East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49 (1956). · Go Syfert
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East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49 (1956). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
338 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 53 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lock Logistics, LLC v. Harun Transportation, Inc. (kyed, 2022-11-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1924 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#20 28 U.S.C. § 1336 cited 2× in this case · 853 total citations of statute #9 49 U.S.C. § 305 cited 2× in this case · 126 total citations of statute #4 28 U. S. C. § 2325 cited 2× in this case · 188 total citations of statute #14 49 U.S.C. § 304 cited 2× in this case · 359 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lock Logistics, LLC v. Harun Transportation, Inc.
E.D. Ky. · 2022 · confidence medium
Tex. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Exp., 351 U.S. 49, 53 (1956) (quoting Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Minor v. Central Forest Products Inc
N.D. Ala. · 2021 · confidence medium
Motor vehicles transporting agricultural or horticultural commodities are exempt from economic, licensing, and reporting regulations by the Secretary of Transportation because the exemption was originally “designed to preserve for the farmers the advantage of low-cost motor transportation.” East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49, 53 (1956).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Walther v. Carrothers Construction Co. of Arkansas, LLC
Ark. · 2016 · confidence medium
Tex. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Foods Express, 351 U.S. 49, 53 (1955)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Solite Corp. v. County of King George
Va. · 1980 · confidence medium
Most *664 recently, in East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49, 54 (1956), the Court concluded that the processing of poultry did not constitute manufacturing, noting that “where the commodity retains a continuing substantial identity through the processing stage we cannot say that it has been ‘manufactured.’ ” Undoubtedly, the poultry in Prentice and East Texas Motor Freight Lines, the cork in Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association , the fruit in American Fruit Growers, and the milk and cream in Dairy Co. were rendered more valuable and useful through the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, Inc. v. United States
W.D.N.C. · 1964 · confidence medium
Although the Interstate Commerce Commission does not enjoy unbounded discretion in the exercise of its regulatory powers, it nevertheless “is the expert in the field of transportation, and its judgment is entitled to great deference because of its familiarity with the conditions in the industry which it regulates.” East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49 , 76 S.Ct. 574 , 100 L.Ed. 917 at 924 (1956).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Deep South Oil Company of Texas v. Federal Power Commission (4×)
5th Cir. · 1957 · confidence medium
And yet the Act itself defines the jurisdictional sale as a "sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption" and then categorically states that the Act "shall not apply to any other * * * sale of natural gas." 62 Does not the very difficulty of attempting to define each of these operations as "processing" or "manufacturing" or analogize gas to a dead chicken, frozen or otherwise, East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc., v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49, 52, 54 , 76 S.Ct. 574 , 100 L.Ed. 917, 922-923, 924 , and the uncontradicted fact that the sales had a …
cited Cited "see" Illinois Central Railroad v. Dupont
M.D. La. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Id.
discussed Cited "see" STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF CRIM. JUST. v. VitaPro Foods, Inc. (2×)
Tex. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 54 , 76 S.Ct. 574 .
discussed Cited "see" State ex rel. Department of Criminal Justice v. Vitapro Foods, Inc. (2×)
Tex. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 54 , 76 S.Ct. 574 .
discussed Cited "see" Gonzalez v. State
Tex. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bennett v. State, 742 S.W.2d 664, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1051 , 108 S.Ct. 2815 , 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988); Penny v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), ce rt. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 , 106 S.Ct. 834 , 88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1986); Williams v. State, 883 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd); Valles v. State, 719 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, no pet.); Tex.Code Crim.
cited Cited "see" State v. Knowlton
Idaho · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 699-700 , 747 P.2d 710, 721-22 (1987), vacated ori other grounds, Lankford v. Idaho, 486 U.S. 1051 , 108 S.Ct. 2815 , 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Desfosses v. Desfosses
Idaho Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688 , 747 P.2d 710 (1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1051 , 108 S.Ct. 2815 , 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Bennett v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bennett v. Texas, 486 U.S. ___ , 108 S.Ct. 2815 , 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Powell v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2815 , 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988).
examined Cited "see" Gold Kist, Inc. v. United States (3×)
N.D. Ga. · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See footnote 3, East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Exp., 351 U.S. 49 at 54 , 76 S.Ct. 574 , 100 L.Ed. 917 (1956). 3 .
examined Cited "see" Munitions Carriers Conference, Inc. v. American Farm Lines (3×)
10th Cir. · 1969 · signal: accord · confidence high
C. v. Weldon, 90 F.Supp. 873, 877 (W.D.Tenn.1950), aff'd per curiam, 188 F.2d 367 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 , 72 S.Ct. 50 , 96 L.Ed. 625 (1951); accord, East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49, 54 , 76 S.Ct. 574 , 100 L.Ed. 917 (1956). 2 49 U.S.C. § 322 (b) (2) provides: "If any person operates in clear and patent violation of any provisions of section 303 (c), 306, 309, or 311 [which require persons dealing in interstate commerce by motor vehicle to obtain a certificate or license] of this title, or any rule, regulation, requirement, or order the…
examined Cited "see" Munitions Carriers Conference, Inc. v. American Farm Lines (3×)
10th Cir. · 1969 · signal: accord · confidence high
C. v. Weldon, 90 F.Supp. 873, 877 (W.D.Tenn.1950), aff’d per curiam, 188 F.2d 367 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 , 72 S.Ct. 50 , 96 L.Ed. 625 (1951) ; accord, East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49, 54 , 76 S.Ct. 574 , 100 L.Ed. 917 (1956). . 49 U.S.C. § 322 (b) (2) provides: “If any person operates in clear and patent violation of any provisions of section 303 (c), 306, 309, or 311 [which require persons dealing in interstate commerce by motor vehicle to obtain a certificate or license] of this title, or any rule, regulation, requirement, or orde…
examined Cited "see" Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co. (3×)
D.S.C. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49 , 76 S.Ct. 574 , 100 L.Ed. 917 [1956] wherein the Supreme Court states: “The exemption of motor vehicles carrying ‘agricultural (including horticul tural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)’ was designed to preserve for the farmers the advantage of low-cost motor transportation.” See also note 2, supra.
examined Cited "see" Agricultural Transportation Association of Texas v. Wilbur C. King (3×)
5th Cir. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See Frozen Food Express v. United States, S.D.Tex. (3 Judge), 1955, 128 F. Supp. 374 , affirmed, 351 U.S. 49 , 76 S.Ct. 574 , 100 L.Ed. 917 ; Frozen Food Express v. United States, S.D.Tex. (3 Judge), 1956, 148 F.Supp. 399 , affirmed, 355 U.S. 6 , 78 S.Ct. 38 , 2 L.Ed.2d 22 ; and ICC Regulations, 49 C.F.R. 210.25, Administrative Ruling 107, legislatively approved as list of exempt commodities by 1958 amendments also establishing grandfather rights; Frozen Food Express v. United States, N.D.Tex. (3 Judge), 1963, 219 F.Supp. 131 ; Jarman v. United States, D.Md. (3 Judge), 1963, 219 F. Supp. 108 ;…
examined Cited "see" Eastern Central Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States (3×)
D.D.C. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Exp., 351 U.S. 49, 54 , 76 S. Ct. 574 , 100 L.Ed. 917 (1956). .
examined Cited "see" Premier Peat Moss Corporation v. United States (6×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1956 · signal: see · confidence high
See East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49, 51 , 76 S.Ct. 574 , 576: “The exemption of motor vehicles carrying ‘agricultural (including ' horticultural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)’ was designed to preserve for the farmers the advantage of low-cost motor transportation.” 6 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Crane v. State
Tex. Crim. App. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
The United States Supreme Court has determined that a prospective juror may be subjected to a challenge for cause based upon that juror's views on the death penalty -when the record shows that the prospective juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties in accordance with the oath taken and the trial judge’s instructions.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); see also Bennett v. State, 742 S.W.2d 664, 674 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), 486 U.S. 1051 , 108 S.Ct. 2815 , 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988), aff'd, 766 S.W.2d *344 22…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Air Lift Co. v. United States (3×)
W.D. Mich. · 1968 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 1956, 351 U.S. 49, 52-54 , 76 S.Ct. 574, 576 , 100 L.Ed. 917 , where the Court observed that “killing, dressing, and freezing a chicken is certainly a change in the commodity,” but, then, after citing and quoting from Anheuser-Busch, supra, tersely commented that a “chicken that has been killed and dressed is still a chicken,” and not a manufactured commodity. 197 F.Supp. at 708 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Earl Glass Co. v. United States (3×)
D. Nev. · 1961 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 1956, 351 U.S. 49, 52-54 , 76 S.Ct. 574, 576 , 100 L.Ed. 917 , where the Court observed that “killing, dressing, and freezing a chicken is certainly a change in the commodity,” but, then, after citing and quoting from An-heuser-Busch, supra, tersely commented that a “chicken that has been killed and dressed is still a chicken,” and not a manufactured commodity.
EAST TEXAS MOTOR FREIGHT LINES, INC., Et Al.
v.
FROZEN FOOD EXPRESS Et Al.
162.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 23, 1956.
351 U.S. 49
David G. Macdonald argued the cause for the East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc., et al., appellants in No. 162. With him on the brief were Francis W. Mclnerny, Peter T. Beardsley, Clarence D. Todd and Dale C. Dillon., Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellant in No. 163. With him on the brief was Leo H. Pou., Charles P. Reynolds and Carl Helmetag, Jr. submitted on brief for the Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. et al., appellants in No. 164., Charles H. Weston argued the cause for the United States and the Secretary of Agriculture, appellees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Barnes, Robert L. Farrington, Neil Brooks and Donald A. Campbell., Carl L. Phinney argued the cause and filed a brief for Frozen Food Express, appellee.
Douglas, Burton, Frankfurter, Minton, Harlan.
Cited by 120 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Three motor common carriers filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission under § 204 (c) of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 547, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 304 (c), alleging that Frozen Food Express, a common carrier by motor vehicle, was and had been transporting fresh and frozen meats and fresh and frozen dressed poultry in interstate commerce without a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commission which covers those commodities. The complaint prayed for a cease and desist order. Frozen Food Express admitted that it was and had been so transporting the named commodities but asserted in defense that those operations were within the exemption of §203 (b)(6).[1]

The Commission found that Frozen Food Express had been performing unauthorized operations and that fresh and frozen meats and fresh and frozen dressed poultry were not within the exemption of § 203 (b)(6). 62[*51] M. C. C. 646. Accordingly it ordered Frozen Food Express to cease and desist from engaging in these operations. Frozen Food Express brought suit before a three-judge District Court (28 U. S. C. § 2325) to set the Commission’s order aside, 28 U. S. C. § 1336; 49 Stat. 550, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 305 (g); 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009. The answer of the United States and the complaint in intervention filed by the Secretary of Agriculture supported the position of Frozen Food Express. The original complainants before the Commission and other interested carriers and carrier associations intervened in support of the Commission. The District Court sustained the Commission’s conclusion that fresh and frozen meats are nonexempt commodities. No appeal was taken from that holding. The District Court held that fresh and frozen dressed poultry are exempt commodities under § 203 (b)(6) and restrained the Commission from enforcing its cease and desist order as respects those products. 128 F. Supp. 374. The cases are here by appeal. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253, 2101 (b).

We agree with the District Court that the Commission’s ruling does not square with the statute. The exemption of motor vehicles carrying “agricultural (including horticultural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)” was designed to preserve for the farmers the advantage of low-cost motor transportation. See especially 79 Cong. Rec. 12217. The victory in the Congress for the exemption was recognition that the price which the farmer obtains for his products is greatly affected by the cost of transporting them to the consuming market in their raw state or after they have become marketable by incidental processing.

The history of the words “agricultural . . . commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)” contained in § 203 (b)(6) supports that conclusion. The bill as it came to the floor of the House from the Interstate[*52] and Foreign Commerce Committee (79 Cong. Rec. 12204) exempted “motor vehicles used exclusively in carrying livestock or unprocessed agricultural products.” Id., 12220. Mr. Pettengill for the Committee offered an amendment which substituted for the words “unprocessed agricultural products” the phrase “agricultural commodities not including manufactured products thereof.” That amendment was agreed to after the following colloquy:

“Mr. PETTENGILL. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a good deal of discussion this afternoon as to what is a processed agricultural product, whether that would include pasteurized milk or ginned cotton. It was not the intent of the committee that it should include those products. Therefore, to meet the views of many Members we thought we would strike out the word ‘unprocessed’ and make it apply only to manufactured products.
“Mr. WHITTINGTON. In other words, under the amendment to the committee amendment, cotton in bales and cottonseed transported from the gin-neries to the market or to a public warehouse would be exempt, whereas they might not be exempt if the language remained, because ginning is sometimes synonymous with processing.
“Mr. PETTENGILL. That is correct.”

It is plain from this change that the exemption of “agricultural commodities” was considerably broadened by making clear that the exemption was lost not by incidental or preliminary processing but by manufacturing.[2] Killing, dressing, and freezing a chicken is certainly a[*53] change in the commodity. But it is no more drastic a change than the change which takes place in milk from pasteurizing, homogenizing, adding vitamin concentrates, standardizing, and bottling. Yet the Commission agrees that milk so processed is not a “manufactured” product, but falls within the meaning of the “agricultural” exemption. 52 M. C. C. 511, 551. The Commission also agrees that ginned cotton and cottonseed are exempt. Id., 523-524. But there is hardly less difference between cotton in the field and cotton at the gin or in the bale or between cottonseed in the field and cottonseed at the gin, than between a chicken in the pen and one that is dressed. The ginned and baled cotton and the cottonseed, as well as the dressed chicken, have gone through a processing stage. But neither has been “manufactured” in the normal sense of the word. The Court in Anheuser-Busch Assn. v. United States, 207 U. S. 556, 562, in a case arising under the tariff laws, said,

“. . . Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture, and yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labor and manipulation. But something more is necessary, as set forth and illustrated in Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609. There must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge, ‘having a distinctive name, character or use.’ ”

[*54] In that case imported corks were made ready for use in beer bottles by stamping, by removal of dust, meal, bugs, and worms, by washing and steaming to remove tannin and to increase elasticity, and by drying. Plainly, the corks were processed. But the Court held they had not been manufactured within the drawback provision of the tariff laws. And see Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 615; United States v. Dudley, 174 U. S. 670.

A chicken that has been killed and dressed is still a chicken. Removal of its feathers and entrails has made it ready for market. But we cannot conclude that this processing which merely makes the chicken marketable turns it into a “manufactured” commodity.[3]

At some point processing and manufacturing will merge. But where the commodity retains a continuing substantial identity through the processing stage we cannot say that it has been “manufactured” within the meaning of § 203 (b)(6).

The Commission is the expert in the field of transportation. And its judgment is entitled to great deference because of its familiarity with the conditions in the industry which it regulates. American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 310. But Congress has placed limits on its statutory powers; and our duty on judicial review is to determine those limits. See Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358. Those limits would be passed here if the Commission were permitted to expand “manufactured” to include such incidental processing as is involved in dressing and freezing a chicken.

Affirmed.

1

Sec. 203 (b)(6) provides:

“Nothing in this part, except the provisions of section 204 relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation or standards of equipment shall be construed to include . . . motor vehicles used in carrying property consisting of ordinary livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural (including horticultural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof), if such motor vehicles are not used in carrying any other property, or passengers, for compensation . . . .”
2

Two more changes were made in the agricultural exemption clause before the bill reached final form. The words “fish, including shellfish,” were added after the word “livestock” (79 Cong. Rec. 12220), and the exemption was strengthened by making it “absolute[*53] rather than discretionary” with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id., at 12225-12226.

As originally enacted in 1935, § 203 (b) (6) exempted motor vehicles “used exclusively” in carrying agricultural commodities. In 1938 the word “exclusively” was deleted and the following language was added at the end of the clause: “if such motor vehicles are not used in carrying any other property, or passengers, for compensation.” 52 Stat. 1237. In 1940 the word “ordinary” was inserted before the word “livestock,” making the exemption applicable to “ordinary livestock.” 54 Stat. 921. Finally, in 1952, the words “agricultural commodities” were broadened to “agricultural (including horticultural) commodities.” 66 Stat. 479.

3

The fact that most poultry is sold alive and is not killed and processed by the grower is not controlling. For § 203 (b) (6) exempts carriers transporting “agricultural commodities” unless those products are “manufactured.” The exemption is concerned with the stage of the processing, not with the person who does it.

Dissent

[*55] Mr. Justice Burton, whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Minton and Mr. Justice Harlan join,

dissenting.

For the reasons given by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 52 M. C. C. 511, 62 M. C. C. 646, and its administrative practice of over 15 years, I would sustain its interpretation of the Act to the effect that fresh and frozen dressed poultry, like fresh and frozen dressed meats, are not entitled to exemption as agricultural commodities. No appeal has been taken from that part of the judgment which held valid the Commission’s determination that fresh and frozen dressed meats are products manufactured from agricultural commodities. The Commission’s like treatment of poultry is not arbitrary or unreasonable. On the contrary, there was much evidence before the Commission which clearly supported its decision. Consequently, we should accord that decision the weight ordinarily given to informed administrative action. We cannot say that the order of the Commission, which held that there is no significant distinction between the two, is not an allowable judgment.

“Such determinations [of fact by the Shipping Board or Interstate Commerce Commission as a basis for administrative orders] will not be set aside by courts if there is evidence to support them. Even though, upon a consideration of all the evidence, a court might reach a different conclusion, it is not authorized to substitute its own for the administrative judgment.” Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, 304. See also, Federal Communications Commission v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U. S. 223, 229; United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U. S. 515, 535-536; Barrett Line, Inc. v. United States, 326 U. S. 179, 199.