Jesse Wilson Jeffress v. William K. Suter, in His Off. Capacity as Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, 70 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
Jesse Wilson Jeffress v. William K. Suter, in His Off. Capacity as Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, 70 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
44 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Elouise Cobell v. Sally Jewell (cadc, 2015-09-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Elouise Cobell v. Sally Jewell
D.C. Cir. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Samuels v. District of Columbia, 70 F.3d 638 , at *1 (D.C.Cir.1995) (unpublished) (“A post-judgment order is generally not appealable as long as any ‘closely related questions or proceedings remain pending.’ ”) (emphasis added) (quoting 15B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3916, at 356 (2d ed.1992)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Trustee 1245 13th Street, Nw 608 Trust v. Anderson
D.C. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Lenman v. Jones, 33 App. D.C. 7, 23 (1909), aff'd, 222 U.S. 51 , 32 S.Ct. 18 , 56 L.Ed. 89 (1911); see also SMS Assocs. v. Clay, 868 F.Supp. 337, 340 (D.D.C.1994) (“The District of Columbia both recognizes and adheres to the doctrine of equitable conversion.”) (citing Liberty Nat’l Bank of Washington v. Smoot, 135 F.Supp. 654, 659 (D.D.C.1955)), aff'd, 315 U.S.App.D.C. 77 , 70 F.3d 638 (1995); Gustin, supra, 347 A.2d at 922-923 ; District of Columbia v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 335 A.2d 238 , 243 n. 7 (D.C.1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Nwachukwu v. Karl
D.D.C. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
Vakharia, 2 F.Supp.2d at 1033 (recognizing that the burden of proof for a motion to strike rests with the movant); see also SMS Assocs. v. Clay, 868 F.Supp. 337, 344 (D.D.C.1994) (concluding that there was ample evidence in the record of the defendant’s bad faith in pleading), aff'd, 70 F.3d 638 (D.C.Cir.1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Moorer v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.
E.D.N.Y · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., SMS Assoc, v. Clay, 868 F.Supp. 337 (D.D.C.1994), aff'd, 70 F.3d 638 (D.C.Cir.1995) (Rule 56(g) sanctions awarded where litigant engaged in “dilatory tactics expressly designed to prolong ... already unduly protracted litigation” in case which had been going on for over 10 years); Alart Assocs., Inc. v. Aptaker, 402 F.2d 779 (2d Cir.1968) (Rule 56(g) sanctions imposed where litigant reasserted substantially the same grounds for summary judgment after the court had already twice rejected the theory).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jesse Wilson Jeffress
v.
William K. Suter, in His Official Capacity as Clerk of the United States Supreme Court
94-5309.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Dec 7, 1995.
70 F.3d 638
Unpublished

70 F.3d 638

315 U.S.App.D.C. 77

NOTICE: D.C. Circuit Local Rule 11(c) states that unpublished orders, judgments, and explanatory memoranda may not be cited as precedents, but counsel may refer to unpublished dispositions when the binding or preclusive effect of the disposition, rather than its quality as precedent, is relevant.
Jesse Wilson JEFFRESS, Appellant,
v.
William K. SUTER, in his official capacity as Clerk of the
United States Supreme Court.

No. 94-5309.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Sept. 20, 1995.
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc Denied Dec. 7, 1995.

Before: WILLIAMS, HENDERSON, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

1

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. The court has determined that the issues presented occasion no need for an opinion. See D.C.Cir.Rule 36(b). It is

2

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court's orders filed August 26, 1994, and September 20, 1994, be affirmed. The United States Supreme Court has exclusive supervisory power over its Clerk, and no other court has authority "to review any action of the Supreme Court or its Clerk." See Marin v. Suter, 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam) (court refused to order Clerk of Supreme Court to accept petition for writ of certiorari), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 131 (1992). Because appellant's complaint lacked an arguable basis in law, it was properly dismissed as frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (permitting sua sponte dismissal of frivolous IFP complaints). Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for reconsideration. See Browder v. Director, Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n. 7 (1978); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C.Cir.1988).

3

The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C.Cir.Rule 41.