N. California Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co.
A defect in removal procedure must be raised within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal, regardless of whether a timely remand motion is filed.
A labor union moved to remand a removed case to state court, citing a forum selection clause and a procedural defect in the removal petition. The district court remanded on both grounds. The Ninth Circuit reviews the forum selection clause de novo, holding it is permissive rather than mandatory, so it does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in state court. Regarding the procedural defect, the court interprets the statute requiring such defects to be raised within 30 days of the notice of removal. Because the union raised the defect in a reply brief filed after the 30-day period, the district court lacked authority to remand on that basis. The court vacates the district court's order remanding the case to state court.
At page 1037Determining mandatory nature of forum selection clause25 citing cases“to be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one.”
- Woodbridge Englewood, Inc. v. Angstrom Fiber Englewood, LLC, No. 1:24-cv-01183 (D. Del. Sept. 16, 2024).(To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one.)
- Woodbridge Englewood, Inc. v. Angstrom Fiber Englewood, LLC, No. 3:24-cv-00056 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2024).(To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one.)
- Mayer v. gpac, LLP, No. 4:23-cv-04085 (D.S.D. May 26, 2023).(To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one.)
- Mayer v. gpac, LLP, No. 3:22-cv-00949 (M.D. Tenn. May 26, 2023).(To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one.)
- Lindfors v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:20-cv-00178 (D. Alaska Dec. 28, 2021).“a remand motion based on a defect in removal procedure must be filed within 30 days after the notice of removal is filed.”
- Wixen Music UK Ltd. v. Transparence Ent. Grp., Inc., No. 2:21-cv-02663 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2021).(To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a 8 forum as the exclusive one.)
- C&S Outdoor Power Equip., Inc. v. ODES Indus. LLC, No. 1:19-cv-01029, 2019 WL 4197608 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2019).(To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one.)
- Scepter, Inc. v. Nolan Transp. Grp., LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d 825 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).published(To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one.)
- Joel Beck v. Nationstar Mortg., 700 F. App'x 691 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished“28 u.s.c. 1447(c) prohibits a defect in removal procedure from being raised later than 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal" and "remand motion based on a defect in removal procedure must be filed within 30…”
- Lender LLC v. Hometown Equity Mortg. LLC, No. 4:22-cv-00304 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2022). (finding forum 3 selection clause was not mandatory because it only provided that the parties consented to 4 jurisdiction in San Francisco County Superior Court and did not specify that jurisdiction 5 was not permitted i…)
Show 15 more citing cases
- MicroDental Labs., Inc. v. Hoofard, No. 2:21-cv-00482 (D. Or. May 28, 2021). Further, “the question whether the forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive is a matter of contract interpretation.” Id. at 1036.
- 1250 Oceanside Partners v. Maryl Grp., Inc., 652 F. App'x 588 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublishedCouncil of Laborers, 69 F.3d at 1036; and that California state courts “shall have jurisdiction over the parties in any action,” Hunt Wesson, 817 F.2d at 76 .
- Omnicell, Inc. v. Medacist Solutions Grp., LLC, 272 F.R.D. 469 (N.D. Cal. 2011).publishedCouncil of Laborers, 69 F.3d at 1036-37 (clause stating that a decision “shall be enforceable by a petition to confirm an arbitration award filed in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco” is permissive).
- Koresko v. RealNetworks, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (E.D. Cal. 2003).publishedId. at 1037.
- HSU v. Oz Optics Ltd., 211 F.R.D. 615 (N.D. Cal. 2002).publishedCouncil of Laborers, 69 F.3d at 1037.
- Dacosta v. Novartis Ag, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Or. 2001).publishedId. at 1037.
- Davis v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 958 F. Supp. 264 (M.D. La. 1997).published Northern California District Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir.1995). 3 .
- Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Iowa 1996).publishedAlthough Terra asserts that the “mandatory” and “exclusive” criteria are separate prongs of the analysis of the enforceability of a forum selection clause, in Council of Laborers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined one of those cri…
- Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985 (C.D. Cal. 1996).published“[a] motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a)”
- United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2000).published
- State of Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2015).published
- Korman v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 32 Cal. App. 5th 206 (Ct. App. 2019).published
- McNeil v. Stanley Works, 33 F. App'x 322 (9th Cir. 2002).unpublished
- Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2015).published
- BRE Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:24-cv-00159 (D. Haw. Sept. 11, 2024).
At page 1038Procedural defect in removal raised after thirty days18 citing cases“the district court had no authority to remand the case to the state court on the basis of a defect in removal procedure raised for the first time more than 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.”
- In re Edward Jones Holders Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2006).published ([T]he district court had no authority to remand the case to the state court on the basis of a defect in removal procedure raised for the first time more than 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.)
- Sanchez, No. 5:25-cv-07203 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2026).“28 u.s.c. 1447 (c) 4 prohibits a defect in removal procedure from being raised later than 30 days after the filing of the 5 notice of removal, regardless of whether a timely remand motion has been filed.”
- Julie Ambrose v. Porsche Cars North Am., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-08229 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025).(We hold that § 1447(c) prohibits a defect in removal procedure from being raised later than 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal, regardless of whether a timely remand motion has been filed.)
- Lena Simmons v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 5:23-cv-01334 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2023).([T]he district court had no authority to remand the case to the state court on the basis of a defect in removal procedure raised for the first time more than 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.)
- L.J. v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 3:20-cv-01569 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2020).(district court had no authority to remand the case to 9 the state court on the basis of a defect in removal procedure raised for the first time more 10 than 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.)
- In re Ford Motor Co. Citibank South Dakota), 264 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2001).published([U]nder Thermtron, we have jurisdiction to decide whether a district court has the power to do what it did in issuing a remand order, although we cannot examine whether a particular exercise of power was proper.)
- McCauley v. Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2001).published([Ujnder Thermtron , we have jurisdiction to decide whether a district court has the power to do what it did in issuing a remand order, although we cannot examine whether a particular exercise of power was proper.)
- Schroeder v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. 3:24-cv-02067 (D. Or. Aug. 4, 2025). (explaining that the moving part must “assert[] a procedural defect as a basis for remand” within 30 days)
- Lauren Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947 (9th Cir. 2024).published “cannot examine whether a particular exercise of power was proper”
- Marlene Thomas v. Aeolus Air Charter, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01523 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2023).Id. at 1038; see also In re Edward Jones Holders Litig., 453 F. 8 Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (C.D.
Show 8 more citing cases
- Carlos Delgado v. Lincoln Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 2:19-cv-09449 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2019).Council, 69 F.3d at 1038; 23 Ungureanu, 2013 WL 1091279 , at *3 n.2. 24 25 Plaintiff likely assumed that his thirty-day window was extended because Lincoln 26 Defendants’ notice of removal was served by mail.
- McDowell Welding & Pipefitting, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 285 B.R. 460 (D. Or. 2002).publishedCouncil of Laborers v. Pitts- *468 burg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1038 (1995).
- Davis v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 958 F. Supp. 264 (M.D. La. 1997).published Northern California District Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir.1995). 3 .
- Pierpoint v. Barnes, 94 F.3d 813 (2d Cir. 1996).published(The statutory purpose served by requiring defects in removal procedure to be raised promptly would be defeated if a party were free to raise such a procedural defect more that 30 days after the filing of the notice of…)
- Buckley v. BMW of North Am., No. 2:19-cv-01255 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2019).
- Vanessa Amaya v. Nissan North Am., Inc., No. 5:23-cv-00875 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2023).
- Emma C. Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006).published
- Academy of Country Music v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 991 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2021).published
At page 1036Determining if forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive7 citing casesclause stating that a decision “shall be enforceable by a petition to confirm an arbitration award filed in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco” is permissive
- Lender LLC v. Hometown Equity Mortg. LLC, No. 4:22-cv-00304 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2022). "To be mandatory, a clause must contain 2 language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one." Id. at 1037 (finding forum 3 selection clause was not mandatory because it only provided that the parties consented to 4 jurisdiction…
- MicroDental Labs., Inc. v. Hoofard, No. 2:21-cv-00482 (D. Or. May 28, 2021). Further, “the question whether the forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive is a matter of contract interpretation.” Id. at 1036.
- 1250 Oceanside Partners v. Maryl Grp., Inc., 652 F. App'x 588 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublishedCouncil of Laborers, 69 F.3d at 1036; and that California state courts “shall have jurisdiction over the parties in any action,” Hunt Wesson, 817 F.2d at 76 .
- Holck v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., 769 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Haw. 2011).publishedCouncil of Laborers, 69 F.3d at 1036-37 (concluding that a forum selection clause, which provided that “[a] decision of the Board of Adjustment ... or the decision of a permanent arbitrator shall be enforceable by a petition to confirm an…
- Omnicell, Inc. v. Medacist Solutions Grp., LLC, 272 F.R.D. 469 (N.D. Cal. 2011).published(clause stating that a decision “shall be enforceable by a petition to confirm an arbitration award filed in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco” is permissive)
- King v. PA Consulting Grp., Inc., 78 F. App'x 645 (10th Cir. 2003).unpublishedThe Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Hunt Wesson in Northern California District Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (9th Cir.1995); the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted its analysis in Caldas & Sons, Inc. v…
- Christopher M. Terran v. Jerold Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 1997).published(reviewing de novo because interpretation of forum selection clause in collective bargaining agreement “does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence)
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- Conrad Vega v. HD Supply Mgmt., Inc., No. 2:26-cv-03123 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2026).
- Pedro Paulo Mansur Pagano Sampaio v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:26-cv-04533 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2026).
- Eloy Guillermo Mora v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 2:25-cv-08700 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025).
- Arlette Villegas v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 2:25-cv-07639 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025).
- Jose Jesus Guerrero Torres v. Nat'l Passenger R.R. Corp., No. 2:23-cv-01066 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2023).
- Aerospace Eng'g Support Corp. v. Eaton Aerospace LLC, No. 2:22-cv-09317 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2023).
- Andrew Risk v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 2:22-cv-09382 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2023).
- Lawrence Jones v. FCA US, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-00859, 2022 WL 1154534 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2022).
- Lawrence Reed v. Sunbridge Hallmark Health Servs., LLC, No. 2:21-cv-03702 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2021).
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- Ebony Stone v. Long Beach Healthcare Ctr., LLC, No. 2:21-cv-00326, 2021 WL 1163572 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021).
- Cari R. Andrews v. Essilor Labs. of Am., Inc., No. 2:20-cv-06332 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2020).
- Darrell Kroeger v. Vertex Aerospace LLC, No. 2:20-cv-03030, 2020 WL 3546086 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2020).
- Keith Roy v. Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-02547 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2020).
- Gloria Campos v. Benny Whitehead Logistics, LLC, No. 5:20-cv-00395 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020).
v.
PITTSBURG-DES MOINES STEEL CO., and Pitt-Des Moines, Inc.
OPINION
WILLIAM A. NORRIS, Circuit Judge:This action to confirm an arbitration award was originally filed in San Francisco Superior Court by the Northern California District Council of Laborers. Defendant Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. removed the action to federal[*1036] court, asserting federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The district court remanded the ease to San Francisco Superior Court on alternative grounds, both of which Pitt-Des Moines now challenges.
First, the district court held that a forum selection clause in the collective bargaining agreement vested exclusive jurisdiction in San Francisco Superior Court over actions to confirm arbitration awards.[1] PittDes Moines argues that the forum selection clause was permissive (permitting jurisdiction in Superior Court) rather than mandatory (requiring that actions be brought only in that court).
Second, the district court held that Pitt-Des Moines’ failure to join P.D.M. Steel Co., a named co-defendant, in the removal petition rendered the petition procedurally defective under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Pitt-Des Moines argues that the district court lacked authority to remand on this basis because the Laborers did not raise the issue of a defect in removal procedure within the 30-day period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
We consider these issues in turn.[2]
I
Forum Selection Clause
The question whether the forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive is a matter of contract interpretation that we review de novo because it does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence.[3] Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir.1987).
The forum selection clause reads as follows:
[a] decision of the Board of Adjustment ... or the decision of a permanent arbitrator shall be enforceable by a petition to confirm an arbitration award filed in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, State of California.
The Laborers interpret the clause to mean that San Francisco Superior Court is the exclusive forum in which arbitration awards may be enforced. Pitt>-Des Moines responds that the effect of the clause is merely that both parties consent to jurisdiction and venue in San Francisco Superior Court, but not that they cannot litigate elsewhere. In our view, Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75 (9th Cir.1987), is controlling authority that the forum selection clause at issue here is permissive, as Pitt-Des Moines contends, not mandatory, as the Laborers contend.
In Hunt Wesson, the forum selection clause provided that the courts of Orange County, California, “shall have jurisdiction over the parties in any action” arising out of the contract. Id. at 76. In interpreting this language as permissive rather than mandatory, we said:
The language says nothing about the Orange County courts having exclusive jurisdiction. The effect of the language is merely that the parties consent to the jurisdiction of the Orange County courts. Although the word “shall” is a mandatory term, here it mandates nothing more than that the Orange County courts have jurisdiction. Thus, [the defendant] cannot object to litigation in the Orange County Superior Court on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction. Such consent to jurisdiction, however, does not mean that the same subject matter cannot be litigated in any other court. In other[*1037] words, the forum selection clause in this case is permissive rather than mandatory.
To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one. For example, in Hunt Wesson we distinguished the clause at issue in Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir.1984), which stated that “this Agreement shall be litigated only in the Superior Court for Los Angeles, California (and in no other)_” Hunt Wesson, 817 F.2d at 77.
Similarly, in Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea Technology, Ltd., 875 F.2d 762 (9th Cir.1989), we held that a clause was rendered mandatory by the additional language that “venue of any action brought hereunder shall be deemed to be in Gloucester County, Virginia.” Id. at 764. In distinguishing Hunt Wesson, we said
[tjhis language requires enforcement of the clause because Docksider not only consented to the jurisdiction of the state courts of Virginia, but further agreed by mandatory language that the venue for all actions arising out of the license agreement would be Gloucester County, Virginia. This mandatory language makes clear that venue, the place of suit, lies exclusively in the designated county. Thus, whether or not several states might otherwise have jurisdiction over actions stemming from the agreement, all actions must be filed and prosecuted in Virginia.
These cases demonstrate that the forum selection clause now before us is permissive. The language “shall be enforceable” is no less permissive than the “shall have jurisdiction” language in Hunt Wesson. The clause does not contain additional language such as “venue ... shall be deemed to be in Gloucester County,” which, in Docksider, designated the state court as the exclusive forum. Nor does it contain the type of mandatory language at issue in Pelleport (cases may be litigated “only in” Los Angeles). In sum, we follow Hunt Wesson in holding that the “shall be enforceable” language at issue here is permissive, not mandatory, because it does not contain language “clearly requir[ing] exclusive jurisdiction.” Hunt Wesson, 817 F.2d at 77.
II
Defect in Removal Procedure
A remand motion based on a defect in removal procedure must be filed within 80 days after the notice of removal is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).[4] The Laborers’ remand motion was filed within 30 days after removal, but it was based solely on the argument that the forum selection clause required remand to San Francisco Superior Court. The Laborers did not raise a defect in removal procedure as a ground for remand until they filed a reply brief more than 30 days after the filing of the removal petition.
Pitb-Des Moines argues that the district court had no jurisdiction to order a remand based upon a defect in removal procedure because the issue was not raised within the 30-day time period prescribed by § 1447(c). The Laborers respond that it is of no consequence that the issue was not raised within the 30-day time limit because § 1447(c) establishes only the time by which a remand motion must be filed, not the time by which any particular argument must be raised. The narrow question presented, therefore, is whether § 1447(e) requires that a defect in removal procedure be raised within 30 days after the filing of the removal petition, as Pitt-Des Moines contends, or whether § 1447(c) permits a procedural defect to be raised after the 30-day period as long as the defect is raised in connection with a timely motion to remand.
We first address the threshold question whether a remand order based upon a defect in removal procedure is subject to appellate review. Although § 1447(d) on its face appears to withdraw all appellate jurisdiction to review remand orders,[5] the statute[*1038] is not without exceptions. See Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351-52, 96 S.Ct. 584, 593-94, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976). We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, under Thermtron, we have jurisdiction “to decide whether a district court has the power to do what it did [in issuing a remand order], although we cannot examine whether a particular exercise of power was proper.” In re Continental Casualty Co., 29 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir.1994) (reviewing a remand order to decide whether it was issued in excess of the district court’s authority). Because a district court lacks power to issue a remand order in violation of § 1447(c), see Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782, 786 (9th Cir.1992) (failure to comply with the 30-day time limit deprives a district court of power to order a remand on the basis of a defect in removal procedure), we have jurisdiction to decide whether the Laborers acted in compliance with the statute when they raised the alleged defect in removal procedure for the first time in their reply brief. That question goes to the district court’s power to order a remand, not to the merits of the court’s finding of a defect in removal procedure.
We now turn to the question whether the Laborers complied with § 1447(c). As we read the statute, it requires that a defect in removal procedure be raised in the district court within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal. In other words, the critical date is not when a motion to remand is filed, but when the moving party asserts a procedural defect as a basis for remand. Any other reading of the statute would elevate form over substance. The purpose of the 30-day time limit is “to resolve the choice of forum at the early stages of litigation,” and to “prevent the ‘shuffling [of] cases between state and federal courts after the first thirty days.’ ” Maniar, 979 F.2d at 785, 786 (quoting FDIC v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316, 322 (5th Cir.1992)). The statutory purpose served by requiring defects in removal procedure to be raised promptly would be defeated if a party were free to raise such a procedural defect more than 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.
We hold that § 1447(c) prohibits a defect in removal procedure from being raised later than 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal, regardless of whether a timely remand motion has been filed. Accordingly, the district court had no authority to remand the case to the state court on the basis of a defect in removal procedure raised for the first time more than 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.
The district court’s order remanding the case to state court is hereby VACATED.[6]
A remand order based on a forum selection agreement is appealable as a collaterally final order. Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 277-78 (9th Cir.1984).
Pitt-Des Moines also appeals the district court's denial of its motions to quash service on P.D.M. Steel Co. and to amend the removal petition to join P.D.M. Steel Co. Because we vacate the remand order, we need not address the district court's denial of these motions.
The Laborers cite Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Management Servs., 926 F.2d 865 (9th Cir.1991) for the proposition that a remand order based on a forum selection clause is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In Spradlin, however, the plaintiff challenged the forum selection clause in his employment agreement on the ground that fraud and unequal bargaining positions rendered the clause unenforceable. Because the issue here concerns the meaning of the clause rather than its enforceability, we exercise de novo review.
§ 1447(c) provides: "A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).”
§ 1447(d) provides: "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise ...."
The remand order included an award of attorneys' fees to the Laborers under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred as a result of the removal.”). Because the remand order is vacated, the order’s award of attorneys’ fees is necessarily vacated as well.