Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. Consum. Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). · Go Syfert
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Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. Consum. Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2009 · …he apa expressly contemplates that notice and an opportunity to comment will be provided prior to agency decisions to repeal a rule. ⚠ not in text
189 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 38 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: National Parks Conservation Association v. Kempthorne (dcd, 2009-08-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 30 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) National Parks Conservation Association v. Kempthorne
D.D.C. · 2009 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
he apa expressly contemplates that notice and an opportunity to comment will be provided prior to agency decisions to repeal a rule.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) NATIONAL PARKS CONSERVATION ASS'N v. Salazar (2×)
D.D.C. · 2009 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
he apa expressly contemplates that notice and an opportunity to comment will be provided prior to agency decisions to repeal a rule.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carmel Valley Fire Protection District v. State
Cal. · 2001 · confidence medium
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America (1983) 463 U.S. 1216 [ 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 ].) We do not find any language in these cases indicating that the legislative branch may not alter the discretion afforded the executive except by withdrawing entirely its original delegation of power to the administrative agency.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission (2×)
Utah · 1994 · confidence medium
Process Gas Consumer's Group v. Consumer Energy Counsel of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alliance for Community Media the Alliance for Communications Democracy People for the American Way v. Federal Communications Commission United States of America, New York Citizens Committee for Responsible Media Media Access New York Brooklyn Producers' Group David Channon National Cable Television Association, Inc., Intervenors (Two Cases). Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium American Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Communications Commission United States of America, New York Citizens Committee for Responsible Media Media Access New York Brooklyn Producers' Group David Channon National Cable Television Association, Inc., Intervenors, Morality in Media, Amicus Curiae. American Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Communications Commission United States of America, New York Citizens Committee for Responsible Media Media Access New York Brooklyn Producers' Group David Channon National Cable Television Association, Inc., Intervenors, National Law Center for Children and Families National Legal Foundation, Amici Curiae
D.C. Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983); accord Jackson, 390 U.S. at 585 n. 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1218 n. 27 ("determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of" severability clause). 48 The analysis differs little in the context of invalidating provisions of regulations promulgated by an agency.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alliance for Community Media v. Federal Communications Commission
D.C. Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983); accord Jackson, 390 U.S. at 585 n. 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1218 n. 27 (“determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of’ severability clause).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jose Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Al Kanahele, Warden, Metropolitan Correctional Center, San Diego, California, United States of America v. Raul Chavez-Sanchez (2×)
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miguel Mada-Luna v. Eugene M. Fitzpatrick, Acting District Director, Immigration & Naturalization Service (2×)
9th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 , reh’g denied, 436 U.S. 1250 , 104 S.Ct. 40 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1457 (1983); accord Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816-17 (D.C.Cir.1983); Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695 , 699 & n. 3 (5th Cir.1979); Arlington Oil Mills, Inc. v. Knebel, 543 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 (5th Cir.1976); National Wildlife Federation v. Clark, 577 F.Supp. 825, 828 (D.D.C.1984); see also Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. S…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
H2856-58 (daily ed. May 26,1982), and the Supreme Court, in turn, declared the legislative veto unconstitutional, see United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983); United States House of Representatives v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CONSUMERS UNION OF v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
H2856-58 (daily ed. May 26, 1982), and the Supreme Court, in turn, declared the legislative veto unconstitutional, see United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983); United States House of Representatives v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Ex Rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives
Kan. · 1984 · confidence medium
Process Gas Consumers Group, et al. v. Consumer Energy Council of America, et al., 463 U.S. 1216 *62 (1983), a one-house legislative veto provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 was challenged as violating the doctrine of separation of powers and the requirement of bicameralism and presentment contained in art.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago
N.D. Ill. · 1984 · confidence medium
Separation of powers doctrine serves “to check the extent of power exercisable by any one branch.of Government in order to protect the people from oppression,” Consumer Energy Council of America v. F.E.R.C., 673 F.2d 425 , 471 (D.C.Cir.1982), aff'd, — U.S. -, -, -, 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Equal Employent Opportunity Commission v. City of Memphis
W.D. Tenn. · 1983 · confidence medium
The modern rule was stated in Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 , 442 (D.C.Cir.1982) aff’d — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983) (post Chadha), where the court considered the “question of where the presumption lies [to be] mostly irrelevant.” It quoted United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 , 585 n. 27, 88 S.Ct. 1209 , 1218 n. 27, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) which stated: “ ‘[Wjhatever relevance such an explicit clause might have in creating a presumption of severability ... the ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, Edison Electric Institute, Chemical Manufacturers Association, Intervenors
D.C. Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Commission (2×)
R.I. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1413 (1983) ( FTC ).
cited Cited "see" The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress
OLC · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (mem.).
discussed Cited "see" Citibank, Federal Savings Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance (2×)
D.D.C. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 , 446 (D.C.Cir.1982), aff'd, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps Of Engineers (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216, 1219 , 103 S.Ct. 3556, 3558 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); INS v. Chadha, supra, 462 U.S. at 984 , 103 S.Ct. at 2801 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting FTC v. Ruberoid, supra ). 2 The Senate argues in its brief that the fact that the Comptroller General is appointed by the President precludes his being part of the legislative branch.
discussed Cited "see" Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216, 1219 , 103 S.Ct. 3556, 3558 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); INS v. Chadha, supra, 462 U.S. at 984 , 103 S.Ct. at 2801 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting FTC v. Ruberoid, supra).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. City of Yonkers
S.D.N.Y. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 673 F.2d 425 , 448 n. 82 (D.C.Cir. 1982), affd mem. sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of America, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983).
cited Cited "see" Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Allstate Insurance
S.D. Miss. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C.Cir.1982), affd, U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan
D.D.C. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
To determine whether the resolution of a matter violates separation of powers principles, thereby making it a non-justiciable political question, we must apply the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Baker : Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or …
examined Cited "see, e.g." McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (4×)
D.D.C. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley , "[u]nless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108-09 , 96 S.Ct. 612 (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 , 52 S.Ct. 559 , 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932)); see also Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 , 441 (D.C.Cir.1982) ("The presence of a severability clause, which expressly sets f…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Liquid Carbonic Industries Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 576 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169 (D.C.Cir.1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Liquid Carbonic Industries Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Polk Power Partners, Limited Partnership, Lavair Cogeneration Limited Partnership, Intervenors. Liquid Carbonic Industries Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Lavair Cogeneration Limited Partnership, Intervenor. Liquid Carbonic Industries Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Lavair Cogeneration Limited Partnership, Aes Wr Limited Partnership, Intervenors (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169 (D.C.Cir.1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Center for Auto Safety
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 576-77 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (car purchasers deprived of disclosures), aff’d, 463 U.S. 1216 , 104 S.Ct. 40 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1457 (1983); Public Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969 , 974 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1980) (bacon purchasers subjected to nitrate additions); Federation of Homemakers v. Butz, 466 F.2d 462 (D.C.Cir.1972) (consumers challenging adequacy of meat labeling); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 , 1096-97 (D.C.Cir.1970) (unwilling consumers of pesticide residues).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Synar v. United States (2×)
D.D.C. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983), affg mem.
examined Cited "see, e.g." American Federation of Government Employees, Afl-Cio, Local 3090 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (4×)
D.C. Cir. · 1985 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 , 445-46 (D.C.Cir.1982), aff'd mem., 463 U.S. 1216 , 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983). 41 Perhaps there are situations in which we would be justified in looking beyond the defect of inconsistency, to affirm an adjudication on the ground that its result was mandated by statute and that the conflicting rule was simply unlawful.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cranston v. Reagan (2×)
D.D.C. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
That case sets forth six separate formulations: Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need …
cited Cited "see, e.g." Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dayton Power & Light Co.
S.D. Ohio · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 , aff’d mem., — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3556 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1402, 1403, 1413 (1983).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Process Gas Consumers Group Et Al.
v.
Consumer Energy Council of America Et Al.; Interstate Natural Gas Association of America Et Al. v. Consumer Energy Council of America Et Al.; Petrochemical Energy Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America Et Al.; American Gas Assn. v. Consumer Energy Council of America Et Al.; United States Senate v. Consumer Energy Council of America Et Al.; United States House of Representatives v. Consumer Energy Council of America Et Al.; United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission Et Al.; And United States House of Representatives v. Federal Trade Commission Et Al.
81-2008; 81-2020; 81-2151; 81-2171; 82-177; 82-209; 82-935; 82-1044.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jul 6, 1983.
463 U.S. 1216
White, Rehnquist, Powell.
Cited by 98 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 90%
Citer courts: District of Columbia (3)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

Rehearing Denied Sept. 8, 1983. See U.S., 104 S.Ct. 40.

Justice WHITE, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. D. C. Cir. Judgment in Nos. 81-2008, 81-2020, 81-2151, and 81-2171 affirmed.

Justice Rehnquist would note probable jurisdiction and set cases for oral argument. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these appeals.

Certiorari in Nos. 82-177 and 82-209 denied. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Judgment in Nos. 82-935 and 82-1044 affirmed. JUSTICE REHNQUIST would note probable jurisdiction and set cases for oral argument. Motion of Charles Pashayan, Jr., et al. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 82-1044 granted. Reported below: Nos. 81-2008, 81-2020, 81-2151, 81-2171, 82-177, and 82-209, 218 U. S. App. D. C. 34, 673 F. 2d 425; Nos. 82-935 and 82-1044, 223 U. S. App. D. C. 386, 691 F. 2d 575.

Dissent

[*1217] Justice White,

dissenting.

The principal issue in these cases is the constitutionality of the legislative veto as applied to agency rulemaking. Given the Court’s recent decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), the summary affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ decisions striking the veto as unconstitutional is hardly surprising. These cases illustrate the constitutional myopia of the Chadha reasoning as applied to independent regulatory agencies and cast further light on the destructiveness of the Chadha holding.

In Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 218 U. S. App. D. C. 34, 673 F. 2d 425 (1982), the Court of Appeals invalidated the one-House legislative veto provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), contained in § 202(c) of the Act, 92 Stat. 3372, 15 U. S. C. § 3342(c) (1982 ed.). The NGPA was a response to the need for financial incentives to encourage the production of natural gas for the interstate market. The Act was a compromise, reached only after months of impasse between the two Houses over the optimal means of deregulating natural gas prices while preventing excessive fuel bills for consumers and industry. Congress finally settled on a phased deregulation of natural gas prices, with a system of incremental pricing to ease the transition. Specifically, the compromise agreed to by the Conference Committee provided for an initial experiment with incremental pricing for a small class of industrial users, while authorizing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to propose expansion of incremental pricing to other industrial users at a later time. This proposal would be submitted to Congress and would become effective unless disapproved by either House. The veto provision was central to this accommodation, because it allowed the Congress to observe the effects of the initial phase of incremental pricing without committing the Nation to a broader program which, it was feared, would drive industrial gas users to oil,[*1218] increasing the demand for imported oil, and raising the cost of gas for residential consumers. The Conference solution allowed the House and Senate to reach agreement and the NGPA was enacted.*

In United States Senate v. FTC, 223 U. S. App. D. C. 386, 691 F. 2d 575 (1982), the Court of Appeals struck down § 21(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 393, 15 U. S. C. §57a-l (1982 ed.), which provides that an FTC trade regulation rule shall become effective unless both Houses of Congress disapprove it. The Act authorizes the Commission to issue trade regulation rules which define unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. 15 U. S. C. §57a(a)(l)(B) (1982 ed.). For three years, Congress debated the breadth of the Commission’s rulemaking authority, noting that the FTC could, pursuant to the Act, “regulate virtually every aspect of America’s commercial life.” 124 Cong. Rec. 5012 (1978) (Rep. Broyhill). The two-House veto provision was settled upon as a means of allowing Congress to study and review the broad and important policy pronouncements of the Commission.

I cannot agree that the legislative vetoes in these cases violate the requirements of Art. I of the Constitution. Where the veto is placed as a check upon the actions of the independent regulatory agencies, the Art. I analysis relied upon in Chadha has a particularly hollow ring. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), I set forth my belief that the legislative veto as applied to rules promulgated by an independent regulatory agency fully comports with the Constitution.

[*1219] “[F]or a regulation to become effective, neither House need approve it, pass it, or take any action at all with respect to it. The regulation becomes effective by non-action. This no more invades the President’s powers than does a regulation not required to be laid before Congress. Congressional influence over the substantive content of agency regulation may be enhanced, but I would not view the power of either House to disapprove as equivalent to legislation or to an order, resolution, or vote requiring the concurrence of both Houses.” Id., at 284-285.
“Disapproval nullifies the suggested regulation and prevents the occurrence of any change in the law. The regulation is void. Nothing remains on which the veto power could operate. It is as though a bill passed in one House and failed in another.” Id., at 285, n. 30.

The Court’s opinion in Chadha has not convinced me otherwise. Congress, with the President’s consent, characteristically empowers the agencies to issue regulations. These regulations have the force of law without the President’s concurrence; nor can he veto them if he disagrees with the law that they make. The President’s authority to control independent agency lawmaking, which on a day-to-day basis is nonexistent, could not be affected by the existence or exercise of the legislative veto. To invalidate the device, which allows Congress to maintain some control over the lawmaking process, merely guarantees that the independent agencies, once created, for all practical purposes are a fourth branch of the Government not subject to the direct control of either Congress or the Executive Branch. I cannot believe that the Constitution commands such a result. For these reasons and for those expressed in my dissenting opinion in INS v. Chadha, I respectfully dissent.

These cases also present the important question of whether the legislative veto is severable from the authorization for FERC to issue an expanded interim pricing rule. There is no severability clause in the NGPA, an omission which itself suggests the inseverability of the provision, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 313 (1936), and much of the legislative history suggests that Congress would not have granted the Commission unfettered rulemaking authority. See, e. g., 124 Cong. Rec. 29662-29663 (1978) (comments of Sen. Percy).