
Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hospital
Accord Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994) (“[N]o federal malpractice claims are created.”); Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 879 (4th Cir.1992) (“EMTALA does not impose on hospitals a national standard of care in screening patients.”); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“[W]e cannot agree that [EMTALA] creates a sweeping federal cause of action with respect to what are traditional state-based claims of negligence or malpractice.”); see also Collins v. DePaul Hospital, 963 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir.1992) (quo…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
DUFFUS v. MAINEHEALTH
Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (similar).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Guzman Ex Rel. Guzman v. Memorial Hermann Hospital System
See Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.1992); see also Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir.1994).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rosie Nell Holcomb, as Administratrix of the Estate of Barbara Jean Smith, Deceased
v.
Paul P. Monahan, M.D., Humana Medical Corporation, Inc., D/B/A Humana Hospital-Montgomery
v.
Paul P. Monahan, M.D., Humana Medical Corporation, Inc., D/B/A Humana Hospital-Montgomery
93-6762.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Aug 31, 1994.
Cited by 26 opinions | Published
45 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 148
Rosie Nell HOLCOMB, as Administratrix of the Estate of
Barbara Jean Smith, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Paul P. MONAHAN, M.D., Defendant,
Humana Medical Corporation, Inc., d/b/a Humana
Hospital-Montgomery, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 93-6762.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 31, 1994.
Tom Dutton, Pittman, Hooks, Marsh, Dutton & Hollis, Birmingham, AL, for appellant.
Les Hayes, III, Melton, Espy, Williams & Hayes, Montgomery, AL, for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
Before EDMONDSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:
1
This case involves the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395dd, et seq. Plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of Barbara Jean Smith, alleges that Humana's treatment of Smith violated sections 1395dd(a) and (b) of the Act. The district court granted Defendant-Humana's motion for summary judgment on both claims under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c).[1] We affirm the judgment.
2
Section 1395dd(a) of EMTALA requires hospitals to provide persons requiring emergency medical treatment with "an appropriate medical screening examination." The Act does not define "appropriate medical screening." But, the congressional purpose behind the enactment of EMTALA[2] supports the conclusion that this language only requires a hospital to provide indigent patients with a medical screening similar to one which they would provide any other patient. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir.1990); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C.Cir.1991).
3
We reject Plaintiff's argument that the "appropriateness" of the screening should be determined by its adequacy in identifying the patient's illness. Section 1395dd(a) is not designed to redress a negligent diagnosis by the hospital; no federal malpractice claims are created. As long as a hospital applies the same screening procedures to indigent patients which it applies to paying patients, the hospital does not violate this section of the Act. As the district court noted, no evidence suggests that Humana treated Ms. Smith differently from other patients. Holcomb, 831 F.Supp. at 834. Thus, Humana was entitled to summary judgment on the section 1395dd(a) claim.
4
Plaintiff also alleges that Humana violated section 1395dd(b) which says that after a hospital determines that a person suffers from an "emergency medical condition" it must provide whatever treatment, within its capabilities, is needed to stabilize the condition before transferring or discharging the patient.[3] 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395dd(b). To succeed on a section 1395dd(b) claim, a plaintiff must present evidence that the patient had an emergency medical condition, the hospital knew of the condition, the patient was not stabilized before being transferred, and the hospital neither obtained the patient's consent to transfer nor completed a certificate indicating the transfer would be beneficial to the patient and was appropriate. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir.1992). In this case, Plaintiff failed to provide evidence either that Smith was in an emergency medical condition when discharged or that Humana knew of the emergency condition. That Smith, at the time of discharge, told the doctors she was feeling better and that her vital signs had stabilized are undisputed. Humana was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's section 1395dd(b) claim.
5
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
1
The facts of the case are undisputed and are contained in the district court opinion. See Holcomb v. Humana Medical Corp., 831 F.Supp. 829 (M.D.Ala.1993)
2
Congress enacted EMTALA to prevent "patient dumping" (the practice whereby private hospital emergency rooms refuse to treat indigent patients by transferring them to public hospitals or turning them away). H.R.Rep. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 at 5 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579
3
An emergency medical condition is defined as one "manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) ...". 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395dd(e)(1)