Anderson Et Al. v. Winsett, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981). · Go Syfert
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Anderson Et Al. v. Winsett, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1985 · …the due process clause may be triggered not only by statutorily created rights, but also by official policies and practices. ⚠ not in text
212 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 38 distinct courts.
Negative lean: 4th  ·  Positive lean: 7th, 8th, DC, 9th, 11th, 2nd, 5th, 3rd
Strongest positive: Patricia Parker v. Helen Corrothers, Warden, Women's Unit Robert Wells, Chairman, Board of Pardons & Paroles A.L. Lockhart, Director of Arkansas Department of Correction, John Bentley Yancey v. Marvin Evans, Jr., Administrator, and Robert Wells, Chairman, Arkansas Board of Probation and Parole (ca8, 1985-02-13) · Strongest negative: Paoli v. Lally (ca4, 1987-03-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Paoli v. Lally (2×)
4th Cir. · 1987 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 891 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981) (Delaware work release program created liberty interest because of specific criteria listed despite lack of mandatory language in statutes and regulations).
discussed Cited "but see" Paoli v. Lally (2×)
4th Cir. · 1987 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.1980) , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 891 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981) (Delaware work release program created liberty interest because of specific criteria listed despite lack of mandatory language in statutes and regulations).
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Patricia Parker v. Helen Corrothers, Warden, Women's Unit Robert Wells, Chairman, Board of Pardons & Paroles A.L. Lockhart, Director of Arkansas Department of Correction, John Bentley Yancey v. Marvin Evans, Jr., Administrator, and Robert Wells, Chairman, Arkansas Board of Probation and Parole (2×)
8th Cir. · 1985 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the due process clause may be triggered not only by statutorily created rights, but also by official policies and practices.
discussed Cited "see" McGrath v. Johnson (2×)
E.D. Pa. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (although injunctive relief is moot because prisoner was released on parole, “claims for damages and for declaratory relief as a predicate to damages, are not”), cert. denied sub nom Anderson v. Winsett, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 891 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Adler v. I & M Rail Link, L.L.C.
N.D. Iowa · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hendley v. Central of Georgia R.R., 609 F.2d 1146 , 1152-53 & n. 5 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 890 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981). “[A] district court’s ability to enjoin a hearing or conduct which violates § 60 is essential to effectuate the purpose of the section.” Id. at 1152.
discussed Cited "see" Bruce E. Hornsby v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company (2×)
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hendley v. Central of Georgia R.R., 609 F.2d 1146 , 1152-53 & n. 5 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 890 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981). "[A] district court's ability to enjoin a hearing or conduct which violates § 60 is essential to effectuate the purpose of the section." Id. at 1152.
cited Cited "see" Hornsby v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co.
E.D. Ark. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hendley v. Central Georgia Railroad Company, 609 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 890 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Felipe Morales v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company
5th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hendley v. Central of Ga. R.R., 609 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 890 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981); Brown v. American Airlines, Inc., 593 F.2d 652 , 653 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited "see" Board of Pardons v. Allen (2×)
SCOTUS · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Winsett, 449 U. S. 1093 (1981) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
discussed Cited "see" Robert Brennan v. Michael J. Cunningham, Etc. (2×)
1st Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. Winsett, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 891 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
discussed Cited "see" Paoli v. Lally (2×)
D. Maryland · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 891 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981), on remand, No. 74-210 (D.Del.
discussed Cited "see" Roosevelt Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Anderson v. Winsett, 449 U.S. 1093, 1095 , 101 S.Ct. 891, 892 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for certiorari) (noting conflict in circuit court’s interpretations of Greenholtz).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." the Texas Education Agency and Mike Morath, Commissioner of Education, in His Official Capacity v. Academy of Careers and Technologies, Inc. D/B/A Academy of Careers and Technologies Charter School (2×)
Tex. App. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1293 (CA6 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 891 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981); Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1007 (CA3 1980) (en banc). 10 Rule IV(3)(d)(3) provides: “(3) The facility administrator will, within a reasonable period of time, review the Program Committee’s recommendation.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eldridge Lovelace v. Richard B. Gramley and Michael P. Lane
7th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Winsett v. McGinnis, 617 F.2d 996 , 1005 (3rd Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981); Finley v. Staton, 542 F.2d 250, 251 (5th Cir.1976). 16 Because the decision whether to grant or deny work release privileges is discretionary, the Due Process Clause does not apply to the plaintiff's parole denial.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Fuller v. Lane (2×)
C.D. Ill. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1005 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 891 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981); Finley v. Staton, 542 F.2d 250, 251 (5th Cir.1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Evans v. Central of Georgia Railroad
N.D. Ga. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
Union, 718 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir.1983); See also Hendley v. Central of Georgia Railroad, 442 F.Supp. 482 , rev’d on other grounds, 609 F.2d 1146 (1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 890 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981) (S.D.Ga.1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. H. David Miller, United States of America v. Continental Fuel Co., Inc., United States of America v. Don A. Bliesner
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Ogden, 303 F.2d at 736-37 ; see also United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940, 948 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 859 , 101 S.Ct. 160 , 66 L.Ed.2d 75 (1980) and 449 U.S. 1093 , 101 S.Ct. 890 , 66 L.Ed.2d 822 (1981) (once witness testified that interviewing government attorney took notes, it was error to fail to conduct inquiry as to whether he had adopted or approved those notes).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Olim v. Wakinekona (2×)
SCOTUS · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bills v. Henderson, 631 F. 2d 1287, 1293 (CA6 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1093 (1981); Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F. 2d 996, 107 (CA3 1980) (en banc).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Raymond W. Anderson and Paul W. Keve
v.
Thomas H. Winsett
79-2014.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 12, 1981.
449 U.S. 1093
White, Rehnquist.
Cited by 64 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 73%
Citer courts: Eighth Circuit (2)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice WHITE, with whom Justice REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment summarily.

Dissent

Justice White, with whom Justice Rehnquist joins,

dissenting.

In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 12 (1979), we held that a Nebraska statute created an “expectancy of release [on parole]” that was “entitled to some measure of constitutional protection.” The Nebraska statute provided in part:

“Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because:
“(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
[*1094] “(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law;
“(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
“(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released át a later date.” [1]

We emphasized that oúr decision rested on the “unique structure and language” of the Nebraska statute and cautioned that whether any other state statute created a liberty interest would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Ibid.

In this case respondent, a Delaware state prisoner, filed suit against petitioners, state prison officials, alleging that petitioners violated his due process rights when they denied him work release. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined the Delaware statutory provisions and regulations governing work release programs in light of Greenholtz and concluded that a liberty interest was implicated when respondent was denied work release. The court conceded that Delaware prison officials exercise substantial discretion in making work release decisions but concluded that their discretion is not unbounded. It determined that under Delaware law prison officials must exercise their discretion “consistently with the purpose and policy behind work release.” [2] The court also observed that the State had established “an elaborate institutional system” for processing work release applications.[3] Two separate committees must evaluate the inmate’s fitness for work release and recommend that work release be granted before the inmate’s application may be sub[*1095] mitted to the prison superintendent. In light of this three-tier review system, the court concluded that the superintendent could not reject work release applications for reasons that were unrelated to the purposes of the work release program. Since Delaware prison officials do not have unlimited discretion to deny work release to an inmate who meets the basic criteria for eligibility, the Court of Appeals held that under Greenholtz respondent had established an “expectancy of [work] release” that was entitled to constitutional protection.[4] The court clearly rejected the view expressed in the dissenting opinion that respondent could not prevail under the standard established in Greenholtz since Delaware law does not provide that an eligible inmate shall be granted work release unless prison authorities determine, based on certain statutory criteria, that work release ought to be denied.

We did not expressly state in Greenholtz that the “shall. . . unless” language of the Nebraska statute was the critical factor underlying our determination that the statute created a liberty interest. However, other Courts of Appeals have examined parole release statutes lacking mandatory language and have concluded in light of Greenholtz that those statutes do not create liberty interests. See Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F. 2d 866 (CA6 1979); Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F. 2d 661 (CA2 1979); Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F. 2d 805 (CA10 1979).[5]

I believe this Court should grant certiorari to clarify the[*1096] implications of the Greenholtz decision by considering whether the Delaware statute and regulations involved in this case created a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

1

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114 (1) (1976) (emphasis added). See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S., at 11.

2

Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F. 2d 996, 1007 (1980) (en banc).

4

The court distinguished this case from Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), in which we rejected the respondent state prisoners’ argument that they had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining in particular prisons. The state statute involved in Meachum permitted prison officials to transfer prisoners to other state correctional institutions “for whatever reason or for no reason at all.” Id., at 228.

5

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated that the presence of mandatory language is an important factor to be considered in determining whether a statute creates a liberty interest. Bowles v. Tennant, 613 F. 2d 776, 778 (1980).