green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
28.9 score
“it is now understood that a federal habeas petition 15 is second or successive if the facts underlying the claim occurred by the time of 16 the initial petition, . . . and if the petition challenges the same state court 17 judgment as the initial petition. . . .”
Treatment trajectory · 2018 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2018
2022
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Skinner v. State of Nevada
it is now understood that a federal habeas petition 15 is second or successive if the facts underlying the claim occurred by the time of 16 the initial petition, . . . and if the petition challenges the same state court 17 judgment as the initial petition. . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Stratics Networks Inc.
The non-delegation 12 doctrine extends from this provision such that Congress “may not transfer to another branch 13 powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14 2116, 2123 (2019).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Costamagna v. McKesson Corp.
Title VII 11 “As a precondition to the commencement of a Title VII action in court, a 12 complainant must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 13 (EEOC or Commission).” Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis, 587 U.S. ____ , 139 S. Ct. 14 1843, 1846 (2019).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Webb v. Rejoice Delivers LLC
However, “to invoke its statutory powers under §§ 3 and 4 to stay litigation and compel 12 arbitration according to a contract’s terms, a court must first know whether the contract itself falls 13 within or beyond the boundaries of §§ 1 and 2.” New Prime v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 14 532, 537 (2019).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jane Doe I v. Eugene Scalia
“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14 2116, 2126 (2019).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Conley v. United States
Mo. Aug. 29, 2014); Brown v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 14, 15 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Peden v. United States, 914 F.3d 1151, 1152 (8th Cir. 2019).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Junior Abreu
Specifically, he urged that the commentary may have related to the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, but once the Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597 (2015), that the “residual clause” was unconstitutionally vague and the Sentencing Commission struck an identical clause from § 4B1.2(a), see Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14, 15 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), the commentary could no longer be viewed as interpreting or explaining the text that remained.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Berenson v. Twitter, Inc.
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 14 1921, 1928 (2019).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Bartolomeo v. United States
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
See Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14, 15-16 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari and describing the differing circuit decisions)10; id. at 16 (stating that "this case 9 The parties in this case agree that, if the residual clause in the career-offender provision was unconstitutionally vague at the time Bartolomeo was sentenced, he could no longer be classified as a career offender because the two predicate convictions presumed to underlie that classification do not otherwise qualify as "crime[s] of violence." 10Our court also has not decided whether a habeas petitio…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nunez v. United States
It 17 is clear, in my view, that “if a sequence of words that increases a person’s time in 18 prison is unconstitutionally vague in one legally binding provision, that same 19 sequence is unconstitutionally vague if it serves the same purpose in another 1 legally binding provision.” Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14, 14 (2019) 2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Carter
Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14, 14 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari in Brown and nine other cases); see also Grummitt v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2707 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari for the same reasons set forth in Brown).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bobbie London, Jr.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
But at a minimum, an issue that has divided so many judges within and among circuits, 4 and that affects so many prisoners, “calls out for an answer.” Brown, 139 S. Ct. at 14 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 4 Compare United States v. Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding London’s motion would be untimely); Russo v. United States, 902 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2018) (same); United States v. Green, 898 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2018) (same); United States v. Greer, 881 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Brown, 868 F.3d 297 (same); Raybon, 867 F.3d 625 (same), with Moore, 871 F.3d at 82 (suggest…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bobbie London, Jr.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
But at a minimum, an issue that has divided so many judges within and among circuits, 4 and that affects so many prisoners, “calls out for an answer.” Brown, 139 S. Ct. at 14 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 4 Compare United States v. Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding London’s motion would be untimely); Russo v. United States, 902 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2018) (same); United States v. Green, 898 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2018) (same); United States v. Greer, 881 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Brown, 868 F.3d 297 (same); Raybon, 867 F.3d 625 (same), with Moore, 871 F.3d at 82 (suggest…
discussed
Cited "see"
John Watford v. J. Ray Ormond
(2×)
See Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14, 15-16 (2018) (denial of cert. petition) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“But for petitioners [who were sentenced pursuant to § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause when the Guidelines were still mandatory], this Court has thus far left the validity of their sentences an open question.
discussed
Cited "see"
Bryant v. United States
See Nunez, 954 F.3d at 472 (Pooler, J., concurring) (“[O]ur decision ‘denies petitioners, and perhaps more than 1,000 like them, a chance to challenge the constitutionality of their sentences.’ Therein lies the injustice.” (quoting Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14, 14 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Pullen
Brown v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 14 , 202 L.Ed.2d 302 (2018) ; see Gipson v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 373 , 202 L.Ed.2d 302 (2018) ; Lewis v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 376 , 202 L.Ed.2d 305 (2018) ; Greer v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 374 , 202 L.Ed.2d 302 (2018) ; Wilson v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 374 , 202 L.Ed.2d 302 (2018) ; Molette v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 373 , 202 L.Ed.2d 301 (2018) ; Homrich v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 374 , 202 L.Ed.2d 302 (2018) ; Chubb v. United States ,…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Thilo BROWN
v.
UNITED STATES.
v.
UNITED STATES.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 15, 2018.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied., Today this Court denies petitioners, and perhaps more than 1,000 like them, a chance to challenge the constitutionality of their sentences.1 They were sentenced under a then-mandatory provision of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the exact language of which we have recently identified as unconstitutionally vague in another legally binding provision. These petitioners argue that their sentences, too, are unconstitutional. This important question, which has generated divergence among the lower courts, calls out for an answer. Because this Court's decision to deny certiorari precludes petitioners from obtaining such an answer, I respectfully dissent., *15The Guidelines directed enhanced punishment for \career offender[s].\" See USSG § 4B1.1(a). Defendants qualified as \"career offender [s]\" if they had \"at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.\" Ibid. There were different ways that a past conviction could count as \"a crime of violence
the ACCA's residual clause was identical to the Guidelines' residual clause. See § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) ( \"... involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another\"). | \" but only one is at issue here: A conviction counted as \"a crime of violence\" if it \"involve[d] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.\" § 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2002). Because it supplied an amorphous catchall at the end of a more definite list
Citer courts: D. Nevada (1)
Regardless of where one stands on the merits of how far Johnson extends, this case presents an important question of federal law that has divided the courts of appeals and in theory could determine the liberty of over 1,000 people.[4] That sounds like the kind of case we ought to hear. See this Court's Rules 10(a), (c).[5] Because the Court nevertheless declines to do so, I respectfully dissent.
4
See Brief for Eight Federal Public Defender Offices as Amici Curiae in No. 16-7056 (CA4), pp. 1a-5a (estimating 1,187 cases pending nationwide).
5
Rule 10 sets forth situations that can weigh in favor of certiorari, although they are "neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion." Rule 10(a) points to a situation in which "a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter." Rule 10(c) points to a situation in which "a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court."