green
Positive treatment
5.7 score
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "see"
Hinshaw v. Smith
See Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo., 43 F.3d 1218, 1224 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 17 (1995). 26 The Board's interests as Hinshaw's employer clearly outweighed Hinshaw's interests in speaking out as a private citizen, and Hinshaw's speech was not protected by the First Amendment.
cited
Cited "see"
Cathryn E. Hinshaw v. LOPFI
See Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo., 43 F.3d 1218, 1224 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 17 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
A-1 Cigarette Vending, Inc. v. United States
(2×)
See M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995); Conti v. United States, 48 Fed.Cl. 532, 536 (2001).
discussed
Cited "see"
Graves v. Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration
See Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo., 43 F.3d 1218, 1226 (8th Cir.) (finding that issue of whether protected speech played substantial role in public employee’s termination is ordinarily issue of fact for jury), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 17 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
Claude Graves v. Arkansas Department Of Finance And Administration
See Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo., 43 F.3d 1218, 1226 (8th Cir.) (finding that issue of whether protected speech played substantial role in public employee's termination is ordinarily issue of fact for jury), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
R. Scott Sexton v. Ronald Martin
See Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo., 43 F.3d 1218, 1225 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 17 (1995); Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited "see"
R. Scott Sexton v. Ronald Martin
See Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo., 43 F.3d 1218 , 1225 (8 th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995); Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 668 (8 th Cir. 1984).
cited
Cited "see"
Woodland Manor III Associates v. McCleod, 89-2477 (2000)
See Eastern Minerals International, Inc. v. U.S. 36 Fed.Cl. 541, 548 (1996) (citing M J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 , 1153-54, cert. denied U.S., 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995)).
cited
Cited "see"
Doyas Ingram v. Dave Johnson
See Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo., 43 F.3d 1218, 1225 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
Doyas Ingram Mark Barbaree v. Dave Johnson, Individually and in His Official Capacity Donald Webb, Individually and in His Official Capacity
See Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo., 43 F.3d 1218, 1225 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 17 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
Fain v. State
(2×)
See Powell v. State, 897 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 54 , 133 L.Ed.2d 19 (1995); Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
discussed
Cited "see"
Buca, Inc. v. Gambucci's, Inc.
See Western Chemical Pumps, 989 F.Supp. at 1127 (citing Versa Products Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 200-01 (3rd Cir.) (possibility of confusion insufficient), ce rt. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 54 , 133 L.Ed.2d 19 (1995)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Maritrans Inc. v. United States
(2×)
See M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
Commerce National Insurance Services, Inc. v. Commerce Insurance Agency, Inc.
See Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 54 , 133 L.Ed.2d 19 (1995); 1 McCarthy § 11:83.
discussed
Cited "see"
Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp.
Finally, in order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that defendants (1) acted under color of state law, and (2) in a manner that deprived plaintiff of “any of the rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; see Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 876 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
Greaves v. State of New York
See Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 876 (2d Cir.1994) (quotation omit *35 ted), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
Eastern Minerals International, Inc. v. United States
See M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 , cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
Juanita L. Hutchison v. Merit Systems Protection Board
See M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1152 (Fed.Cir.) (when reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the record is reviewed de novo to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Walcek v. United States
(2×)
See also M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153 (Fed.Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Findlay v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc.
(2×)
Plaintiffs section 1981 claim accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, when he “has notice of the act that is claimed to have caused the injury.” Jenkins, 44 F.Supp.2d at 530 ; see also Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995); Hudson v. Delphi Energy and Engine Management Sys., Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d 256, 258 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (“The statute of limitations [for a section 1981 claim] begins to run at ‘that point in time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [his] …
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Ormiston v. Nelson
Owens, 488 U.S. at 251 , 109 S.Ct. at 582 ; see also Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ormiston v. Nelson
(2×)
Owens, 488 U.S. at 251 , 109 S.Ct. at 582 ; see also Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 , 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995). 5 However, federal law governs the determination of the accrual date (that is, the date the statute of limitations begins to run) for purposes of the statute of limitations in a section 1983 action.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Herndon v. United States
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2899 , 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (identifying the nature of the property interest as a "logically antecedent inquiry” to takings analysis); see also M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (Fed.Cir.) (conducting a logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the property interest), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 53 , 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
M & J Coal Co.
v.
United States
v.
United States
No. 94-1851.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 2, 1995.
Published
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.