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Positive treatment
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Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981
2003
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lockhart v. Com.
In this context the Court held: "Cross-examination on a part of a transaction enables the opposing party to elicit evidence on redirect examination of the whole transaction at least to the extent that it relates to the same subject." Id. at 540, 273 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1081 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 990 , 100 S.Ct. 521 , 62 L.Ed.2d 419 (1979)).
examined
Cited "see"
Lagrone v. State
(4×)
See Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 , 101 S.Ct. 3022 , 69 L.Ed.2d 400 (1981) (holding no abuse of discretion where trial court refused questioning on definitions of terms “deliberately, probability and criminal acts of violence” in capital case); Battie v. State, 551 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) (determining that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying questioning regarding veniremember’s understanding of term “criminal acts of violence” in capital appeal); see also Woolridge, 827 S.W.2d at 905 (affirming trial judg…
discussed
Cited "see"
Williams v. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections
(2×)
See Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 , 101 S.Ct. 3022 , 69 L.Ed.2d 400 (1981); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 870-871 , 268 S.E.2d 316, 319-320 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986 , 101 S.Ct. 407 , 66 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980). 6 As Texas' prohibition against the use of unadjudicated offenses in noncapital cases suggests, the use of such evidence at sentencing is at tension with the fundamental principle that a person not be punished for a crime that the state has not shown he committed.
discussed
Cited "see"
Sunward Corporation v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
See Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634, 638 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 , 101 S.Ct. 3021 , 69 L.Ed.2d 400 (1981); Anderson v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 543 F.2d 732, 739 (10th Cir.1976); Hall v. Hercules, Inc., 494 F.2d 420, 423 (10th Cir.1974); Kansas Elec.
discussed
Cited "see"
Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
See Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634, 638 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 , 101 S.Ct. 3021 , 69 L.Ed.2d 400 (1981); Anderson v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 543 F.2d 732, 739 (10th Cir.1976); Hall v. Hercules, Inc., 494 F.2d 420, 423 (10th Cir.1974); Kansas Elec.
discussed
Cited "see"
Wilson v. Commonwealth
(2×)
See Linwood Earl Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532, 540 , 273 S.E.2d 48, 53 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 , 101 S.Ct. 3022 , 69 L.Ed.2d 400 (1981). *4 We turn now to the constitutional challenge to the statute.
cited
Cited "see"
Allentown Racquetball & Health Club, Inc. v. Building & Construction Trades Council of Lehigh & Northampton Counties
See Kerry Coal Co. v. UMW, 637 F.2d 957 , 965 (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 1981), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. No. 80-1891 May 8, 1981); Annot., 7 ALR Fed. at 818.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
David M. Pruett v. Charles Thompson
(2×)
See, e.g., Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532 , 273 S.E.2d 48 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 , 101 S.Ct. 3022 , 69 L.Ed.2d 400 (1981).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Harris v. Tomczak
Rather, the question is whether the individual had achieved the necessary degree of notoriety where he was defamed — i.e. where the defamation was published.” Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1295 -96 n.22. 29 Some courts have apparently measured the population in terms of the region of the plaintiff’s residence, see Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., Inc., 626 F.2d at 1253 (“[b]oth [plaintiffs] achieved ‘pervasive fame or notoriety’ at least regionally”); see also Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 , 101 S.Ct. 3021 , …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Milton
v.
Texas Briley v. Virginia
v.
Texas Briley v. Virginia
No. 80-6324; No. 80-6367.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 26, 1981.
Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 4 opinions | Published
Lead Opinion
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; and
Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-[*1032] rari denied. Reported below: No. 80-6324, 599 S. W. 2d 824; No. 80-6367, 221 Va. 532, 273 S. E. 2d 48.
Dissent
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.