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Positive treatment
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Treatment trajectory · 2013 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Eustice v. Equifax Inc.
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Khalaf v. Equifax Inc.
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lee v. Equifax Information Services, LLC
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Silva v. Equifax, Inc.
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Eustice v. Equifax Inc.
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Adams v. Equifax, Inc.
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
HUTCHINSON v. EQUIFAX, INC.
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joshpe v. Equifax Information Services LLC
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
FLOWERS v. EQUIFAX, INC.
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Audella Patterson v. Equifax, Inc.
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Eustice v. Equifax Inc.
The court interpreted Section 501(a) as a mere “aspirational statement of Congressional policy”: “[i]t does not provide for certain duties or the performance of or refraining from any specific acts on the part of financial institutions, nor does it articulate or imply a standard of conduct or care, ordinary or otherwise.” , 293 Ga. at 164-65.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LLC Et Al. v. COBB COUNTY Et Al.
(5×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Bd. of Educ., 333 Ga. App. 144, 151 ( 775 SE2d 622 ) (2015) (Dillard, J., concurring). 11 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 8, at 16; accord Callaway Blue Springs, LLLP, 2017 WL 2417779 , at *5 (1); Day, 333 Ga. App. at 151 (Dillard, J., concurring). 7 perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” But as we have repeatedly explained, the alleged duty cannot rest solely upon OCGA § 51-1- 6 because…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Shapiro v. Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Thus, we must presume that if the General Assembly also wished to allow EMC members to sue an EMC to seek relief for a violation of OCGA § 46-3-340, “it would have expressly authorized them to do so.” Kemp v. Kemp, 337 Ga. App. 627, 636 ( 788 SE2d 517 ) (2016). 36 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 164 ( 744 SE2d 686 ) (2013); accord Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Morrisroe, 323 Ga. App. 248, 249 ( 746 SE2d 859 ) (2013); see Gobran Auto Sales, Inc. v. Bell, 335 Ga. App. 873, 877 (2) ( 783 SE2d 389 ) (2016) (explaining that OCGA § 51-1-6 “do[es] not create causes of action, …
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
McCONNELL Et Al. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Wells Fargo Bank v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 165 ( 744 SE2d 686 ) (2013). 7 Similarly, we conclude that OCGA § 10-1-393.8, which is part of the Fair Business Practices Act of 1975 (the “FBPA”) as amended, 8 cannot serve as the source of such a statutory duty.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
The Best Jewelry Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Fulton County, Georgia
OCGA § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” On its face, this statute authorizes suit only when there has been an “alleged breach of a legal duty,” whether intentional or negligent, “with some ascertainable standard of conduct.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 164 ( 744 SE2d 686 ) (2013) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dion v. Y.S.G. Enterprises, Inc.
Of course, a wrongful death action “cannot rest solely upon OCGA § 51-1-6 because this statute sets forth merely general principles of tort law. [Cit.]” Wells Fargo Bank v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 164 ( 744 SE2d 686 ) (2013).
cited
Cited "see"
Regional Finance Company of Georgia, LLC v. Nicholas Pearson
See Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 164 ( 744 SE2d 686 ) (2013) (negligence plaintiff must show “the alleged breach of a legal duty with some ascertainable standard of conduct”).
discussed
Cited "see"
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. COBB COUNTY
See Wells Fargo Bank v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162 ( 744 SE2d 686 ) (2013) (rejecting argument that policy statement in federal banking statute set out sufficiently specific legal duty to support a state negligence claim under OCGA § 51-1-6 for misuse of confidential customer information); Central Anesthesia Assocs., P.C. v. Worthy, 254 Ga. 728 ( 333 SE2d 829 ) (1985) (medical malpractice decision not mentioning OCGA § 51-1- 6).
discussed
Cited "see"
Bellsouth Telecomms., LLC v. Cobb Cnty.
See Wells Fargo Bank v. Jenkins , 293 Ga. 162 , 744 S.E.2d 686 (2013) (rejecting argument that policy statement in federal banking statute set out sufficiently specific legal duty to support a state negligence claim under OCGA § 51-1-6 for misuse of confidential customer information); Central Anesthesia Assocs., P.C. v. Worthy , 254 Ga. 728 , 333 S.E.2d 829 (1985) (medical malpractice decision not mentioning OCGA § 51-1-6 ).
cited
Cited "see"
In re Equifax, Inc.
See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins , 293 Ga. 162 , 164-65, 744 S.E.2d 686 (2013).
discussed
Cited "see"
Nicollette Black v. Hai Hong Trinh
See Wells Fargo Bank , 293 Ga. at 164 -165 , 744 S.E.2d 686 ; see also Best Jewelry Manufacturing Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc., 334 Ga. App. 826 , 833-834 (1) (b), 780 S.E.2d 689 (2015) ; U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Phillips , 318 Ga. App. 819 , 825-826 (3), 734 S.E.2d 799 (2012).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Raj Laliwala v. Carlton Harris
Moreover, it is unclear how these alleged inspection failures could have created a duty that did not already exist. 5 Spivey v. Hembree, 268 Ga. App. 485, 487 (1) (a) ( 602 SE2d 246 ) (2004); see also Seymour Elec. & Air Conditioning Svc. v. Statom, 309 Ga. App. 677, 679 ( 710 SE2d 874 ) (2011) (discussing the essential elements of a negligence claim, beginning with the existence of a legal duty). 6 Wells Fargo Bank v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 164 ( 744 SE2d 686 ) (2013). 4 The Appellants cited to an affidavit of the contractor they hired to finish the Project, who opined that the work that had b…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
MCCONNELL Et Al. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.
The violation of a private duty, accompanied by damage, shall give a right of action."); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins , 293 Ga. 162 , 164, 744 S.E.2d 686 (2013) (A legal duty that will support an actionable claim of negligence "cannot rest solely upon OCGA § 51-1-6 because this statute sets forth merely general principles of tort law.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Gobran Auto Sales, Inc. v. Bell
See also Wells Fargo Bank v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 164 ( 744 SE2d 686 ) (2013); Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 281 (1) ( 528 SE2d 238 ) (2000).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
IN THE MATTER OF ROBBIE M. LEVIN
S11Y0598.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jun 17, 2013.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.
Published
Per curiam.
The Court having reviewed the Notice of Compliance with Conditions submitted by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, and it appearing that Robbie M. Levin has complied with all of the conditions for reinstatement following his suspension by this Court, see In the Matter of Levin, 289 Ga. 170 (709 SE2d 808) (2011), it is hereby ordered that Robbie M. Levin be reinstated to the practice of law in the State of Georgia.
Reinstated.
All the Justices concur.