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Quoted verbatim 7×
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1987 ·
…t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.
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Treatment trajectory · 1901 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1901
1963
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Stafne v. Zilly
the criminal court of the district, as a court of general criminal jurisdiction, possessed the power to strike the name of the plaintiff from its rolls as a practicing attorney.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Harbison v. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
judges of courts of record of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Harbeck v. Smith
for it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Figueroa-Flores v. Acevedo-Vilá
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the allegation of malice or corrupt motives could always be made and if the motives could be inquired into judges would be subjected to the same vexatious litigation upon such allegations, whether the motives had or had not any real sustenance.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Jefferson v. City of Hazlehurst
t is a general principal of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his convictions, without apprehensions of personal consequences to himself.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Johnson v. Kelsh
t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Johnson v. Kelsh
t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bare v. Atwood
Ed. 2d 331, 338 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 , 20 L.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Haagensen v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Id. at 357 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (quoting Bradley, 13 Wall, at 352, 20 L.Ed. 646 ).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Goldhaber v. Higgins
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
At common law, it was “a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [had to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 649 (1872).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Murphy v. Maine
The origins of this doctrine in the United States can be traced to the 1872 Supreme Court case of Bradley v. Fisher, which itself traced the doctrine back to 1608 in England. 13 Wall. 335 , 80 U.S. 335, 347-48 , 20 L.Ed. 646 *173 (1872).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pasqua v. Council
Accordingly, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’ ” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 , 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331, 339 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872)). “[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function no…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. City of Bordentown
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 , 13 Wall at 354, 20 L.Ed. 646 (U.S.Dist.Col.1871).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Otworth v. the Florida Bar
It is not important for the court to consider whether the defendant judge acted in error, maliciously, or in excess of his authority; instead the court is instructed to look at whether the defendant judge acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 356-57 , 98 S.Ct. 1099 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. 335 , 13 Wall, at 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 ).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Roemer v. Crow
Id., at 356-357 , 98 S.Ct. at 1104-1105; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall, at 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 . 502 U.S. at 11-12 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
MacFarlane v. Smith
Sparkman, supra, 435 U.S. at 356 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 n. 7 (citing Bradley, supra, 13 Wall, at 352, 20 L.Ed. 646 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chase v. Bouchard
After citing cases from numerous jurisdictions, we adopted a test set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rock Ridge Ltd. v. Assessor of Taxes of Woonsocket
Under the statute in this case the Superior Court would always have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims for tax abatement. *780 There is a critical distinction between the complete absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the refusal to exercise that jurisdiction because it was not properly invoked. “[J]urisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he [or she] holds, [however], the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are * * * questions for his [or her] determination * * * although upon the correctness …
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Parker v. State
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
As Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 352 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872), makes amply clear, only when jurisdiction is "entirely wanting in the court, and this being necessarily known to its judge,” does a judge forfeit immunity for his judicial acts for reasons of lack of jurisdiction.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Estate of Flowers
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-352 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 , 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hooper v. Clinkingbeard
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-352 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 , 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. City Vending of Muskogee, Inc.
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
This rule applies to judicial review of administrative actions to the same extent as it does to court judgments and decrees." Id. at 128. [5] For the concept of "facial invalidity" see infra Part II(A). [6] Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-352 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 , 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). [7] State v. Williams, 209 Wis. 541 , 245 N.W. 663, 665 (1932). [8] The manner and extent of an adjudicative authority's exercise are but two factors which are just as appropriate for a tribunal's determination as any other issue …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Scarso v. Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services
A judge must be allowed to “exercise the authority vested in him [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of the personal consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall at 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Josiah Haynesworth and Fred Hancock v. Frank P. Miller, Chief, Law Enforcement Section, Office of the Corporation Counsel, (Two Cases)
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 , 16 S.Ct. 631, 637 , 40 L.Ed. 780, 786 (1896); see Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 184-185 , 569 F.2d 10, 15-16 (1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 , 98 S.Ct. 3089 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978) (applying the broad standard of Spalding to find official's conduct protected); cf. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 , 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331, 339 (1978) (judge enjoys immunity unless he acts in the “‘clear absence of all jurisdiction’”) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872)). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Spencer v. City of Seagoville
Despite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes results, the doctrine of judicial immunity is thought to be in the best interests of ‘the proper administration of justice ... [, for it allows] a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’ Stump, 435 U.S. at 363 , 98 S.Ct. at 1108 , 55 L.Ed.2d at 343 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 649 (1872)); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (judicial immunity …
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Dykes v. Hosemann
(3×)
The rationale for this limitation on judicial immunity is set out in Bradley v. Fisher and reiterated in Stump v. Sparkman: “Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known, no excuse is permissible.” Stump, 98 S.Ct. at 1104 n. 6, quoting Bradley, 13 Wall, at 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 .
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Korotki v. Goughan
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
The Court in Bradley held that “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” 13 Wall at 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 , also quoted from Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 435 U.S. at 355-56 , 98 S.Ct. at 1104-05 (footnote omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Burt v. Mitchell
As the Bradley court suggested, 13 Wall, at 348-49, 20 L.Ed. 646 , controversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a judicial decree.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Campana v. Muir
The Supreme Court held that it was “a general principle of the highest importance to the administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority invested in him [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, supra, at 347.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph Brewer v. M. Prentiss Blackwell
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872), quoted in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 , 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331, 339 (1978). 12 When, however, judicial officers act in a “nonjudicial” capacity, they are not immune from liability for that conduct.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brooks v. Fitch
The Court stated that factors to be considered in determining whether an act is a “judicial” one include analysis of “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,” as well as of “the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. 13 Wall at 362, 20 L.Ed. 646 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Baier v. Parker
If upon such allegations a judge could be compelled to answer in a civil action for his judicial acts, not only would his office be degraded and his usefulness destroyed, but he would be subjected for his protection to the necessity of preserving a complete record of all the evidence produced before him in every litigated case, and of the authorities cited and arguments presented, in order that he might be able to show to the judge before whom he might be summoned by the losing party — and that judge perhaps one of an inferior jurisdiction — that he had decided as he did with judicial inte…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nickels v. Meden
(2×)
As early as 1872, the Court recognized that it was ‘a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, (should) be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’ Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 13 Wall, at 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
K. C. M. v. State
The court noted that under the well-established doctrine of judicial immunity “judges ... are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even where such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” 435 U.S. at 355-56 , 99 S.Ct. at 1104-05, 55 L.Ed.2d at 338-39 , quoting, Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646, 650 (1872).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of CDM
The court noted that under the well-established doctrine of judicial immunity "judges ... are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even where such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." 435 U.S. at 355-56 , 99 S.Ct. at 1104-05, 55 L.Ed.2d at 338-39 , quoting, Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646, 650 (1872).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sidney A. Sparks, R. L. Lynd, D/B/A Sidney A. Sparks, Trustee v. Duval County Ranch Company, Inc.
(2×)
These range from Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351-52 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872), to Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 , 98 S.Ct. 1099 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Quinlan
In Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 , 20 L.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Verrill v. Dewey
This distinction was first examined by Mr. Justice *633 Field in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872): “A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fowler v. Alexander
“It has been the settled doctrine of the English Courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are aware of, in the courts of this country.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 , 20 L.Ed. 646, 649 (1872).
cited
Cited "see"
Lamb v. Smith and Wamsley PLLC
See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 3 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868).
cited
Cited "see"
Buhl v. Doe
See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 , 13 Wall. 335, 351-352 , 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). . . .
discussed
Cited "see"
Harrison v. Joseph B. Mazza, LLC
See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 US 335, 347 , 20 L Ed 646 (1871) (explaining that the principle “has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many cen- turies, and has never been denied * * * in the courts of this country”).
cited
Cited "see"
Lamb v. ZBS Law LLP
See Bradley 2 v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 3 (1868).
cited
Cited "see"
White v. Fleming
See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 , 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872).
cited
Cited "see"
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Bahan (Slip Opinion)
See majority opinion at ¶ 26, quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 355 , 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871).
discussed
Cited "see"
Rusk v. Tymkovich
See Mireles, 502 U.S. 9 -10, 112 S.Ct. 286 , 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (“[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 , 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871))).
discussed
Cited "see"
Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, LLC v. Swope (In Re J & S Properties, LLC)
See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 , 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872) (Describing judicial immunity as “the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries” that “has never been denied ... in the courts of this country.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Darling v. Falls
It is well settled that “judges are absolutely immune from suit for deprivation of civil rights brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1992); see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 , 98 S.Ct. 1099 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (“As early as 1872, the [Supreme] Court recognized that it was ‘a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’ �…
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Pargoud
v.
United States
v.
United States
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 18, 1872.
Cited by 8 opinions | Published
Citer courts: S.D. New York (2) · District of Columbia (1) · S.D. Mississippi (1) · D. Puerto Rico (1) · E.D. Virginia (1) · W.D. Washington (1)
The CHIEF JUSTICE
now gave the judgmentof theeourt.
We have recently decided, in the case of Armstrong v. United States, * that, the President’s proclamation of December 25th, 1868, granting pardon and amnesty unconditionally and without reservation to all who participated, directly[*158] or indirectly, in the late rebellion, relieves claimants of captured and abandoned property from proof of adhesion to the United States during the late civil war. It was unnecessary, therefore, to prove such adhesion or personal pardon for taking part in the rebellion against the United States.
The judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petition is
Reversed.
*
Supra, fhe case immediately preceding.