United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355 (1948). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355 (1948). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 2 distinct cases · …the fact that the false literature leaves in a separate mail does not save the article from being misbranded. at p. 114 ✓
154 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 37 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Frank Sarcona (ca11, 2012-01-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1948 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1948 1987 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Frank Sarcona (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
11th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the fact that the false literature leaves in a separate mail does not save the article from being misbranded.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Frank Sarcona (2×)
11th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the fact that the false literature leaves in a separate mail does not save the article from being misbranded.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. An Undetermined Number of Shipping Packages, Etc., Vitasafe Corporation, United States of America v. Vitasafe Corporation, a Corporation, Nutritional Quality Controls, Inc., Acorporation, the Dollar Vitamine Plan, Inc., a Corporation, Life Nutrition, Inc., a Corporation, International Oil and Metals Corporation, a Corporation, Dr. Parkermedicine Company, a Corporation, Philip S. Volosov, an Individual and Henry d.cohen, an Individual
3rd Cir. · 1965 · confidence medium
It is apparent that the failure to make such a fact-finding was inadvertent since its basis is amply established by the record. 60 For the reasons stated the causes at Appeal No. 14964 and at Appeal No. 15066 will be remanded with directions to the District Court to vacate its Decrees respectively entered therein on April 13, 1964 and September 29, 1964, and to enter new Decrees in accordance with the Opinion of this Court. 1 21 U.S.C.A. 334 2 'Food' within the meaning of 21 U.S.C.A. 321(f) 3 'Drug' within the meaning of 21 U.S.C.A. 321(g) 4 In contravention of 21 U.S.C.A. 343(a) and 352 Secti…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Vitasafe Corp.
3rd Cir. · 1965 · confidence medium
United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355, 358 , 69 S.Ct. 112, 114 (1948).
cited Cited "see" State v. Briggs
N.C. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 , 93 L.
cited Cited "see" Coons v. State
Tex. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vertz v. State, 686 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1985, pet. ref d), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 830 , 107 S.Ct. 114 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 61 (1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re D.A.C.
N.C. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence low
Simply put, although common sense suggests that a juvenile is likely to comply with a parental instruction to talk to investigating officers, “the fact that the defendant is youthful will not preclude the admission of his inculpatory statement absent mistreatment or coercion by the police.” State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 8 , 305 S.E.2d 685, 690 (1983); see also United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that an individual, such as a prisoner, would “always accurately perceive that his ultimate freedom of movement is absolutely restrained” and requiring addit…
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Hanafy (4×)
N.D. Tex. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355, 357-58 , 69 S.Ct. 112 , 93 L.Ed. 61 (1948) (leaflets explaining the use of “electrical devices allegedly aiding in the diagnosis and cure of various diseases and physical disorders such as cancer, diabetes, tuberculosis, arthritis, and paralysis”); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349-51 , 69 S.Ct. 106 , 93 L.Ed. 52 (1948) (literature explaining the use of the drugs, even when shipped separately); United States v. Walton, 36 F.3d 32, 33-35 (7th Cir.1994) (the “use-before” dates on invoices and packing slips for pacemakers); Unit…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Varela-Cruz (2×)
D.P.R. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
Thus, “[t]he Act must be given a reasonable construction to effectuate its salutary purposes.” Sanders, 196 F.2d at 898 ; see also United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d 864, 870 (3rd Cir.1965) citing United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355, 358 , 69 S.Ct. 112 , 93 L.Ed. 61 (1948) (stating that “that the problem of its enforcement ‘is a practical one of consumer protection, not dialectics’ ”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Ledbetter
Conn. App. Ct. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 972-73 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 , 107 S. Ct. 114 , 93 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Kasz Enterprises, Inc. (2×)
D.R.I. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Kordel, 335, U.S. at 350, 69 S.Ct. at 109-110; see also United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355, 357-58 , 69 S.Ct. 112, 113-14 , 93 L.Ed. 61 (1948).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Bradley v. State
Del. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 4th Cir., 779 F.2d 970, 972-73 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 , 107 S.Ct. 114 , 93 L.Ed.2d 61 (1986); Cervantes v. Walker, 9th Cir., 589 F.2d 424, 427 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Richard Willoughby, Quintin Prioleau, Arthur Prioleau, and Carleton Montgomery
2d Cir. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 972-73 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied 479 U.S. 830 , 107 S.Ct. 114 , 93 L.Ed.2d 61 (1986), Flittie v. Solern, 751 F.2d 967, 974 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1025 , 106 S.Ct. 1223 , 89 L.Ed.2d 333 (1986); Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1978).
cited Cited "see, e.g." National Labor Relations Board v. Amateyus, Ltd., D/B/A Volk & Huxley and Vulcan Typography Co.
2d Cir. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Burns, 406 U.S. at 291 , 92 S.Ct. at 1584 ; see also NLRB v. Babad, 785 F.2d 46, 49-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 107 S.Ct. 114 , 93 L.Ed.2d 61 (1986).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Urbuteit
13.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 20, 1948.
335 U.S. 355
Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Philip El-man, William W. Goodrich and Bernard D. Levinson., H. 0. Pemberton argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Douglas, Black, Frankfurter, Murphy, Kordel.
Cited by 46 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 92%
Citer courts: Eleventh Circuit (3)

Opinion of the Court by

Mr. Justice Douglas,

announced by Mr. Justice Reed.

The United States filed a libel under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (52 Stat. 1044, 21 U. S. C. § 334),[*356] seeking seizure of 16 machines labeled “Sinuothermic.” The libel alleged that the device was misbranded within the meaning of the Act (52 Stat. 1050, 21 U. S. C. § 352 (a)) in that representations in a leaflet entitled “The Road to Health” relative to the curative and therapeutic powers of the device in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment and prevention of disease were false and misleading. It charged that the leaflet had accompanied the device in interstate commerce.

Respondent, Fred Urbuteit, appeared as claimant of several of the devices. He admitted that the devices and leaflets had been shipped in interstate commerce,- but denied that they were shipped together or that they were related to each other. He also denied that the statements made in the leaflet were false or misleading. The case was tried without a jury and the articles were ordered condemned. The judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 164 F. 2d 245. The case is here on certiorari to resolve the conflict between it and Kordel v. United States, ante, p. 345.

Respondent Urbuteit terms himself a naturopathic physician and conducts the Sinuothermic Institute in Tampa, Florida. The machines against which the libel was filed are electrical devices allegedly aiding in the diagnosis and cure of various diseases and physical disorders such as cancer, diabetes, tuberculosis, arthritis, and paralysis. The alleged cures effected through its use are described in the allegedly false and misleading leaflet, “The Road to Health,” published by Urbuteit and distributed for use with the machines.

Urbuteit shipped from Florida a number of these machines to one Kelsch, a former pupil of his who lives in Ohio. Kelsch used these machines in treating his patients and, though he did not receive them as a merchant, he sold some to patients. As part of this transaction Urbu-teit contracted to furnish Kelsch with a supply of leaflets,[*357] which were sent from Florida to Ohio at a different time than when the machines were forwarded. Kelsch used the leaflets to explain the machines to his patients.

The leaflets seem to have followed the shipment of the machines. But as Kordel v. United States holds, that is immaterial where the advertising matter that was sent was designed to serve and did in fact serve the purposes of labeling.. This machine bore only the words, U. S. Patent Sinuothermic Trade Mark. It was the leaflets that explained the usefulness of the device in the diagnosis, treatment, and cure of various diseases. Measured by functional standards, as § 201 (m) (2) of the Act permits, these leaflets constituted one of the types of labeling which the Act condemns.

The power to condemn is contained in § 304 (a) and is confined to articles “adulterated or misbranded when introduced into or while in interstate commerce.” [1] We do not, however, read that provision as requiring the advertising matter to travel with the machine. The reasons of policy which argue against that in the case of criminal prosecutions under § 303 are equally forcible when we come to libels under § 304 (a). Moreover, the common sense of the matter is to view the interstate transaction in its entirety — the purpose of the advertising and its actual use. In this case it is plain to us that the movements of machines and leaflets in interstate commerce were a single interrelated activity, not separate or isolated ones. The Act is not concerned with the purification of the stream of commerce in the abstract.[*358] The problem is a practical one of consumer protection, not dialectics. The fact that the false literature leaves in a separate mail does not save the article from being misbranded. Where by functional standards the two transactions are integrated, the requirements of § 304 (a) are satisfied, though the mailings or shipments are at different times.

The Court of Appeals held that certain evidence tendered by Urbuteit as to the therapeutic or curative value of the machines had been erroneously excluded at the trial, a ruling that we are not inclined to disturb. Petitioner claims, however, that the error was not prejudicial. The argument is that since the evidence of the false and misleading character of the advertising as respects the diagnostic capabilities of the machines was overwhelming, that false representation was adequate to sustain the condemnation, though it be assumed that the therapeutic phase of the case was not established. We do not reach that question. Since the case must be remanded to the Court of Appeals, that question and any others that have survived will be open for consideration by it.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Murphy, and Mr. Justice Jackson dissent for the reasons stated in their dissent in Kordel v. United States, ante, p. 345, decided this day, although this case arises under the limitation of § 304 (a), “while in interstate commerce,” which has a different scope from § 301 (k), while “held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce.”
1

The relevant portion of this section reads as follows:

“Any article of food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded when introduced into or while in interstate commerce . . . shall be liable to be proceeded against while in interstate commerce, or at any time thereafter, on libel of information and condemned in any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which the article is found . . .