green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
2.2 score
“cercla is a strict liability statute, one of the purposes of which is to shift the cost of cleaning up environmental harm from the taxpayers to the parties who benefitted from the disposal of the wastes that caused the harm.”
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002
2014
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. City of Chico
cercla is a strict liability statute, one of the purposes of which is to shift the cost of cleaning up environmental harm from the taxpayers to the parties who benefitted from the disposal of the wastes that caused the harm.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Klamath Irrigation District v. United States
(2×)
Id. at 1581-82 ; see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 46 Fed.Cl. 29, 35-36 (2000), aff'd, 271 F.3d 1327 (Fed.Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1096 , 122 S.Ct. 2293 , 152 L.Ed.2d 1051 (2002). 26 Treating the sovereign act doctrine as a prelude to a common law impossibility de fense, indeed, clashes with the underlying rationale of that doctrine and of the unmistakability doctrine, as well.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Bronster
See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2001) {en banc) ("Thus five justices ... in Eastern Enterprises agreed that regulatory actions requiring the payment of money are not takings.”), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1096 , 122 S.Ct. 2293 , 152 L.Ed.2d 1051 (2002); Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir.1999) (noting that the five Justices viewed the dispute under Due Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause "because no identifiable property interest was infringed by the legislation”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1117 , 120 S.Ct. 9…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
M.J. Woods, Inc. v. Conopco, Inc.
A. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL The doctrine of collateral estoppel — also known as issue preclusion — operates almost identically under federal and New York State law by barring “the relitigation of an issue that was raised, litigated, and actually decided by a judgment in a prior proceeding, regardless of whether the two suits are based on the same cause of action.” Postlewaite v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 338 F.3d 42 , 47-48 (2d Cir.2003); see also Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d 295 , 740 N.Y.S.2d 252 , 766 N.E.2d 914, 919 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1096 , 122 S.Ct. 2293 , 152 L.Ed.2d 1051 (2002); …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Sprinkler Fitters Local 417
v.
Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.
v.
Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.
01-1395.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 28, 2002.
Published
Citer courts: E.D. California (1)
SPRINKLER FITTERS LOCAL 417
v.
MINNESOTA CHAPTER OF ASSOCIATED BUILDERS & CONTRACTORS, INC., ET AL.
No. 01-1395.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 28, 2002.
1
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 267 F. 3d 807.