green
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1991 ·
…an indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense to be charged.
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Treatment trajectory · 1953 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1953
1989
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Wanxiang Am. Corp.
a misrepresentation is an assertion that is not in accord with the facts.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
In Re Franklyn C. NOFZIGER
(2×)
an indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense to be charged.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Box
However, an indictment does not have to be drafted with precise specificity; whether an indictment is sufficient “is not a question of whether [the indictment] could have been more definite and certain,” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953), as long as the indictment contains “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 12 charged,” Fed.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Spencer v. United States Department of Justice
United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953); Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77 , 80–81 (1927).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Young-Bey
Indictments do not have to be drafted with precise specificity; whether an indictment is sufficient “is not a question of whether [the indictment] could have been more definite and certain,” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953), as long as the indictment contains “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged,” Fed.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Munchel
Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tommy Lamar Thomas v. State
In filing a special demurrer, an accused “claims not that the charge in an indictment is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction, but rather that the charge is imperfect as to form or that the accused is entitled to more information.”4 And when we review an indictment on interlocutory appeal prior to a trial, we must apply the rule that “a defendant who has timely filed a special demurrer 4 Hairston v. State, 322 Ga. App. 572, 574 (2) ( 745 SE2d 798 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); see Jones v. State, 289 Ga. 111, 115 (2) (c) ( 709 SE2d 773 ) (2011) (“A defendant is e…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Nassif
Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953)), and the charging document need not inform the defendant “as to every means by which the prosecution hopes to prove that the crime was committed,” United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 124 (D.C.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Miller
And the Federal Rules “were designed to eliminate technicalities in criminal pleading and are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure.” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Venkata
The rule was designed to “eliminate technicalities in criminal pleadings and [is] to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure.” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Oseguera Gonzalez
Sufficiency “is not a question of whether [the indictment] could have been more definite and certain,” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953), as long as the indictment contains “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged,” FED.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Harmon
P. 7(c)(1), sufficiency “is not a question of whether [the indictment] could have been more definite and certain,” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bradley v. United States
Even when an “indictment could have been worded with greater precision,” it will not be subject to dismissal so long as it “‘sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.’” United States v. Hendrex, 387 F.2d 931, 932 (6th Cir. 1968) (quoting United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Addison v. State
C. § 601(a)(1))); cf. Allison, 2016 WL 5462439, at *3 (“[I]t is sufficient if the information covers any one of the three harms covered by the [child endangerment] statute.”); Harley, 534 A.2d at 257 (“As to the assault charge, the exact nature and description of the instrument used during the altercation is not an essential element of the crime.”). 17 See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376-78 (1953). 18 See Deedon, 189 A.2d at 663 (explaining that a bill of particulars “may not be used to supply a missing element of the offense in question”). 7 nothing to be cured by a bi…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Concord Management and Consulting LLC
Sufficiency “is not a question of whether [the indictment] could have been more definite and certain,” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 (1953), but of “whether it is fair to require the accused to defend himself on the basis of the charge as stated,” Conlon, 628 F.2d at 155 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rashad Wearing
The test for determining the sufficiency of an indictment is “whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged,” lets the defendant know “what he must be prepared to meet,” and if “any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense . . . the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Villegas (David) v. State
See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 , 763 64 (1962); United States v. - Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1953).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Resendiz-Ponce
As we have said, the Federal Rules “were designed to eliminate technicalities in criminal pleadings and are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure.” United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374, 376 (1953).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Hitt, Robert
"The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet." United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. David Leseberg
United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953); United States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.1983). 10 Leseberg challenges his conviction of failure to provide proof of insurance under 18 U.S.C. § 18 and 36 C.F.R. § 4.2 /NRS 485.187(1)(b), since he subsequently provided proof of insurance at trial pursuant to NRS 485.187(1)(c).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
El Pueblo de Puerto Rico v. Millán Álvarez
United States v. Miller, supra, pág. 135; Russell v. United States, supra, pág. 764; United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953); United States v. Hess, supra, pág. 487.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dunnigan
See § 1621(1); United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374, 376 (1953); United States v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564, 574, 576 (1937).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Richard Williams, Jr.
United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953); Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Stigall
United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 , 74 S.Ct. 113, 114-15 [1-2], 98 L.Ed. 92 , 96 (1953); State v. Garrett, 627 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Mo.banc 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 906 , 103 S.Ct. 208 , 74 L.Ed.2d 166 (1982); State v. Strickland, 609 S.W.2d 392, 395 [7] (Mo.banc 1981).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Greene
“An indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged. ‘The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, “and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.” ’ ” United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374, 3…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bahr
(2×)
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 , 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1046 , 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 375, 376-77 , 74 S.Ct. 113, 114, 115 , 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953); Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 584 , 14 S.Ct. 934 , 38 L.Ed. 830 (1894); United States v. Collins, 652 F.2d 735, 738 (8th Cir.1981).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Williams v. State
“An indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged. ‘The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, “and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offence, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.” ’ ” United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374, 3…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chappell v. State
See McKisic v. State, 238 Ga. 644, 645 ( 234 SE2d 908 ); Hopper v. Hampton, 244 Ga. 361, 362 ( 260 SE2d 73 ). “ ‘The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, “and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.” ’ ” United States v. Deb…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dorfman
United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 [ 74 S.Ct. 113, 114 , 98 L.Ed. 92 ] (1953) (quoting Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431 [ 52 S.Ct. 417, 419 , 76 L.Ed. 861 ] (1931)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mario E. Indorato
See Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 445 , [ 15 S.Ct. 144 , 39 L.Ed. 214 ]; Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427, 431 [ 33 S.Ct. 383 , 57 L.Ed. 583 ]; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 [ 55 S.Ct. 629 , 79 L.Ed. 1314 ]; United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377-378 [ 74 S.Ct. 113 , 98 L.Ed. 92 ], Count 1 2 meets fully these protective requirements.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Walker v. State
(2×)
In United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374, 376 (74 SC 113, 98 LE 92) the court held that "[a]n indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged. `The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, "and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Christman
United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Schall
E. g., Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427 [ 52 S.Ct. 417 , 76 L.Ed. 861 ]; Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 [ 71 S.Ct. 576 , 95 L.Ed. 774 ]; United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 *922 [ 74 S.Ct. 113 , 98 L.Ed. 92 ].
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Harry Lee Dickerson
See Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 445 [ 15 S.Ct. 144, 146 , 39 L.Ed. 214 ]; Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427, 431 [ 33 S.Ct. 383, 384 , 57 L.Ed. 583 ]; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 [ 55 S.Ct. 629, 630 , 79 L.Ed. 1314 ]; United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377-378 [ 74 S.Ct. 113, 115-116 , 98 L.Ed. 92 ].” Russell v. United States, supra 369 U.S. at 763 , 82 S.Ct. at 1047 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert C. Beitel and Ebbie F. Brownrigg v. United States
United States v. De-Brow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 [ 74 S.Ct. 113 , 98 L.Ed. 92 ].
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Russell v. United States
(2×)
It need not contain. . . any other matter not necessary to such statement." *782 The rule was "designed to eliminate technicalities" and is "to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure." Debrow , at 376.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Peter Seeger
Thus, it has been long recognized that 'every ingredient of which the offence is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged in the indictment * * *' U.S. v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168, 174 , 21 L.Ed. 538 (1872). 9 9 'The object of the indictment is, first, to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, and avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and, second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to supp…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Baron Dehirsch Meyer, Leonard L. Abess, W. George Kennedy and Sam R. Becker
(See, also, United States v. Debrow, 1953, 346 U.S. 374, 373 [ 74 S.Ct. 113 , 98 L.Ed. 92 ].)” 9 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Albert Samuel Wright v. United States
(2×)
United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376, 378 , 74 S.Ct. 113 , 98 L.Ed. 92 ; Hewitt v. United States, 8 Cir., 110 F.2d 1, 4-5 ; Perez v. United States, 9 Cir., 10 F.2d 352, 353 .
cited
Cited "see"
Goldyn v. Hayes
See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953) (“An indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged.
discussed
Cited "see"
Joni Goldyn v. Loy Hayes
(2×)
See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 , 74 S.Ct. 113 , 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953) ("An indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged.
discussed
Cited "see"
Joni Goldyn v. Loy Hayes
(2×)
See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 , 74 S.Ct. 113 , 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953) ("An indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged.
cited
Cited "see"
Goldyn Hayes
See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953) (“An indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged.
discussed
Cited "see"
In Re Goodwin
(2×)
Id. at 358-59 , 616 P.2d 1237 (citing Keto v. United *626 States, 189 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir.1951); accord United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377-78 , 74 S.Ct. 113 , 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Burgess v. United States
(2×)
Hsu v. United States, 392 A.2d 972, 977 (D.C.1978); see United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378 , 74 S.Ct. 113, 115-16 , 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953); Nichols v. United States, 343 A.2d 336, 343 (D.C.1975).
discussed
Cited "see"
Norfolk v. Houston
See Perri v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrections of Illinois, 817 F.2d 448 , 451 (7th Cir.) (presumption of correctness applies to state court’s finding of a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of Miranda rights), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 843 , 108 S.Ct. 135 , 98 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987); Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 853 , 112 S.Ct. 161 , 116 L.Ed.2d 126 (1991); Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.1991) (following Derrick), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1031 , 112 S.Ct. 870 , 116 L.Ed.2d 776 (1992); see Ahmad v. Redman, 782 F.2d 409, 412-13 (3rd …
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Jeffrey M. Levine
See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953) (both elements are essential to a perjury charge); United States v. Reinecke, 524 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C.Cir.1975) (competency is an essential element).
examined
Cited "see"
United States v. Giampa
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Debrow, 346 U.S. at 377-78 , 74 S.Ct. at 115-16 ; Shirk, 981 F.2d at 1389 ; Olatunji, 872 F.2d at 1166 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Gary N. Fields v. Edward W. Murray, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections
(2×)
See Perri v. Director, Dep’t of Conections, 817 F.2d 448 , 450-51 (7th Cir.) (noting that Miller's footnote three called into question Brewer's holding), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 843 , 108 S.Ct. 135 , 98 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Debrow
v.
Debrow
NO. 51.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 30, 1953.
John F. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and Felicia H. Dubrovsky., Ben F. Cameron argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were W. S. Henley, R. W. Thompson, Jr., Albert Sidney Johnston, Jr., W. W. Dent and T. J. Wills.
Minton, Reed.
Cited by 454 opinions | Published
Citer courts: D.C. Circuit (2)
[*375] Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents here, defendants below, were charged by separate indictments with the crime of perjury, as defined in 18 U. S. C. § 1621. [1] Each indictment read in material part as follows:
“[T]he defendant herein, having duly taken an oath before a competent tribunal, to wit: a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments known as the Subcommittee on Investigations, a duly created and authorized subcommittee of the United States Senate conducting official hearings in the Southern District of Mississippi, and inquiring in a matter then and there pending before the said subcommittee in which a law of the United States authorizes that an oath be administered, that he would testify truly, did unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully, and contrary to said oath, state a material matter which he did not believe to be true . . .
The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were sustained on the ground that the indictments did not allege the name of the person who administered the oath nor his authority to do so. [2] The Court of Appeals[*376] affirmed, one judge dissenting, 203 F. 2d 699, and we granted certiorari, 345 U. S. 991, because of the importance of the question in the administration of federal criminal law.
An indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged.
“The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, ‘and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offence, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.’ Cochran and Sayre v. United States, 157 U. S. 286, 290; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 34.” Hagner v. United States, 285 U. S. 427, 431.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were designed to eliminate technicalities in criminal pleading and are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure. Rule 2, F. R. Crim. Proc. Rule 7 (c) provides in pertinent part as follows:
“The indictment . . . shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. ... It need not contain . . . any other matter not necessary to such statement. . . .”
The essential elements of the crime of perjury as defined in 18 U. S. C. § 1621 are (1) an oath authorized by a law of the United States, (2) taken before a competent tribunal, officer or person, and (3) a false statement wil-fully made as to facts material to the hearing. The indictments allege that the subcommittee of the Senate was a competent tribunal, pursuing matters properly[*377] before it, that in such proceeding it was authorized by a law of the United States to administer oaths, and that each defendant duly took an oath before such competent tribunal and wilfully testified falsely as to material facts.
The oath administered must be authorized by a law of the United States. This requirement is met by the allegations in the indictments that the defendants had “duly taken an oath.” “Duly taken” means an oath taken according to a law which authorizes such oath. See Robertson v. Perkins, 129 U. S. 233, 236. The name of the person who administered the oath is not an essential element of the crime of perjury; the identity of such person goes only to the proof of whether the defendants were duly sworn. Therefore, all the essential elements of the offense of perjury were alleged.
The source of the requirement that an indictment for perjury must aver the name and authority of the person who administered the oath is to be found in R. S. § 5396, 18 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 558. It may be worthy of note that this provision was expressly repealed by Congress in 1948, 62 Stat. 862, in the revision and recodification of Title 18. The House Committee on Revision of the Laws had the assistance of two special consultants who were members of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and who “rendered invaluable service in the technical task of singling out for repeal or revision the statutory provisions made obsolete by the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4.. In the tabulation of laws omitted and repealed by the revision, it is stated that R. S. § 5396 was repealed because “Covered by rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Id., at A214.
The charges of the indictments followed substantially the wording of the statute, which embodies all the elements of the crime, and such charges clearly informed the[*378] defendants of that with which they were accused, so as to enable them to prepare their defense and to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecutions for the same offense. It is inconceivable to us how the defendants could possibly be misled as to the offense with which they stood charged. The sufficiency of the indictment is not a question of whether it could have been more definite and certain. If the defendants wanted more definite information as to the name of the person who administered the oath to them, they could have obtained it by requesting a bill of. particulars. Rule 7 (f), F. R. Crim. Proc.
The indictments were sufficient, and the dismissal thereof was error. The judgments are
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
1
“Perjury generally.
“Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
2
United States v. Debrow et al., U. S. D. C. S. D. Miss., Feb. 11, 1952 (unreported).