Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954). · Go Syfert
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Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 9× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2011 · …determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function. ✓
cited 6× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1985 · …determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function. ✓
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · …determination of the scope of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function. ≈ altered
1,110 citation events (117 in the last 25 years) across 86 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rivera-Schatz v. FOMB (ca1, 2019-02-22) · Strongest negative: Izzarelli v. Rexene Products Co. (ca5, 1994-06-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1954 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1954 1990 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Izzarelli v. Rexene Products Co.
5th Cir. · 1994 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Deak v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 572, 578-79, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding amendment to Plan that benefitted certain participants at expense of others, to be arbitrary and capricious, and breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, even though, if adopted "absent from or insulated from any conflicts of interest,” same amendment might not violate ERISA), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988). 32 .
discussed Cited "but see" McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama
N.D. Ala. · 1988 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see, Deak v. Masters, Mates and Pilots Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 572 (11th Cir.1987) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988); Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir.1987) cert. granted, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1288 , 99 L.Ed.2d 498 (1988); Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.1988). 4.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Rivera-Schatz v. FOMB
1st Cir. · 2019 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
determination of the scope . . . of legislation" on fictional facts "involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Méndez-Núñez v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.) (3×)
1st Cir. · 2019 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
determination of the scope ... of legislation" on fictional facts "involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico (3×)
D.P.R. · 2015 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
determination of the scope ... of legisla tion in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) S. Ohio Complete Pain Mgt., L.L.C. v. Portsmouth (3×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: accord · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
determination of the scope of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Hughes v. Hosemann (6×)
Miss. · 2011 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 6 verbatim quotes · confidence low
determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Deborah Hughes v. Delbert Hosemann (3×)
Miss. · 2010 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc. (3×)
D. Del. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete ease involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) In Re Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd. Partnerships Securities Litigation (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D.N.Y. · 1994 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
in general, the mail and wire fraud statutes require, inter alia, a showing of intentional fraud.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
these factual allegations must give rise to a 'strong inference' that the defendants possessed the requisite fraudulent intent
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Boley v. Pineloch Associates, Ltd.
S.D.N.Y. · 1988 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
these factual allegations must give rise to a 'strong inference' that the defendants possessed the requisite fraudulent intent.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Washington (3×)
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. State Of Washington (3×)
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roake v. Brumley
5th Cir. · 2026 · confidence medium
It reiterated that, even when a plaintiff insists that a law can never be constitutionally applied, “‘[d]etermination of the scope . . . of legislation in advance . . . involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.’” Id. (brackets and first ellipsis in original) (quoting Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Loc. 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Washington v. Trump
9th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
That’s because “[d]etermination of the scope” of a federal action “in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.” Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Loc. 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saline Parents v. Merrick Garland
D.C. Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Absent a concrete factual context, determination of the scope and constitutionality of a purported government policy “in advance of its immediate adverse effect . . . involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.” Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954). “[J]udicial appraisal [of the issue] is likely to stand on a much surer footing in the context of a specific application of [agency policy] than could be the case in the framework of [a] generalized challenge.” Cause of Action, 999 F.3d at 705 (…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Energetic Tank, Inc. v. Unknown
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
Any hypothetical sanctions— whether under the Touhy regulations, the Ethics in Government Act, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or otherwise—have not “been set in motion against individuals on whose behalf relief [is] sought, because an occasion for doing so [has] not arisen.” Int’] Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Loc. 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 223 (1954).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cause of Action Institute v. DOJ
D.C. Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Here, as is often true, ‘[d]etermination of the scope [of the purported policy] in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.’” See id. at 301 (second alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954)). “[J]udicial appraisal [of the issue] is likely to stand on a much surer footing in the context of a specific application of [agency policy] than could be the case in the framework of [a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Santa Monica v. Stewart
Cal. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
(See Longshoremen’s Union v. Boyd (1954) 347 U.S. 222, 224 [ 98 L.Ed. 650 , 74 S.Ct. 447 ] [“Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function”]; Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 172-173 [concluding that case is not sufficiently ripe if “ ‘[plaintiffs] are not immediately faced with the dilemma of either complying with the guidelines or risking penalties for violating them’ ”].) Cou…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Texas v. United States
SCOTUS · 1998 · confidence medium
Here, as is often true, “[d3etermination of the scope ... of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.” Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 224 (1954).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Board of Education of San Diego Unified School District v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
(Longshoremen’s Union v. Boyd (1954) 347 U.S. 222, 224 [ 74 S.Ct. 447, 448 , 98 L.Ed. 650 ].) Similarly, District’s concern it may be facing an unfavorable political climate does not present legal issues for resolution in this proceeding.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) G. Anthony Montante v. James J. Blanchard
6th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Given these uncertainties, any attempt to resolve the substantive merits of the case in its present posture would involve " 'too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.' " Id. (quoting International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954)). 10 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Renne v. Geary (2×)
SCOTUS · 1991 · confidence medium
State courts also may provide further definition to § 6(b)'s operative language, "endorse, support, or oppose." "Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function." Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 224 (1954).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brandenberg v. McClellan
E.D. Mo. · 1977 · confidence medium
It was held in International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 *945 U.S. 222, 223, 224, 74 S.Ct. 447, 448 , 98 L.Ed. 650, 652 (1954), that such an action was ". . . not a lawsuit to enforce a right; it is an endeavor to obtain a court's assurance that a statute does not govern hypothetical situations that may or may not make the challenged statute applicable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kleppe v. New Mexico
SCOTUS · 1976 · confidence medium
We have often declined to decide important questions regarding “the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case,” Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 224 (1954), or in the absence of “an adequate and full-bodied record.” Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U. S. 111, 113 (1962).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ellis v. Dyson (2×)
SCOTUS · 1975 · confidence medium
Apparently petitioners are no longer interested in the case and were not even in communication with the counsel who purport to represent them. [18] As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in his opinion for the Court in Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 223 (1954): "[A]ppellee contends that the District Court . . . should have dismissed the suit for want of a `case or controversy,' for lack of standing . . . to bring this action. . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases (2×)
SCOTUS · 1974 · confidence medium
Rulings on these questions would plainly be rulings upon "hypothetical situations that may or may not [arise]." Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 224 (1954).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) O'Shea v. Littleton (2×)
SCOTUS · 1974 · confidence medium
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated the applicable principle in speaking for the Court in International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 223 (1954): "On this appeal, appellee contends that the District Court should not have reached the statutory and constitutional questions—that it should have *505 dismissed the suit for want of a `case or controversy,' for lack of standing on the union's part to bring this action, . . . .
discussed Cited "see" Reddy v. Foster (2×)
1st Cir. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Texas, 523 U.S. at 301 , 118 S.Ct. 1257 (“Here, as is often true, ‘[djeter-mination of the scope ... of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 , 74 5.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954))); Labor Relations Div., 844 F.3d at 322 (finding a lawsuit seeking “pre-enforcement relief ... not ripe for adjudication no matter how it…
discussed Cited "see" Battoni v. IBEW Local Union No. 102 Employee Pension Plan
D.N.J. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Deak v. Masters, Mates and Pilots Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 572, 581 (11th Cir.1987) (“absent any unfunded liability and actuarial determinations requiring restrictions on re-employment, discriminating among Plan beneficiaries to strengthen the Union was arbitrary and capricious and violated the Trustees fiduciary duty of loyalty.”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988).
examined Cited "see" Fields, Beverly v. Off Eddie Johnson (6×)
D.C. Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
Co., 349 U.S. 366, 372-73 , 75 S.Ct. 845 , 99 L.Ed. 1155 (1955); see Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 , 74 S.Ct. 447 , 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954).
cited Cited "see" United States House of Representatives v. United States Department of Commerce
D.D.C. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
cited Cited "see" Arons v. Lalime
W.D.N.Y. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
R.Civ.P. 9(b). 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1); see Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988); W.E.
discussed Cited "see" Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C.
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.1989).
discussed Cited "see" Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C.
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.1989).
discussed Cited "see" Pits, Ltd. v. American Express Bank International
S.D.N.Y. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
Finally, the Court of Appeals has held that a complaint charging fraud must assert that defendant possessed an intent to defraud or, at minimum, “allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.” Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., 25 F.3d at 1128 (citations omitted); see Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.1989).
discussed Cited "see" Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa
S.D.N.Y. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.1989).
discussed Cited "see" Kidder Peabody & Co. v. Unigestion International, Ltd.
S.D.N.Y. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.1989).
examined Cited "see" New Mexicans For Bill Richardson v. Gonzales (3×)
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 323 , 111 S.Ct. 2331, 2339-40 , 115 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991) (citing Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 , 74 S.Ct. 447, 448-49 , 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954)).
examined Cited "see" New Mexicans for Richardson v. Gonzales (3×)
10th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 323 , 111 S.Ct. 2331, 2339-40 , 115 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991) (citing Longshoremen’s Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 , 74 S.Ct. 447, 448-49 , 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954)).
cited Cited "see" State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 49-50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988).
examined Cited "see" Lawrence M. Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., Rodney H. Sellers, and Francis J. Eaton (4×)
2d Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa
S.D.N.Y. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.1989).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation
2d Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.1989) (in banc).
discussed Cited "see" ZVI Trading Corp. Employees' Money Purchase Pension Plan & Trust v. Ross
2d Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.1989) (in banc).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. Securities Litigation
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 13 and Beck v. Manufactures Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988), RICO claim overruled, United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 , 110 S.Ct. 56 , 107 L.Ed.2d 24, 25 (1989).
examined Cited "see" Interstate Food Processing Corp. v. State of Me. (3×)
D. Me. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 , 74 S.Ct. 447, 448 , 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954) (citations omitted).
cited Cited "see" Schwartz v. Oberweis
N.D. Ind. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 , 108 S.Ct. 698 , 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S AND WAREHOUSEMEN’S UNION, LOCAL 37, Et Al.
v.
BOYD, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
195.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 8, 1954.
347 U.S. 222
A. L. Wirin argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Norman Leonard., Charles Gordon argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Olney, John F. Davis, Beatrice Rosenberg and L. Paul Winings.
Frankfurter, Black.
Cited by 189 opinions  |  Published
9 passages pin-cited by 11 cases
Pinpoint authority: #10,655 of 633,719
Citer courts: Mississippi Supreme Court (9) · Ninth Circuit (6) · First Circuit (3) · D. Delaware (3) · S.D. New York (3) · Ohio Court of Appeals (3) · D. Puerto Rico (3)

Lead Opinion

Mr. Justice Frankfurter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an action by Local 37 of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union and several of its alien members to enjoin the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization at Seattle from so construing § 212 (d) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality[*223] Act of 1952* as to treat aliens domiciled in the continental United States returning from temporary work in Alaska as if they were aliens entering the United States for the first time. Declaratory relief to the same effect is also sought. Since petitioners asserted in the alternative that such a construction of the challenged statute would be unconstitutional, a three-judge district court was convened. The case came before it on stipulated facts and issues of law, from which it appeared that the union has over three thousand members who work every summer in the herring and salmon canneries of Alaska, that some of these are aliens, and that if alien workers going to Alaska for the 1953 canning season were excluded on their return, their “contract and property rights [would] be jeopardized and forfeited.” The District Court entertained the suit but dismissed it on the merits. 111 F. Supp. 802. In our order of October 12, 1953, we postponed the question of jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 346 U. S. 804.

On this appeal, appellee contends that the District Court should not have reached the statutory and constitutional questions — that it should have dismissed the suit for want of a “case or controversy,” for lack of standing on the union’s part to bring this action, because the Attorney General was an indispensable party, and because habeas corpus is the exclusive method for judicial inquiry in deportation cases. Since the first objection is conclusive, there is an end of the matter.

Appellants in effect asked the District Court to rule that a statute the sanctions of which had not been set in motion against individuals on whose behalf relief was[*224] sought, because an occasion for doing so had not arisen, would not be applied to them if in the future such a contingency should arise. That is not a lawsuit to enforce a right; it is an endeavor to obtain a court’s assurance that a statute does not govern hypothetical situations that may or may not make the challenged statute applicable. Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75; see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, and Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450. Since we do not have on the record before us a controversy appropriate for adjudication, the judgment of the District Court must be vacated, with directions to dismiss the complaint.

It is so ordered.

This section states that the exclusionary provisions of § 212 (a) shall, with exceptions not here relevant, “be applicable to any alien who shall leave Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands of the United States, and who seeks to enter the continental United States . . . 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (d) (7).

Dissent

Mr. Justice Black,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas concurs, dissenting.

This looks to me like the very kind of “case or controversy” courts should decide. With the abstract principles of law relied on by the majority for dismissing the case, I am not in disagreement. Of course federal courts do not pass on the meaning or constitutionality of statutes as they might be thought to govern mere “hypothetical situations . . . .” Nor should courts entertain such statutory challenges on behalf of persons upon whom adverse statutory effects are “too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.” But as I read the record it shows that judicial action is absolutely essential to save a large group of wage earners on whose behalf this action is brought from irreparable harm due to alleged lawless enforcement of a federal statute. My view makes it necessary for me to set out the facts[*225] with a little more detail than they appear in the Court’s opinion.

Every summer members of the appellant union go from the west coast of continental United States to Alaska to work in salmon and herring canneries under collective-bargaining agreements. As the 1953 canning season approached the union and its members looked forward to this Alaska employment. A troublesome question arose, however, on account of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163. Section 212 (d) (7) of this new Act has language that given one construction provides that all aliens seeking admission to continental United States from Alaska, even those previously accepted as permanent United States residents, shall be examined as if entering from a foreign country with a view to excluding them on any of the many grounds applicable to aliens generally. This new law created an acute problem for the union and its numerous members who were lawful alien residents, since aliens generally can be excluded from this country for many reasons which would not justify deporting aliens lawfully residing here. The union and its members insisted on another construction. They denied that Congress intended to require alien workers to forfeit their right to live in this country for no reason at all except that they went to Alaska, territory of the United States, to engage in lawful work under a lawfully authorized collective-bargaining contract. The defendant immigration officer announced that the union’s interpretation was wrong and that workers going to Alaska would be subject to examination and exclusion. This is the controversy.

It was to test the right of the immigration officer to apply § 212 (d) (7) to make these workers subject to exclusion that this suit was filed by the union and two of its officers on behalf of themselves and all union members who are aliens and permanent residents. True, the action[*226] was begun before t'he union members went to Alaska for the 1953 canning season. But it is not only admitted that the immigration official intended to enforce § 212 (d)(7) as the union and these workers feared. It is admitted here that he has since done precisely that. All 1953 alien cannery workers have actually been subjected to the wearisome routine of immigration procedure as though they had never lived here. And some of the union members are evidently about to be denied the right ever to return to their homes on grounds that could not have been legally applied to them had they stayed in California or Washington instead of going to Alaska to work for an important American industry.

Thus the threatened injury which the Court dismisses as “remote” and “hypothetical” has come about. For going to Alaska to engage in honest employment many of these workers may lose the home this country once afforded them. This is a strange penalty to put on productive work. Maybe this is what Congress meant by passing §212 (d)(7). And maybe in these times such a law would be held constitutional. But even so, can it be that a challenge to this law on behalf of those whom it hits the hardest is so frivolous that it should be dismissed for want of a controversy that courts should decide? Workers threatened with irreparable damages, like others, should have their cases tried.