McGee v. Cnty. of Orange, 120 S. Ct. 71 (1999). · Go Syfert
McGee v. Cnty. of Orange, 120 S. Ct. 71 (1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“here a class has been certified under (b)(3), class members may opt out of the class and, a judgment will not have a res judicata effect on those who elect to do so.”
18 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Millett v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (mesuperct, 2000-03-02)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Millett v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
Me. Super. Ct · 2000 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
here a class has been certified under (b)(3), class members may opt out of the class and, a judgment will not have a res judicata effect on those who elect to do so.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hazen Ex Rel. LeGear v. Reagen (3×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
“We do not see any basis for inferring that Congress meant federal consent decrees that are not based on [the required PLRA findings] to remain in effect and amenable to enforcement in state courts.” Id. at 156. *699 In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit carefully distinguished between consent decrees, which are enforceable through the supervising court’s exercise of its contempt powers, and private settlements, enforceable only through a new action for breach of contract.
cited Cited "see" Davis v. Gunter
D. Neb. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See [Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 824 , 120 S.Ct. 72 , 145 L.Ed.2d 61 (1999)].
discussed Cited "see" Everett Hadix, Plaintiffs-Appellees/cross-Appellants v. Perry M. Johnson,defendants-Appellants/cross-Appellees
6th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (“Since prospective relief, under the set of definitions provided in the Act, includes a consent decree to the extent that the decree does not award compensatory monetary damages, we think it clear from the statute itself that, if those findings were not made in connection with the entry of the decree, and if the court does not proceed to make the requisite findings that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right, the Act requires the termination of such a consent decree.�…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Frank McGEE, et ux.
v.
COUNTY OF ORANGE
No. 98-2035.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 4, 1999.
120 S. Ct. 71

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.