Goodman v. Lewis, 277 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. 1981). · Go Syfert
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Goodman v. Lewis, 277 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
46 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Roach v. Roach (gactapp, 2014-06-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roach v. Roach
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Whether a deed is made with the intent to delay or defraud creditors is ordinarily an issue of fact for the jury, see Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605, 606 (1) ( 277 SE2d 908 ) (1981), but in this case there was no material dispute in the evidence with respect to Appellee’s intent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cavin v. Brown
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Bank of Polk County, 265 Ga. 744 ( 462 SE2d 374 ) (1995). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 744 . 4 OCGA § 19-6-35 (b). 5 Rolleston v. Cherry, 237 Ga. App. 733, 735 (1) (a) ( 521 SE2d 1 ) (1999). 6 Boyett v. Wester, 265 Ga. 387 -388 ( 456 SE2d 504 ) (1995). 7 Hill v. Hill, 219 Ga. App. 247, 248 ( 464 SE2d 656 ) (1995). 8 Cf. Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605, 606, fn. 1 ( 277 SE2d 908 ) (1981) (in determining insolvency, the value of the debtor’s remaining property is determined as of the date of the conveyance sought to be set aside). 9 (Citation omitted.) Id. 10 Id. 11 Barclay, su…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Cooper
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
“It is well-established that whether a deed was made with the intent to delay or defraud creditors is a question of fact for the jury to decide from all the circumstances of the case.” Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605, 606 (1) ( 277 SE2d 908 ) (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Langston v. Allen (2×)
Ga. · 1997 · confidence medium
“It is well established that whether a deed was made with the intent to delay or defraud creditors is a question of fact for the jury to decide from all of the circumstances of the case. [Cit.]” Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605, 606 (1) ( 277 SE2d 908 ) (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Travis Pruitt & Associates, P.C.
Ga. · 1995 · confidence medium
“It is well established that whether a [conveyance] was made with the intent to delay or defraud creditors is a question of fact for the [factfinder] to decide from all of the circumstances of the case. [Cit.]” Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605, 606 (1) ( 277 SE2d 908 ) (1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Artrac Corp. v. Austin Kelley Advertising, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Primrose v. Browning, 56 Ga. 369 (3) (1876).” Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605, 606 (1) ( 277 SE2d 908 ).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Barber (2×)
Bankr. M.D. Ga. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605 , 277 S.E.2d 908 (1981); Cavin v. Brown, 246 Ga.App. 40 , 538 S.E.2d 802 (2000).
discussed Cited "see" Stokes v. McRae (2×)
Ga. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605 ( 277 SE2d 908 ) (1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kenny Allen Roach v. Randall Wayne Roach, Jr. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence medium
In such cases, “no relief can be afforded the victimized wrong-doer,” and “the parties are to be left as they stand.” Id.; see also Langan v. Langan, 224 Ga. 399, 402 (2) ( 162 SE2d 405 ) (1968) (“An executed contract . . . made for the purpose of delaying or defrauding a creditor, is binding upon the maker, and he is estopped from impeaching it.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 Whether a deed is made with the intent to delay or defraud creditors is ordinarily an issue of fact for the jury, see Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605, 606 (1) ( 277 SE2d 908 ) (1981), but in this case…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Holmes v. Perry (In Re Holmes) (2×)
Bankr. M.D. Ga. · 2003 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare O.C.G.A. § 18-2-75(a) (effective July 1, 2002) (transfer is fraudulent if debtor did not receive a reasonably equivalent value and was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer). 22 . 247 Ga. 658 , 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981). 23 . 247 Ga. 605 , 277 S.E.2d 908 (1981) 24 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GOODMAN
v.
LEWIS
37231.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 19, 1981.
277 S.E.2d 908
Hartley, Rowe & Fowler, G. Michael Hartley, Walter P. Rowe, for appellant., John C. Pennington, William G. Posey, for appellees.
Marshall.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Per curiam.

In this case, a trustee in bankruptcy has brought suit against the bankrupt and his wife to set aside various conveyances of real property made by the bankrupt to his wife. The trustee’s argument is that as to creditors the conveyances are null and void under Code § 28-201 (2) and (3). “The following acts by debtors shall be fraudulent in law against creditors and others, and as to them null and void, viz: ... 2. Every conveyance of real or personal estate, by writing or otherwise, and every bond, suit, judgment and execution, or contract of any description, had or made with intention to delay or defraud creditors, and such intention known to the party taking. A bona fide transaction on a valuable consideration, and without notice or[*606] ground for reasonable suspicion, shall be valid. 3. Every voluntary deed or conveyance, not for a valuable consideration, made by a debtor insolvent at the time of such conveyance.” Code § 28-201. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, and the trustee appeals.

In this appeal, the trustee argues: (1) the evidence demanded a finding that the conveyances were made with the intent to delay or defraud creditors, within the meaning of § 28-201 (2); (2) the evidence demanded a finding that the bankrupt was insolvent after the conveyances, within the meaning of § 28-201 (3);[1] and (3) the trial judge erred in refusing to admit in evidence a financial statement prepared by the bankrupt approximately six months prior to the conveyances sought to be set aside.

1. It is well established that whether a deed was made with the intent to delay or defraud creditors is a question of fact for the jury to decide from all of the circumstances of the case. Powell v. Westmoreland, 60 Ga. 572 (4) (1878). It is likewise well established that whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent is a question of fact for the jury. Primrose v. Browning, 56 Ga. 369 (3) (1876).

2. Here, the jury was authorized in finding that the bankrupt was not rendered insolvent by making the conveyances sought to be set aside.[2] The jury was also authorized to find that these conveyances were not made with the intent to delay or defraud creditors. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in overruling the appellant’s motion for directed verdict.

3. In a financial statement prepared by the bankrupt approximately six months before he made the subject conveyances, he valued one of the parcels in an amount almost three times as high as he testified the parcel was worth when he conveyed it to his wife. The trustee complains that the trial judge refused to admit this financial statement for impeachment purposes. The trial judge’s refusal in this regard was at most harmless error, because the bankrupt was fully cross-examined concerning the alleged decrease in the market value of this parcel between the date the financial[*607] statement was executed and the date the parcel was conveyed to the bankrupt’s wife.

Decided May 19, 1981. Hartley, Rowe & Fowler, G. Michael Hartley, Walter P. Rowe, for appellant. John C. Pennington, William G. Posey, for appellees.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Marshall, J., who dissents.
1

The test for determining whether a debtor is insolvent, within the meaning of § 28-201 (3), is whether the value of his remaining property is sufficient to pay in full all of his debts. Cohen v. Parish, 100 Ga. 335 (28 SE 122) (1897). The value of the debtor’s remaining property must be determined as of the date the conveyance sought to be set aside was made. Ayers v. Harrell, 111 Ga. 864 (2) (36 SE 946) (1900).

2

The jury was authorized to find that the debtor’s equity in various real estate projects in which he had invested, as well as his cash, insurance, and other personal property, was sufficient in value to pay his debts at the time he made these conveyances to his wife.

Dissent

Marshall, Justice,

dissenting.

Under Code § 28-201 (2), a conveyance is subject to being set aside if it was made with the intent to delay or defraud creditors.

In this case, the testimony of the bankrupt and his wife unequivocally establishes that there was no monetary consideration for the subject conveyances, and they were made so that the bankrupt’s involvement in various real estate syndications would not “jeopardize” these properties. In my opinion, this demanded a finding that the conveyances were made in order to insulate these properties from the demands of creditors and, therefore, that they were made with the intent to at least delay creditors. I would hold that the trial judge should have granted the appellant’s motion for directed verdict.