green
Positive treatment
6.4 score
Treatment trajectory · 1911 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1911
1968
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DeKalb County v. Daniels
(2×)
It can not be taken until just and adequate compensation is ‘first paid.’ Tender is equivalent to payment, and the right to take private property for public purposes by one having the right of eminent domain never exists until compensation is either paid or ten dered.” Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 464 ( 71 SE 903 ) (1911).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
R. E. Adams Properties, Inc. v. City of Gainesville
Schroeder tracked Hard v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 74, 75 ( 132 SE2d 25 ), cert. denied 3/5/71, which approved the contention that: "When private property is condemned for public use the. owner is entitled to receive just and adequate compensation as of the date of the taking, and not as of the date of the announcement of the taking, and the value of the property should be fixed at the time of its taking.” Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 464 ( 71 SE 903 ) does not hold, as the trial court apparently construed it, that the jury is free to determine a "…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State Highway Department v. Cantrell
Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 470 ( 71 SE 903 ).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
City of Gainesville v. Chambers
Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 465-468 ( 71 SE 903 ). *27 Case No. 43065.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Isley v. Little
Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 471 ( 71 SE 903 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
City of Atlanta v. Lunsford
Counsel for the city urge that, since it has been held, in State Highway Board v. Warthen, 54 Ga. App. 759 ( 189 SE 76 ), Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 465 ( 71 SE 903 ), and Central Ga. Power Co. v. Stone, 142 Ga. 662 (2) ( 83 SE 524 ), that when the amount of the award has been increased by the final judgment the condemnee is entitled to interest on the amount of the increase from the time of the taking of the property, it would be unfair to hold that the city is not likewise entitled to interest on the excess when the amount of the award has been decreased.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. City of Atlanta
While testimony to the effect that as soon as the agitation of the movement to change tile grade of the street was begun, but before any work was actually commenced, the market value of similar abutting properties began to increase, could not be admissible for the purpose of showing an actual enhancement of the market value of the property in dispute by reason of the change, of which the city could avail itself, still, since the evidence thus adduced was relevant for the purpose of throwing light upon the actual value of the property prior to the change (Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 …
discussed
Cited "see"
Department of Transportation v. Knight
See Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456 (3) ( 71 SE 903 ) (1911); Hard v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 74 ( 132 SE2d 25 ) (1963); Civils v. Fulton County, 108 Ga. App. 793, 796 (2b) ( 134 SE2d 453 ) (1963). 3.
cited
Cited "see"
Atkinson v. Olmstead
See Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456 (1), 460 ( 71 S. E. 903 ). 2.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Department of Transportation v. George
(2×)
Compare Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 470 ( 71 SE 903 ) (1911); State Hwy.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Woodside v. City of Atlanta
(2×)
See also Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456 ( 71 S. E. 903 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Stricklin
v.
Brotherton, and vice versa
v.
Brotherton, and vice versa
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jun 19, 1911.
W. E.'Mann and W. H. Payne Jr., for plaintiff., Samuel P. Maddox and J ames E. Rosser, for defendant.
Beck.
Cited by 3 opinions | Published
Beck, J.
The court below granted a first new trial upon special grounds contained in the motion, complaining of certain instructions of the court to the jury, and overruled the motion as to the other grounds. Both parties excepted to the judgment of the court. It can not be said that the verdict was demanded by the evidence; and that being the case, the judgment granting a first new trial will not be disturbed, and this court will not inquire into the sufficiency of the grounds upon which a new trial was granted, nor those which were overruled; but ' the court below, having itself granted a new trial, will be allowed, at the next hearing, to deal with the case de novo under the evidence as it may then be developed.
Judgment affirmed on the main hill of exception; cross-hill of exceptions dismissed.
All the Justices concur.