Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan
A district court may consider evidence not presented to the plan administrator if circumstances establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review.
An employee sued for long-term disability benefits after his claim was limited due to a plan provision regarding mental illness. The district court granted summary judgment, refusing to consider new medical evidence diagnosing the employee with chronic fatigue syndrome. The court holds that because the plan failed to define 'mental illness' or 'functional nervous disorder,' these terms are ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured. Furthermore, while a district court should not accept new evidence merely because it was not presented to the plan administrator, additional evidence may be necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review when the original hearing was conducted under a misconception of the law.
At page 943Interpreting ambiguous plan terms favoring the insured64 citing cases“to enable the full exercise of informed and independent judgment.”
- Kandice Gray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. 2:23-cv-00630 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2024). (Id. at 841–42.) 25 On de novo review, “the court should not review documents not submitted to the plan 26 administrator prior to its decision.” Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability 27 Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir.…
- Ayers v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 869 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (D. Or. 2012).published(new evidence [not before the plan administrator] may be considered [by the district court] under certain circumstances to enable the full exercise of informed and independent judgment)
- Schwartz v. Metro. Life Ins., 463 F. Supp. 2d 971 (D. Ariz. 2006).published (if either a cause or a symptom of the disease were physical and caused the disability in whole or in part, then benefits are payable)
- Ariana M. v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 884 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2018).published(We agree with the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits that new evidence may be considered under certain circumstances to enable the full exercise of informed and independent judgment.)
- Oldoerp v. Wells Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1237 (N.D. Cal. 2014).published See id. (“There is marked posterior occipital lymphadenopathy with multiple swollen and tender nodes.”).
- Dime v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 764 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (W.D. Wash. 2025).published“when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary 15 to conduct an adequate de novo review”
- Turkoly v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 3:21-cv-01019 (D. Or. Sept. 20, 2023).Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1995).
- Bernardo Sanchez v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-03732 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2022).See id.; Opeta v. Northwest Airlines Pension Plan, 484 6 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term 7 Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1995)).
- (PS) Zelhofer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:16-cv-00773 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2022).Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017 , 1025 (4th Cir. 1993) (en 8 banc)). 9 In most cases only the evidence before the plan administrator at the time of the 10 determination should be reviewed and district courts should not consider additional evi…
- Michele Reed McCoy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 8:19-cv-00575 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2020).“new 3 evidence may be considered under certain circumstances to enable the full exercise of 4 informed and independent judgment”
Show 50 more citing cases
- Furey v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 936 (N.D. Cal. 2020).published Stating that “no one is arguing that Mr. 22 23 2 The court determines Furey’s entitlement to benefits “based on the evidence in the administrative record and ‘other evidence as might be admissible under the restrictive rule’” set out in Mo…
- Sidlo v. Kaiser Permanente Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 3d 1183 (D. Haw. 2016).published“new evidence may be considered under certain circumstances to enable the full exercise of informed and independent judgment”
- Dragu v. Motion Picture Indus. Health Plan for Active Participants, 144 F. Supp. 3d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2015).published“under carefully circumscribed conditions”
- O'Neal v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 10 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (D. Mont. 2014).publishedMongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943-44 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Quesinberry v. Life Ins.
- Dunner v. Univ. of S. California Long Term Disability Plan, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2011).publishedAug. 6, 2007) (citing Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943-44 (9th Cir.1995)).
- Vaught v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp. Health Plan, 408 F. App'x 89 (9th Cir. 2011).unpublishedThe district court’s decision was based on the administrative record, but also noted that the court had previously determined that the introduction of extrinsic evidence was appropriate under Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disabili…
- Doe v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am. (lina), 737 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2010).published Id. at 941.
- Schramm v. CNA Fin. Corp. Insured Grp. Benefits Prog., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2010).publishedThe Ninth Circuit has adopted a de novo scope of review that allows a district court, in its discretion, to consider evidence outside the administrative record in order "to enable the full exercise of an informed and independent judgment.”…
- Ermovick v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP Long Term Disability Coverage for All Employees, 373 F. App'x 761 (9th Cir. 2010).unpublishedWe held that the district court’s “construction of the standard was plainly wrong,” that the review “failed to constitute ‘an independent and thorough inspection of the administrator’s decision,’ ” and that the district court failed to “ ‘…
- Porco v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010).published Thus, “ ‘in most cases,’ only the evidence that was before the plan administrator should be considered.” Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1084 (citing Mongeluzo, 46 F.3d at 944). 67.
- Toth v. Ina Life Ins. Co. of New York, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (D. Or. 2009).publishedMongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir.1995).
- Velikanov v. Union Sec. Ins., 626 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2009).published“only when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision”
- Rex T. KEARNEY, Jr. v. Stand. Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1999).published
- McCoy v. Fed. Ins., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Wash. 1998).published
- Capianco v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Uromed Corp., 247 F. App'x 885 (9th Cir. 2007).unpublished
- Billings v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 459 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 2006).published
- Snow v. Stand. Ins., 87 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 1996).published
- Isaac Thompson v. Long Term Disability Plan for Employees of Usg Corp., 87 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublished
- Ann M. Cohn v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 116 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- Kearney v. Stand. Ins., 144 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 1998).published
- Kenneth L. Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2002).published
- Russann H. Hall v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 300 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2002).published
- Donald Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Emp. Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan Erisa Plan, 310 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002).published
- Eijinio Banuelos v. Constr. Laborers' Trust Funds for S. California, 382 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2004).published
- Toni Feibusch v. Integrated Device Tech., Inc. Emp. Benefit Plan, & Sun Life Assurance Co. Of Canada, 463 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2006).published
- Michael Patton v. MFS/sun Life Fin. Distributors, Inc., 480 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2007).published
- Medford v. Metro. Life Ins., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Nev. 2003).published
- Perez v. Cozen & O'Connor Grp. Long Term Disability Coverage, 459 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (S.D. Cal. 2006).published
- Mizzell v. Paul Revere Ins., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2003).published
- Klund v. High Tech. Solutions, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2005).published
- Grady v. Paul Revere Life Ins., 10 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.R.I. 1998).published
- Parra v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2003).published
- Raithaus v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Haw. 2004).published
- Eusebio Cotto Villegas v. Fed. Express Corp., 468 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.P.R. 2006).published
- Thomas v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal. 1998).published
- Silver v. Exec. Car Leasing Long-Term Disability Plan, 466 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2006).published
- LaMarco v. CIGNA Corp., 33 F. App'x 301 (9th Cir. 2002).unpublished
- Hertan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 111 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2015).published
- Merklin v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 136 F. App'x 29 (9th Cir. 2005).unpublished
- Teplick v. Boeing Co. Emp. Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, 156 F. App'x 917 (9th Cir. 2005).unpublished
- Beaty v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 313 F. App'x 46 (9th Cir. 2009).unpublished
- Loban v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 262 F. App'x 793 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Davis v. First Reliance Stand. Life Ins., 277 F. App'x 737 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Ermovick v. Silberberg, 282 F. App'x 623 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Flynn v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2011).published
- Baxter v. MBA Grp. Ins. Trust Health & Welfare Plan, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (W.D. Wash. 2013).published
- Rzasa v. Reliance Stand. Ins., 2000 DNH 075 (D.N.H. 2000).published
- Frank Regula v. Delta Fam.-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- Micha v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (S.D. Cal. 2011).published
- Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2017).published
At page 944Allowing additional evidence for de novo review61 citing casesIn [certain] circumstances . . . additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision” but “[w]e emphasize that a district court should not take additional evidence merely because someone at a later time comes up with new evidence that was not presented to…
- Kandice Gray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. 2:23-cv-00630 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2024). (We emphasize that 28 a district court should not take additional evidence merely because someone at a later 1 time comes up with new evidence that was not presented to the plan administrator.)
- Bunger v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 299 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (W.D. Wash. 2018).published([T]he claim of [CFS] is not a new claim, but simply a new explanation for Mongeluzo's disability.)
- Schwartz v. Metro. Life Ins., 463 F. Supp. 2d 971 (D. Ariz. 2006).published The administrative record evidence does not support the conclusion that Plaintiff is disabled due only to “mental illness” which is defined as a “mental, emotional or nervous condition of any kind.” See, e.g., Mongeluzo, 46 F.3d at 943 (“i…
- Virgil Harris v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 42 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2022).published(In [certain] circumstances . . . additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision” but “[w]e emphasize that a district court should not take additional evidence merely beca…)
- Johal v. United States Life Ins. Co. in the City of New York, 494 F. Supp. 3d 644 (D. Ariz. 2020).published (We leave to the district court whether to remand to the plan 8 administrator for an initial factual determination.)
- Perez v. Unum Life Ins. Co. Of Am., No. 5:21-cv-03207 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2022).Co., 458 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 24 2006). 25 In reviewing the plan administrator’s decision, the Court has discretion to allow evidence 26 that was not before the plan administrator, but “only when circumstances clearly establish that 27…
- (PS) Zelhofer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:16-cv-00773 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2022).Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017 , 1025 (4th Cir. 1993) (en 8 banc)). 9 In most cases only the evidence before the plan administrator at the time of the 10 determination should be reviewed and district courts should not consider additional evi…
- McCluer v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, No. 3:21-cv-00008 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2021). After his administrative 14 appeal was denied, Mongeluzo was seen by an immunologist who opined that Mongeluzo 15 “had been disabled from [chronic fatigue syndrome] since April 1986 and that his 16 disability was not caused by a mental ill…
- Kollar v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, No. 3:20-cv-05278, 2021 WL 2949801 (W.D. Wash. July 14, 2021).“[A] district court should not take 21 additional evidence merely because someone at a later time comes up with new evidence that 22 was not presented to the plan administrator”
- Wolf v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 541 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (W.D. Wash. 2021).publishedEven if it were, 21 courts may consider external evidence in ERISA cases on de novo review only “‘when 22 circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an 1 adequate de novo review of the benefit decision…
Show 48 more citing cases
- Alicia Perez v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 843 F. App'x 57 (9th Cir. 2021).unpublished“circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision”
- Clifton v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., No. 2:19-cv-02091 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2020).It may “exercise its discretion to consider evidence outside of the 4 administrative record ‘only when the circumstances clearly establish that additional 5 evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decisio…
- Benjamin Wise v. Monterey Cnty. Hosp. Ass'n Health & Welfare Plan, No. 5:18-cv-07454 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2020).“The district court should exercise its 11 discretion, however, only when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is 12 necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision.” Id. at 944 (internal 13 quot…
- Furey v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 936 (N.D. Cal. 2020).published Stating that “no one is arguing that Mr. 22 23 2 The court determines Furey’s entitlement to benefits “based on the evidence in the administrative record and ‘other evidence as might be admissible under the restrictive rule’” set out in Mo…
- Lowell v. United Behavioral Health, No. 4:20-cv-01989 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2020).“when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary 13 to conduct an adequate de novo review”
- Jones v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 457 F. Supp. 3d 751 (D. Ariz. 2020).publishedAirlines Pension Plan for Contract Emp., 484 F.3d 1211 , 1217 27 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (quoting Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term 28 Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1995)). 1 In Opeta, the Ninth Ci…
- Vanmark Strickland v. At&t Pension Benefit Plan, No. 18-15336 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020).unpublished“a district court should not take additional evidence merely because someone at a later time comes up with new evidence that was not presented to the plan administrator”
- Johnson v. Wellmark of South Dakota, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 3d 780 (D.S.D. 2020).published“only when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review”
- Kollar v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, No. 3:19-cv-05180, 2019 WL 6839335 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2019).“a district court should not take 13 additional evidence merely because someone at a later time comes up with new evidence that 14 was not presented to the plan administrator”
- Vigdorchik v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, No. 4:19-cv-03891 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019).“only 10 when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate 11 de novo review of the benefit decision”
- Alicia Perez v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 2:18-cv-07422 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2019).“circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision”
- Dave Nagy v. Grp. Long Term Disability, No. 16-16160 (9th Cir. June 21, 2018).unpublished“circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision”
- Tommy Dowdy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 890 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2018).published“only when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision”
- Goetz v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 272 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (E.D. Wash. 2017).publishedPlan, 46 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Quesinberry v. Life Ins.
- Lawrence v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2015).published“when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision”
- Carrier v. Aetna Life Ins., 116 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2015).published Apr. 11, 2005) (“At trial, the Court generally considers only ‘the evidence that was before the plan administrator ... at the time of the determination.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability…
- Muniz v. Amec Constr. Mgmt., Inc., 623 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2010).publishedThis argument fails because “[a] district court, when exercising de novo review of an ERISA benefits denial decision, may admit additional evidence when ‘circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an a…
- Doe v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am. (lina), 737 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2010).published Id. at 941.
- Mazet v. Halliburton Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 366 F. App'x 839 (9th Cir. 2010).unpublished Income Protection Plan, 349 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir.2003); Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1090-91 ; Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1995)); Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1090 -91 (quoting Mongeluzo,…
- Porco v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010).published Thus, “ ‘in most cases,’ only the evidence that was before the plan administrator should be considered.” Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1084 (citing Mongeluzo, 46 F.3d at 944). 67.
- Mchenry v. Pacificsource Health Plans, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Or. 2010).published “necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review”
- Olsen v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (E.D. Wash. 2009).publishedFor example, in Friedrich v. Intel Corp., 181 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir.1999), the Ninth Circuit found that a district court, when exercising de novo review of an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) benefits denial, may admit…
- Podolan v. Aetna Life Ins., 909 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Idaho 1995).published
- Kearney v. Stand. Ins., 144 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 1998).published
- Russann H. Hall v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 300 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2002).published
- Donald Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Emp. Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan Erisa Plan, 310 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002).published
- Canseco v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 93 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 1996).published
- Beatriz Lee v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 444 (9th Cir. 1998).unpublished
- Friedrich v. Intel Corp., 181 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1999).published
- Byron Ingram v. Martin Marietta Long Term Disability Income Plan for Salaried Employees of Transferred Ge Operations, 244 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- John W. Dishman v. Unum Life Ins. Co. Of Am., 269 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- Donald Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Emp. Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan Erisa Plan, 349 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2003).published
- Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2006).published
- Henry v. Home Ins., 907 F. Supp. 1392 (C.D. Cal. 1995).published
- Williamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 943 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1996).published
- Waggener v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (S.D. Cal. 2002).published
- Lundquist v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (C.D. Cal. 2005).published
- Fleming v. Kemper Nat'l Servs., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Cal. 2004).published
- Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins., 458 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2006).published
- Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1999).published
- Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 250 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- Dishman v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- Nicula v. First Unum Life Ins., 23 F. App'x 805 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Hyder v. Kemper Nat'l Servs. Inc., 302 F. App'x 731 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Miller v. Verizon Wireless Short Term Disability Plan, 247 F. App'x 880 (9th Cir. 2007).unpublished
- Huntsinger v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 268 F. App'x 518 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Ehrensaft v. Dimension Works Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Nev. 2000).published
- Bunger v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 196 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2016).published
At page 942Reviewing summary judgment and plan ambiguity interpretation20 citing casesDISCUSSION Standard of Review A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1986). Viewing the evidence in…
- Mlk, Jr. Cmty. Hosp. v. Cmty. Ins. Co., No. 19-55053 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2020).unpublishedMongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1995).
- Doe v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am. (lina), 737 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2010).published Id. at 941.
- Dupree v. Holman Prof'l Counseling Centers, 572 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2009).published Dealers Assoc, of Cal. Health and Welfare Benefit, 64 F.3d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1995)).
- Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n of California Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, 64 F.3d 1389 (9th Cir. 1995).published
- Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996).published
- Rex T. KEARNEY, Jr. v. Stand. Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1999).published
- Alford v. DCH Found. Grp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 311 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2002).published
- Podolan v. Aetna Life Ins., 909 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Idaho 1995).published
- Hetterley v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Or. 1998).published
- Gaines v. Sargent Fletcher, Inc. Grp. Life Ins. Plan, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2004).published
Show 7 more citing cases
- United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (E.D. Cal. 2001).published
- Bonilla v. Principal Fin. Grp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Ariz. 2003).published
- McCoy v. Fed. Ins., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Wash. 1998).published
- Qidwai v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 56 F. App'x 425 (9th Cir. 2003).unpublished
- Lay v. Treesource Indus., Inc., 143 F. App'x 786 (9th Cir. 2005).unpublished
- Carter v. Hewlett Packard Co. Income Prot. Plan, 302 F. App'x 752 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Capianco v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Uromed Corp., 247 F. App'x 885 (9th Cir. 2007).unpublished
At page 941Review of disability claim based on medical diagnoses3 citing cases“had been disabled from [chronic fatigue syndrome] since April 1986 and that his 16 disability was not caused by a mental illness or functional nervous disorder”
- McCluer v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, No. 3:21-cv-00008 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2021). “had been disabled from [chronic fatigue syndrome] since April 1986 and that his 16 disability was not caused by a mental illness or functional nervous disorder”
- Doe v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am. (lina), 737 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2010).published Id. at 941.
- Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 910 F. Supp. 1044 (M.D. Pa. 1995).published
v.
BAXTER TRAVENOL LONG TERM DISABILITY BENEFIT PLAN, an unincorporated association Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, a Connecticut corporation and Dynamic Controls, a division of Baxter Travenol Labs, a California corporation
Raymond Mongeluzo appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellees, the Baxter-Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, and Dynamic Controls, a division of Baxter Travenol Laboratories. Mongeluzo’s action is based on the denial of his claim for long-term disability benefits pursuant to section 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1985).[1] Mongeluzo contends the district court erred by refusing to consider new evidence tending to show that he was suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome when he was terminated from his employment in 1986. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
Mongeluzo, who has a Master’s Degree in Business Administration, began work as a hospital information specialist in November of 1985 for Dynamic Controls. His work, which he describes as very demanding, included frequent business trips and overtime. One month after the start of his employment, Mongeluzo suffered an umbilical hernia. He had corrective surgery in January of 1986 and immediately returned to a heavy workload. One week after his surgery, he developed white streaks on his tongue which required medical treatment. His ulcerative colitis, which had required hospitalization in 1973, flared up as well. The symptoms of colitis that persisted in 1986 were severe abdominal cramps, diarrhea, and rectal bleeding.
Mongeluzo states in a declaration dated March 29, 1993, that he began to experience severe fatigue while employed at Dynamic Controls, which rendered him unable to perform his work. He states he also suffered from headaches, oral candidiasis, and back and shoulder pain. In April of 1986 he was terminated for unsatisfactory work performance.
After he was terminated, Mongeluzo received treatment from a psychiatrist for anxiety and depression, and from an internist for his ulcerative colitis. He was examined by at least ten different doctors from April of 1986 until December of 1988, some in connection with his application for workers’ compensation benefits, and some in connection with symptoms including loss of energy, ulcerative colitis, oral candidiasis, painful lymph nodes, headaches, muscle weakness, joint pain, depression, and anxiety. Mongeluzo has never returned to work.
As an employee of Dynamic Controls, Mongeluzo participated in Baxter-Travenol’s long-term disability plan. The governing plan was issued by Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, a subsidiary of CIGNA Employee Benefits Company (CIGNA). CIGNA administers the Baxter-Travenol plan and pays the.benefits. In 1986, Monge-luzo requested Dynamic Controls to send him the forms to apply for long-term disability. In June of 1988, after a lengthy delay and intervention by the Department of Labor, Baxter-Travenol, the parent company of Dynamic Controls, provided Mongeluzo with claim forms and other plan documents. Mongeluzo submitted his claim for long-term disability benefits on August 2, 1988. On January 13, 1989, CIGNA awarded Mongelu-zo retroactive disability benefits for a period of twenty-four months from October 9, 1986, through October 8, 1988.
On May 9,1989, CIGNA notified Mongelu-zo that it was limiting him to twenty-four months of disability benefits based on CIG-NA’s determination that Mongeluzo’s disability was caused by a “mental illness” or a “functional nervous disorder.” This determination was based on a clause in the limita[*941]tions section of the plan that reads in relevant part:
Payment will not be made under this plan for any disability ... for more than 24 months during your lifetime if the disability is caused by mental illness or functional nervous disorder.
On July 7,1989, Mongeluzo appealed CIG-NA’s determination, stating that his disability did not have a psychiatric origin but rather was due to ulcerative colitis and “back disorders.” CIGNA directed Mongeluzo to an orthopedist, Dr. Leonard Kalfuss, for a medical evaluation. After extensive orthopedic testing and a review of Mongeluzo’s available medical history, Dr. Kalfuss reported on July 17,1990, that Mongeluzo’s back ailments would not prevent his employment, suggested a gastrointestinal consultation to rule out ulcerative colitis, and recommended a current psychiatric evaluation to support his opinion that Mongeluzo’s psychological status would require “periodic and continued evaluation.”
On August 31, 1990, CIGNA denied Mon-geluzo’s appeal on the basis of Dr. Kalfuss’ report and the clause in the plan limiting benefits for mental illness. Mongeluzo filed this action, which sought disability benefits beyond the twenty-four month “mental illness” limitation, in federal court on October 8, 1991.
In February of 1992, Mongeluzo received a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome from Dr. Vincent Marinkovieh, an immunologist at Stanford University Medical School. Dr. Marinkovieh declared:
After I completed my work-up and testing of Mr. Mongeluzo I sent a letter dated March 23, 1992 to his attorney ... [in which] I confirmed my earlier diagnosis of [chronic fatigue syndrome] and stated that based upon his history, Mr. Mongeluzo had been disabled from [chronic fatigue syndrome] since April 1986 and that his disability was not caused by a mental illness or functional nervous disorder.
[Chronic fatigue syndrome] is an immunological disorder which, until very recently, has been unfamiliar to many physicians. The syndrome was first reported in the medical literature after an outbreak of fatigue at Incline Village, California in 1984. The diagnostic guidelines of [chronic fatigue syndrome] were first published in 1988.
Dr. Marinkovieh provided his findings to CIGNA on February 26, 1992, stating that Mongeluzo’s “history strongly suggests] a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome with multiple chemical hypersensitivities].” Mar-inkovieh also sent a letter to Mongeluzo’s attorney in which he stated the same findings. The attorney forwarded a copy of Marinkovich’s letter to CIGNA on April 1, 1992. CIGNA refused to consider Dr. Mar-inkovich’s report or to reclassify its diagnosis of Mongeluzo.
The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Mongeluzo argued that the “mental illness” limitation was ambiguous and therefore to be construed against the drafter. Mongeluzo also argued that the district court should consider new evidence. Specifically, Mongeluzo requested the court to consider the diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome because it had been unavailable when he (1) became disabled in 1986, (2) presented a claim for disability benefits to CIGNA in 1988; and (3) appealed to CIGNA in 1989.[2] The court declined to consider the new evidence.
On appeal, Mongeluzo argues that the district court improperly excluded the new medical evidence of chronic fatigue syndrome in its de novo review. He also argues that the district court failed to apply this circuit’s rule that ambiguous terms in an insurance policy must be construed against the drafter.
[*942] DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1986). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant law. Ashton v. Cory, 780 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir.1986).
In actions challenging denials of benefits based on interpretations pursuant to section 1132(a)(1)(B), the district court reviews de novo, “unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 956-57, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989). The benefit plan here does not grant such discretion to the administrator. See Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948, 949 & nn. 1 and 2 (9th Cir.1993) (illustrating language that constitutes grant of discretion). Our review is also de novo.
1. Whether the Terms of the Plan Are Ambiguous
Mongeluzo argues that because the terms “mental illness” and “functional nervous disorder” are not defined in the plan, those terms must be construed against the drafter. Mongeluzo is correct. See id. at 950 (“Ambiguities in the Plan are to be resolved in [the insured’s] favor.”); Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1013, 111 S.Ct. 581, 112 L.Ed.2d 587 (1990).
The district court did not decide whether the terms “mental illness” or “functional nervous disorder” were ambiguous; it only noted they were undefined: “[njeither the PLAN or Summary Plan Description provide[s] a definition of ‘Mental Illness’ or ‘Functional Nervous Disorder.’” In granting summary judgment, the district court concluded that:
Having applied a de novo standard in reviewing the complete record before the plan administrator, the court finds that the decision of the plan administrator that Mr. Mongeluzo’s disability was caused by a mental illness or functional nervous disorder was correct and was supported by ample evidence. It follows that, in accordance with the language of the plan, Plaintiff was entitled to only 24 months of benefits, which, he admits, he received.
No. 91-5467 WJR (Bx), Order Granting Summary Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (filed 4/8/93) at 4, para. 3.
However, in considering motions for summary judgment, the district court must decide whether there are genuine issues of material fact, not whether there was substantial or ample evidence to support the plan administrator’s decision. See Casey v. Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1098 (7th Cir.1994) (“Where the plan administrator has left contested issues of fact unresolved, the district court’s review under Rule 56(c) should have been limited to determining whether any of the facts in dispute were material.”).
Mongeluzo argues that his disability is not due to mental illness but rather to an immunological disorder. Mongeluzo further argues that:
[T]he mental illness limitation was ambiguous as applied to plaintiff even prior to the diagnosis of [chronic fatigue syndrome]. Plaintiff suffered from symptoms including fatigue, ulcerative colitis, oral candidiasis, painful lymph nodes, recurrent headaches, muscle weakness, joint pain, depression and anxiety. CIGNA’s policy does not address the question of whether a disability with mixed physical and emotional symptoms and an unclear etiology is considered a “mental illness.” This is particularly problematic in cases — such as plaintiffs— where the vast majority of symptoms are physical, but the patient becomes depressed or anxious over a lack of adequate medical diagnosis and treatment.
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14.
In Patterson, we said the undefined term “mental disorder” was ambiguous in two ways:
First, the Plan does not specify whether a disability is to be classified as “mental”[*943] by looking to the cause of the disability or to its symptoms....
Second, the Plan does not make clear whether a disability qualified as a “mental disorder” when it results from a combination of physical and mental factors.
Patterson, 11 F.3d at 950. The same observations are true in the case before us; therefore, the terms of the Baxter-Travenol Plan are ambiguous. Because of the rule that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the insured, if either a cause or a symptom of the disease were physical and caused the disability in whole or in part, then benefits are payable. Id. at 951.
Because the critical terms of the plan are ambiguous, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Mongeluzo’s symptoms constituted a “mental illness” or a “functional nervous disorder.” Consequently, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
2. Whether the District Court Erred by Failing to Consider New Medical Evidence
Because the plan administrator and the district court did not recognize the ambiguity of the terms “mental disorder” or “functional nervous disorder,” they failed to make the proper factual findings as to the nature of Mongeluzo’s disability. See id. at 951.
We now must decide whether the evidence regarding Mongeluzo’s chronic fatigue syndrome may be considered on remand.
The district court declined to consider the new evidence:
Defendants moved to exclude the declaration of Dr. Marinkovich and other documentation not before the plan administrator at the time of appeal. Where there was a sufficiently developed record before the plan administrator the court should not review documents not submitted to the plan administrator prior to its decision, James v. Equicor, 791 F.Supp. 804 (N.D.Cal.1992). Accordingly, the court will not review or evaluate Dr. Marinko-vieh’s evidence because it was not submitted to the plan administrator during the investigation and appeal of Mr. Mongelu-zo’s claim.
The court exercises its discretion to limit its review to the record before the administrator because the record was sufficiently developed.
No. 91-5467 WJR (Bx), Order Granting Summary Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (filed 4/8/93) at 4, paras. 1 & 2.
The scope of review that a district court may use upon de novo review of a plan administrator’s decision has not been resolved in this circuit. Mongeluzo urges us to follow a number of other circuits that permit the admission, under carefully circumscribed conditions, of new evidence that was not part of the record before the plan administrator. See Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d at 1098-99 & n. 4; Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir.1993); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir.1993) (en banc); Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare and Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1184-85 (3d Cir.1991); Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir.1989); cf. Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir.1992) (upholding rejection of evidence that was not before the plan administrator); Perry v. Simplicity Eng’g, Div. of Lukens Gen. Indus., Inc., 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir.1990) (limiting the district court’s review to the evidence presented to the plan administrator).
We agree with the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits that new evidence may be considered under certain circumstances to enable the full exercise of informed and independent judgment. In Quesinberry, the Fourth Circuit stated:
[W]e ... believe that the purposes of ERISA ... warrant significant restraints on the district court’s ability to allow evidence beyond what was presented to the administrator. In our view, the most desirable approach to the proper scope of de novo review under ERISA is one which balances the[ ] multiple purposes of ERISA. Consequently, we adopt a scope of review that permits the district court in [*944] its discretion to allow evidence that was not before the plan administrator. The district court should exercise its discretion, however, only when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision. In most cases, where additional evidence is not necessary for adequate review of the benefits decision, the district court should only look at the evidence that was before the plan administrator ... at the time of the determination.
987 F.2d at 1025 (emphasis added). In the circumstances of this ease, additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision because the narrow definition of “mental illness” in Patterson changes the legal posture of this case and requires reevaluation of the evidence.
Seen in this light, the claim of chronic fatigue syndrome is not a new claim, but simply a new explanation for Mongeluzo’s disability. Thus, evidence regarding chronic fatigue syndrome must be considered on remand as one possible explanation for the disability that Mongeluzo has experienced. Consideration of that explanation is part of the determination of whether physical causes or physical symptoms were in whole or in part a cause of Mongeluzo’s disability such that benefits must be paid. Thus, the change in the posture of the ease, occasioned by the narrow definition of “mental illness,” justifies the taking of additional evidence.
We emphasize that a district court should not take additional evidence merely because someone at a later time comes up with new evidence that was not presented to the plan administrator. However, where the original hearing was conducted under a misconception of the law; that is, the meaning of “mental illness” or “functional nervous disorder,” it is necessary for the case to be reevaluated in light of the proper legal definitions.
We therefore remand to the district court for a factual determination whether Monge-luzo suffers from a disability not “caused by mental illness or functional nervous disorder,” as we have construed those terms. We leave to the district court whether to remand to the plan administrator for an initial factual determination. See Patterson, 11 F.3d at 951 (remand to administrator ordered); Uddeholm, 32 F.3d at 1099 n. 4 (“The district court is not required to remand the case to the administrator.”).
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED for findings and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Section 1132(a)(1)(B) provides:
A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his righls under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.
The evidence Mongeluzo offered in district court that was not in the administrative record was: (1) Dr. Marinkovich’s report; (2) an affidavit from the Area Supervisor of the Division of Workers’ Compensation, explaining that the decision to award workers' compensation was based solely on physical disability; and (3) an affidavit from Dr. Marinkovieh submitting seven medical articles that conclude that chronic fatigue syndrome is likely caused by an immunological factor and that depression results from the syndrome, rather than the syndrome resulting from depression.