green
Positive treatment
15.1 score
Treatment trajectory · 1931 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1931
1978
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 44 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hudson Specialty Insurance Co v. Brash Tygr, LLC
(2×)
The dual purpose doctrine as adopted in Missouri was expounded by an eminent jurist, Judge (later Justice) Cardozo, in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 167 N.E. 181, 183 (N.Y. 1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Leordeanu v. American Protection Insurance Co.
(2×)
It is still necessary ... for the claimant to show that the injury is of a kind and character that had to do with and originated in the work, business, trade or profession of his employer and was received while he was engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer."). [19] Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 182 (1929). [20] Id. at 183 . [21] 464 S.W.2d 102, 102-103 (Tex.1971). [22] 369 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex.1963), overruled in part on other grounds by McKelvy v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.1964). [23] Davis, 464 S.W.2d at 102-103 ; Jecker, 369 …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Deise v. Mastercuts/Regis Corp.
If, however, the work has no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand remained undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk." Pepco, Inc. v. Ferguson, 734 P.2d 1321 , 1987 OK CIV APP 15 , citing In the Matter of Marks v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 182 (N.Y.1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McClelland v. Simon-Williamson Clinic, PC
If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk." Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. at 93 , 167 N.E. at 183 (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Swartz v. McDonald's Corp.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk. 167 N.E. at 183 (citation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Montgomery County v. Wade
As explained by Judge Cardozo in In re Dependents of Marks v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 93-94 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929) (citation omitted): “If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Murray v. Associated Insurers, Inc.
(2×)
In Humphrey v. Quality Cleaners & Laundry, 251 N.C. 47 , 110 S.E.2d 467 (1959), this Court set out the test for determining whether a trip that has both personal and business purposes is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, [he] is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. * * * If however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gilgon, Inc. v. Hart
Id. (quoting Texas Power & Light Co. v. Evans, 225 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1949, no writ) (on reh’g) and citing Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lois Hamilton, Individually and Personal Representative of the Estate of Harry Hamilton, Deceased v. Prudential Insurance Company of America
If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undone, the travel is then personal and personal the risk. 180 Md. 517, 527, 25 A.2d 667, 671 (1942) (quoting Mark's Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 93-4 , 167 N.E. 181, 182-83 (1929) (emphasis added))
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rhonda Kay Thomas v. Service Lloyds Insurance Company
Janak, 381 S.W.2d at 180 (quoting Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (N.Y.1929) (citations omitted)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jackson v. Midwest Youngstown Industries
Gingell v. Walters Contracting Corp., 308 S.W.2d 683, 688-89 (Mo.App.1957) {citing Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (Ct. of App.N.Y.1929)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Helm v. Wismar
(2×)
Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J.); O'Dell v. Lost Trail, Inc., 339 Mo. 1108 , 100 S.W.2d 289, 293 (1936).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Auto-Owners Insurance v. Moore
The test in Anderson was adopted from a New York opinion by Judge Cardozo, which stated: “If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been cancelled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk.” 18 Ariz.App. at 282 , 501 P.2d at 458 , quoting Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 121 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McClain v. Welsh Co.
This doctrine was first enunciated by Judge [later Justice] Cardozo in Marks Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929). 1 The test espoused in Marks Dependents v. Gray and followed in Gingell is: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own....
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pepco, Inc. v. in Re Ferguson
In those cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the test from the New York courts for liability arising from injuries sustained by an employee while engaged in mixed purpose missions: “In the matter of Marks Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 182, 183 , the New York Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, says: We do not say that service to the employer must be the SOLE CAUSE of the journey, BUT AT LEAST MUST BE A CONCURRENT CAUSE.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
James H. Hartzell, Beryl Hartzell, and Ross Hartzell v. United States
Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wise v. Armold Transfer & Storage Co., Inc.
Further, it has been held that “[i]f the work of an employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own.” Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 99 , 370 P.2d 816, 818 (1962) (quoting Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (App.1929)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
D & C BUILDERS v. Cullinane
Id. at 182-83. 2 The dual purpose doctrine has been interpreted by many jurisdictions to invoke a weighing of the business and personal motivations for the trip to determine the “primary” or “dominant” purpose of the excursion.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Greenlaw Jewelers v. Industrial Commission
Kriese v. Industrial Commission, 27 Ariz. App. 318, 320 , 554 P.2d 914, 916 (1976), quoting Marks’ Dependents v. Gray et al., 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Williams v. Hoyt Construction Co., Inc.
His return was necessitated, however, by the fact that no sleeping facilities were available at the convention and the question of coverage under the act was limited to whether decedent was an employee. 6 The classic test was propounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Matter of Marks v. Gray, 251 N. Y. 90, 93 , 167 N. E. 181, 183 (1929), as follows: “If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own * * *.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Boone v. Industrial Commission
In reaching this conclusion we relied upon the McCampbell case, supra, and Hancock v. Industrial Commission, 82 Ariz. 107 , 309 P.2d 242 (1957) where we said, quoting from Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 182 (1929), that “* * * the decisive test must be whether it is the employment or something else that has sent the traveler forth upon the journey or brought exposure to its perils. * * *” Applying this test to the instant case, the record is silent as to any evidence that the Club required Mr. Boone to live where he did or to walk to and from work.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Golay v. Keister Lumber Company
This principle was first formulated by Judge Cardozo in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
E & M Motel Management, Inc. v. Knight
(2×)
(Marks’ Dependents v. Gray et al., 167 N.E. 181 at 183 (1929)). ****** A different question would arise if performance of the service were to occasion a detour, and in the course of such detour the injuries were suffered.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Whitington v. Industrial Commission
In discussing the basic dual purpose rule which is cited with approval in Butler v. Industrial Comm., 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703 (1937) and application of Barrett, 78 Ariz. 219 , 278 P.2d 409 (1954), Judge Cardozo used the following language in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 93 , 167 N.E. 181, 182-183 (1929): “* * * Unquestionably injury through collision is a risk of travel on a highway.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rencehausen v. Western Greyhound Lines
Our Supreme Court in Hancock v. Industrial Commission, 82 Ariz. 107 , 309 P.2d 242 (1957) cited with approval: “ * * * the decisive test must be whether it is the employment or something else that has sent the traveler forth upon the journey or brought exposure to its perils * * Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 182 (1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gordon v. Puritan Chemical Company
(2×)
Corp v. Joplin Cement Co., supra, 337 S.W.2d 252, 255 [2]; Barton v. Western Fireproofing Co., Mo.App., 326 S.W.2d 344, 347-348 [2]; Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 [2].
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pool Well Servicing Co. v. Morris
(2×)
The Industrial Commission (now court) denied claimant an award and this court in sustaining that order stated: "In the matter of Marks Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 182, 183 , the New York Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo says: `We do not say that service to the employer must be the sole cause of the journey, but at least it must be a concurrent cause.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dobson v. Commercial Oil Transport, Inc.
In sustaining an order denying the award the Court stated: “In the matter of Marks Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 182, 183 , the New York Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, says: ‘We do not say that service to the employer must be the sole cause of the journey, but at least it must be a concurrent cause.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Daniels v. Krey Packing Company
In such a situation, this court has applied the test laid down by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (2): “To establish liability, the inference must be permissible that the trip would have been made though the private errand had been canceled. * * * The test in brief is this: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. * * * If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Barton v. Western Fireproofing Company
Or, as stated by Justice Cardozo in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181, 183 (2), in a lucid statement of principle said to have “never yet been improved upon” [Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. 1, § 18.12, p. 241] and on several occasions quoted or cited with approval by our Missouri courts : 1 “To establish liability, the inference must .be permissible that the trip would have been made though the private errand had been canceled. * * * The test in brief is this : If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his e…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Heaton v. Ferrell
This case does not fall within any of the principal exceptions [58 Am.Jur., Workmen’s Compensation, § 217, loc. cit. 724] to the basic “going-and-coming rule,” i. e., where the employer provides transportation as an incident of employment 7 or knowingly remunerates the employee for the time or expense involved, 8 or where the employee performs or expects to perform en route some special task, service or errand in connection with his employment. 9 Under some circumstances, injuries occurring on the employer’s premises during the lunch hour may be considered as having arisen in the cour…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Atiles Moréu v. Industrial Commission
In the foregoing cases, we followed the test laid down by Judge Cardozo in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 167 N. E. 181, 182 (N. Y., 1929), that an employee is travelling in the course of his employment only if the work creates the necessity for the travel apart from the ordinary travel to and from work.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Atiles Moréu v. La Comisión Industrial de Puerto Rico
En los casos arriba citados, seguimos la fórmula establecida por el Juez Cardozo en Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 167 N.E. 181, 182 (N.Y., 1929), al efecto de que un empleado viaja en el curso de su empleo solamente si el trabajo crea la necesidad de viajar, aparte, del viaje corriente para ir al trabajo y regresar de éste.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Atiles Moréu v. Comisión Industrial
La resolución de la Comisión Industrial será confirmada. (1) El principio enunciado en Cordero, Admor., v. Comisión Industrial, 60 D.P.R. 873 , no está aquí envuelto, toda vez que el patrono ni suministra ni paga por la transportación do sus obreros para ir y venir del trabajo. (2) Bacó v. Comisión Industrial, supra, a la pág. 872, citando del Juez Cardozo en Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 167 N.E. 181, 182 (N. Y., 1929).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Atiles Moréu v. Industrial Commission
Bacó v. Industrial Commission, supra, at p. 842, quoting from Judge Cardozo in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 167 N.E. 181, 182 (N.Y., 1929).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lindell v. Minnesota American Legion Publishing Co.
But their contention here is and before the commission was that Lindell at the time of his fatal injury was engaged in a mission of his own to make a patriotic address; that he had done so over a period of many years, using the same speech with a few modifications from time to time; that if it were not for the occasion of making a patriotic address Lindell would not have gone on this trip; that under the act the claimant has the burden of proof; that here the evidence “stands in equipoise,” hence “that burden has not been met and no award can be made”; that the commission may not “co…
discussed
Cited "see"
Linzy v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
See generally Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 167 N.E. 181, 183 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, C.J.) (“[T]he decisive test must be whether it is the employment or something else that has sent the traveler forth upon the journey or brought exposure to its perils.”).
cited
Cited "see"
Rigsby v. Pitner
See opinion of Chief Justice Cardozo in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 .
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Cited "see"
Rickenbaker v. Layton
See Marks’ Dependents v. Gray et al., 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 and Holder v. Haynes, 193 S.C. 176 , 7 S.E.2d 833 .
cited
Cited "see"
Standard Oil Co. v. Smith
See Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N. Y. 90, 93-94 , 167 N. E. 181, 183 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Cochran Elec. Co. v. Mahoney
Appeals Bd., 6 Cal.3d 860 , 101 Cal.Rptr. 105 , 495 P.2d 433, 439 (1972); Morris v. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 179 Wash. 423 , 38 P.2d 395 (1934) (employee in the course of employment throughout special errand, even if errand temporarily interrupted for personal activity); Hilding v. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 162 Wash. 168 , 298 P. 321 (1931) (injury during return trip from Idaho where employee traveled at the direction of employer, in furtherance of employer's business covered under the IIA). [2] Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437 , 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). [3] Wilson, 98 Wash.2d at 437 ,…
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Cited "see, e.g."
Pollock v. Reeves Bros., Inc.
G.S. 97-2(6); Clark v. Burton Lines, 272 N.C. 433 ; see also Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 167 N.E. 181 . 2.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Blesy v. United States
See, e. g., Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 (1929); Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., 231 N.Y. 273 , 131 N.E. 914 (1921).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Robins Silk Manufacturing Co., Inc., Appellant, Against Consolidated Piece Dye Works, Respondent
New York Court of Appeals.
May 28, 1929.
S. John Block for appellant.
Robert E. Mebel for respondent.
<italic>Per Curiam.</italic>.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
Per Curiam.
The appellant, Robins Silk Manufacturing Co., Inc., delivered silks to the respondent, Consolidated Piece Dye Works, to be dyed. A controversy as to the manner in which the work had been done was submitted to arbitration. A motion was made by the appellant to[*89] vacate the award on two grounds: First, that one of the three arbitrators had been guilty of misbehavior in inspecting the respondent’s machinery in the absence of the parties, and second, that another arbitrator had been guilty of misbehavior in bargaining with the respondent for employment while the arbitration was pending. The Supreme Court at Special Term upheld the first of these charges, though refusing to sustain the second. The Appellate Division reversed and confirmed the award.
As to the first of the two charges, the evidence sustains a finding that the arbitrator who inspected the machinery was acting with the knowledge and consent of both the parties to the proceeding. In such circumstances there can be no basis for a holding that the inspection was misconduct within the rule of Berizzi Co., Inc., v. Krausz (239 N. Y. 315). Whether misconduct might have been found in the absence of consent, there is no occasion to consider.
As to the second of the two charges, the evidence sustains a finding that the treaty for employment did not begin till the award had been made, at a time, therefore, when the arbitrator was functus officio. If he had bargained for employment while the arbitration was pending, his act would have been misbehavior so flagrant and offensive as to vitiate the award, though the closing of the contract was postponed till later. The courts below have found, however, that he is not subject to that reproach. The proposal did not come from him, but came from the new employer, and came for the first time when he had ceased to be an arbitrator. What he did in bargaining so soon thereafter might better not have been done since it has exposed him to suspicion. We cannot say that it was misbehavior as matter of law.
The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
Cardozo, Ch. J., Pound, Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.