green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 5×
33.8 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2007 · 2 courts ·
…n all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject must decide it.
⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2006 ·
…t is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. for these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to reside in the court
✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1996 ·
…the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise
✓
Treatment trajectory · 1900 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Swanson v. Garrett
the power is one . . . incidental to all courts . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Clear! Blue, LLC v. Clear Blue, Inc.
n all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject must decide it.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
In Re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation
(2×)
t is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. for these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to reside in the court
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Calvo, William A., III, In Re:
(2×)
the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Cisneros v. Cost Control Marketing & Sales Management
n all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject must decide it.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Honors
The Supreme Court has admonished, however, that these powers “ought to be exercised with great caution.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Henderson v. Wright
Ohio 1991) (quoting Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marit, LLC f/k/a Ecoco, Inc. v. Bokor
We recognize that attorneys may have an interest in that privilege, but that does not abridge the district court's inherent authority “to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824)); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 , 645 n.6 (1985) (“Federal courts admit and suspend attorneys as an exercise of their inherent power.”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert Sofaly v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC
United States v. Hud- son & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wickline v. Cumberledge
When exercising its inherent authority to impose sanctions, the Court must ensure that its power is “exercised with great caution.” Id. (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)) The second source of authority to sanction an attorney is the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lynch v. Bailey-Roka
The ODC Defendants have not identified any action based on or including the same claim that the Lynches have previously dismissed, (D.I, 129 at 13-15 (detailing Lynch’s filings related to the ODC Defendants, which do not include an action based on the same claim dismissed by Lynch).) 10 (quoting Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
TZE GLOBAL DIS TICARET A.S. v. PAPERS UNLIMITED, INC.
Among these inherent powers includes “the power to discipline attorneys who appear before [the court].” Id. (citing Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
RightCHOICE Managed Care v. Labmed Services, LLC
When a district court uses its inherent power “to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases” by “disciplin[ing] attorneys who appear before it,” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (citation omitted), it must do so with “great caution,” Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Elmer Curtis Jones
Among those powers is “the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.” Id. (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824)).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
In re: Frank Lawrence, Jr.
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
In Application of Mosher, this court stated that “a district court’s denial of an application for admission to practice before the district court is reviewable by this court for an abuse of discretion.” 25 F.3d 397, 400 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cooper v. Wilson
Jan. 7, 2016), citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) and United States v. Nolen, 472 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Courts enjoy broad discretion to determine who may practice before them and to regulate the conduct of those who do.”). 8 Marshall, 2016 WL 81484 , at *6, citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824). 9 See, e.g., Marshall, 2016 WL 81484 . 10 See Local Civil Rule 83(b)(12) which provides the procedure for a judge to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an attorney. 11 Cooper is cautioned that communications between clients and their legal counsel that …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Petition Records Release v.
For example, courts possess inherent authority to "impose silence, respect, and decorum," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227 (1821); require "submission to their lawful mandates," id.; "fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process," Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45; "hear a motion in limine," Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016); entertain a "motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens," id.; and generally to "manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases," id. at 47 (collecting cases). 2 This authority …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MAURER v. GL QICHEN INVESTMENT LTD
Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824)) (stating that the Court has the “well- established authority to exercise ethical supervision of the bar.”); cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 (1977) (Recognizing that a party should not use a “a legal process . . . against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.”) Finally, in a similar case, the Court previously “encourage[d] Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel to attempt to resolve any future disputes without involving the courts at the o…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MAURER v. HEIGHTS PLAZA GROUP, LLC
Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824)) (stating that the Court has the “well- established authority to exercise ethical supervision of the bar.”); cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 (1977) (Recognizing that a party should not use a “a legal process . . . against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.”) Finally, in a similar case, the Court previously “encourage[d] Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel to attempt to resolve any future disputes without involving the courts at the o…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Merle Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C.
We recognize that attorneys may have an interest in that privilege, but that does not abridge the district court’s inherent authority “to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (citing Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824)); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 , 645 n.6 (1985) (“Federal courts admit and suspend attorneys as an ex- ercise of their inherent power.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Merle Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C.
We recognize that attorneys may have an interest in that privilege, but that does not abridge the district court’s inherent authority “to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (citing Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824)); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 , 645 n.6 (1985) (“Federal courts admit and suspend attorneys as an ex- ercise of their inherent power.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Merle Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C.
We recognize that attorneys may have an interest in that privilege, but that does not abridge the district court’s inherent authority “to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (citing Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824)); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 , 645 n.6 (1985) (“Federal courts admit and suspend attorneys as an ex- ercise of their inherent power.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Allen v. Fitzgerald
Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 529-30 (1824); see also In re G.LS., 745 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1984) (courts “have the authority to decide, within the bounds of due process, who will be admitted to practice”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re: Frank Lawrence, Jr.
As early as 1824, the Supreme Court held that federal courts have the power to control admission to their bar: “The power is one which ought to be exercised with great caution, but which is, we think, incidental to all Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the profession.” Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (“[T]he Court has held that a federal court has the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilfred Aka v. United States Tax Court
(2×)
But long ago, the Supreme Court gave us guidance on that issue, observing in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall that each court must exercise “discretion” in disciplining members of its own bar because “no other tribunal can decide [such matters] with the same means of information.” Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 530 (1824).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In the Matter of Keven A. McKenna
This discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised; and no other tribunal can decide, in a case of removal from the bar, with the same means of information as the Court itself.” Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re: Randall J. Hake v.
Because the bankruptcy court is vested with this discretion, a reviewing court “should not interpose its authority to overturn a lower court’s decision to discipline an attorney absent a showing that the conduct of the court below ‘was irregular, or was flagrantly improper.’” Id. (quoting Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Molski v. Mandarin Touch Restaurant
This discretion ought to be exercised with great *929 moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised.” Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat, at 530, 6 L.Ed. 152 (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sheridan v. Michels
See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. 364, 374 (1868); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1867); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643-45 (1985) ("Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers."). -55- amended the Bankruptcy Code to create the core/non-core distinction, the case law available to Congress provided no reason to think that bankruptcy courts' status as Article I tribunals …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Glatter v. Mroz
Id. (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 , 6 L.Ed. 152, 152 (1824)). 9 However, because of their potent nature, “inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Id., 501 U.S. at 42-43 , 111 S.Ct. at 2131-32 , 115 L.Ed.2d at 45 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 , 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463 , 65 L.Ed.2d 488, 499-500 (1980)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fellheimer, Bichen & Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Technologies, Inc.
Among the implied and "'incidental'" powers of a federal court is the power "to discipline attorneys who appear before it." Id. (quoting Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Whitehouse v. USDC for RI
Power of District Court to Regulate Grand Jury Subpoenas ________________________________________________________ A federal court has the "inherent power . . . to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (citing Ex parte ________ ________ Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824)).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
Consistent with our unaltered admonition that inherent powers must be exercised "with great caution," Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824), the necessity predicate limits the exercise of inherent powers to those exceptional instances in which congressionally authorized powers fail to protect the processes of the court.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Petition for Writ of Prohibition
“The power [to issue a prerogative writ] is one which ought to be exercised with great caution....” Ex Parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 , 6 L.Ed. 152, 152 (1824).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Frazier v. Heebe
(2×)
This Court may exercise its inherent supervisory power to ensure that these local rules are consistent with “‘the principles of right and justice.’” In re Ruffalo, 390 U. S. 544, 554 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (citation omit ted); see In re Snyder, 472 U. S. 634, 643 (1985); Theard v. United States, 354 U. S. 278, 282 (1957); Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 530 (1824). 3 Section 2071 requires that local rules of a district court “shall be consistent with” the “rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court.” 4 Today we invoke our supervisory authority to prohi…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Snyder
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378-379 (1867); Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Willcher
(6×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him." Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 529 [ 6 L.Ed. 152 ] (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
discussed
Cited "see"
Barnett v. United States Air Force
(2×)
See Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 , 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824).
discussed
Cited "see"
Bojicic v. DeWine
See id. (“[I]t is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved.”) (quoting (Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824)); see also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1334 (4th ed.) (“[P]artisan advocacy is a form of public service so long as it aids the process of adjudication; it ceases to be when it hinders that process, when it misleads, distorts, and obfuscates, when it renders the task of the deciding tribunal not easier, but more difficult.”) (quoting Fuller & Randall, Prof…
discussed
Cited "see"
Palczynsky v. Oil Patch Group, Inc.
(2×)
See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 , (1991) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 , 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Wager v. G4S Secure Integration, LLC
(2×)
See Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 , 6 L.
discussed
Cited "see"
In re: Loring Justice
See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (citing Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 , 378–79 (1867) and Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 , 531 - 10 - Case No. 20-5479, In re Justice (1824)).
cited
Cited "see"
Aleisa v. Gojo Industries, Inc.
See Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824).
discussed
Cited "see"
William A. Brewer Iii v. Lennox Hearth Products, LLC Turner & Witt Plumbing, Inc. Strong Custom Builders, LLC Thermo Dynamic Insulation, LLC State Farm Lloyds Insurance Company Ken and Becky Teel Ross and Meg Rushing
The inherent authority to sanction is limited by due process, so sanctions must be just and not excessive.45 Moreover, “[b]ecause inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls,”46 and “[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint[,] discretion,”47 and “great caution.”48 To that end, invocation of the court’s inherent power to sanction necessitates a finding of bad faith.49 With the understanding that inherent powers must be used sparingly, our appellate courts have consistently held that a court’s inherent power to sanction �…
cited
Cited "see"
Miller v. Southwest Credit Systems, L.P.
See Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824).
discussed
Cited "see"
Phx. Ins. Co. v. Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd.
E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of Pa. , 850 F.2d 969 , 971 (3d Cir. 1988) ; accord Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp. , 122 F.2d 925 , 929 (3d Cir. 1941) ("In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject must decide it." (quoting Smith v. McIver , 22 U.S. 532 , 535, 9 Wheat. 532 , 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824) )).
discussed
Cited "see"
Tobias Chavez v. Dole Food Company Inc
See Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 929-30 (3d Cir.1941) (adopting "Chief Justice Marshall's] salutary rule that, 'In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject must decide it.’ ”) (quoting Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532, 535 , 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824)); see also First City Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Simmons, 878 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1989) ("[WJhere there are two competing lawsuits, the first suit should have priority, absent the showing of balance of convenience or special circumstances giving priority to the second.”); Orthman…
examined
Cited "see"
Parker v. Jacobs
(3×)
See In re Evans, 801 F.2d at 706 (“ ‘[N]o other tribunal can decide, in a case of removal from the bar, with the same means of information as the [sanctioning] Court itself.’ ”) (quoting Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529 , 22 U.S. 529, 530 , 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824)).
examined
Cited "see"
In Re: Warren
(3×)
See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 530 , 9 Wheat. 529 , 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ex parte BURR.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 17, 1824.
Marshall.
Cited by 260 opinions | Published
Mr. Emmett moved for a rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, commanding that Court to restore one Burr, an attorney of that Court, who had been suspended from practice for one year, by order of that Court.[a]
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a motion for a mandamus to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, to restore Mr. Burr to his place of attorney at the bar of that Court.
It is a very unusual application, on which the Court has felt considerable doubts.
[*530] On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to reside in the Court. This discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised; and no other tribunal can decide, in a case of removal from the bar, with the same means of information as the Court itself. If there be a revising tribunal, which possesses controlling authority, that tribunal will always feel the delicacy of interposing its authority, and would do so only in a plain case.
Some doubts are felt in this Court respecting the extent of its authority as to the conduct of the Circuit and District Courts towards their officers; but without deciding on this question, the Court is not inclined to interpose, unless it were in a case where the conduct of the Circuit or District Court was irregular, or was flagrantly improper.
In the case at bar, the proceedings were supposed to be irregular, because Mr. Burr was put to answer charges not made on oath.
That the charges, in a regular complaint against an attorney, ought not to be received and acted on, unless made on oath, is admitted. It is a course of proceeding which is recommended by considerations,[*531] too obvious to require that they should be urged. But this is not a proceeding of that description. The Court did not call on Mr. Burr to answer an accusation in the nature of an information against him. The inquiry was invited by himself; the charges were made at his instance; and the Court proceeded on them at his request. Mr. Burr himself, then, dispensed with the preliminary step of an affidavit to the charges which were to constitute the subject of that inquiry. He waived this preliminary. The testimony on which the Court proceeded was all on oath, and obtained in a manner which is not exceptionable. There is, then, no irregularity in the mode of proceeding which would justify the interposition of this Court. It could only interpose, on the ground that the Circuit Court had clearly exceeded its powers, or had decided erroneously on the testimony. The power is one which ought to be exercised with great caution, but which is, we think, incidental to all Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the profession. Upon the testimony, this Court would not be willing to interpose where any doubt existed. It is the less inclined to interpose in this case, because the complaint is not of an absolute removal, but of a suspension, which is nearly expired, after which, Mr. Burr may be restored by the Court itself, should not very serious objections exist to that measure.
Motion denied.
[a] Mr. Emmett cited Tidd's Pract. 59. 1 Johns. Cas. 134. 181. Bac. Abr. tit. Mandamus.