New Mexico State High. Com'n v. Ferguson, 652 P.2d 230 (N.M. 1982). · Go Syfert
New Mexico State High. Com'n v. Ferguson, 652 P.2d 230 (N.M. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 4× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1992 · …we will construe a statute to give it its intended effect.
73 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: City of Raton v. Arkansas River Power Authority (nmd, 2008-09-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) City of Raton v. Arkansas River Power Authority (3×) also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited as authority (rule)
D.N.M. · 2008 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the purpose of the notice provisions of the tort claims act is to ensure that the agency allegedly at fault is notified that it may be subject to a lawsuit.... we will construe a statute to give it its intended effect.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF NM v. Hughes (2×)
N.M. · 1992 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
we will construe a statute to give it its intended effect.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Regents of the University v. Hughes (2×)
N.M. · 1992 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
we will construe a statute to give it its intended effect.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cruz v. City of Deming (2×) also: Cited "see"
D.N.M. · 2023 · confidence medium
State Highway Comm’n v. Ferguson, 652 P.2d 230, 231 (N.M. 1982), thereby permitting it “to protect itself against false or exaggerated claims while also permitting it to identify and settle meritorious claims,” Lopez, 930 P.2d at 149 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Lewis v. Santa Fe (4×)
N.M. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Ferguson establishes that where a police agency is not the agency causing the 13 alleged harm, and there is no proof of the agency at fault receiving actual notice, a 14 police report does not constitute sufficient actual notice for purposes of Section 15 41-4-16(B). 98 N.M. at 681, 652 P.2d at 231.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lopez v. State (2×)
N.M. · 1996 · confidence medium
Receipt of a police report could provide actual notice “only where the report contains information which puts the governmental entity allegedly at fault on notice that there is a claim against it," thereby satisfying the statutory purpose ‘“to ensure that the agency allegedly at fault is notified that it may be subject to a lawsuit.’ ” Id. (quoting New Mexico State Highway Comm’n v. Ferguson, 98 N.M. at 681, 652 P.2d 230 at 231 (alteration in original)); see also Frappier v. Mergler, 107 N.M. 61, 64 , 752 P.2d 253, 256 (Ct.App.1988); Smith, 106 N.M. at 372 , 743 P.2d at 128 . 10.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Powell v. NM STATE HWY. & TRANSP. DEPT. (4×) also: Cited "see"
N.M. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The governmental entity that is to receive notice is "the particular agency that caused the alleged harm." Ferguson, 98 N.M. at 681, 652 P.2d at 231; Smith v. State ex rel.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Powell v. New Mexico State Highway & Transportation Department (4×) also: Cited "see"
N.M. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The governmental entity that is to receive notice is “the particular agency that caused the alleged harm.” Ferguson, 98 N.M. at 681, 652 P.2d at 231; Smith v. State ex rel.
examined Cited as authority (rule) City of Las Cruces v. Garcia (8×)
N.M. · 1984 · confidence medium
The Court of Appeals held that under Ferguson, if the City traffic department is the governmental agency responsible "for overseeing the safety of intersections, * * * then notice of the occurrence to that department in the form of the police report is actual notice to the City." The court's holding and instructions were based on our statement in Ferguson that Subsection 41-4-16(B) means that "the particular agency that caused the alleged harm must have actual notice before written notice is not required." Ferguson, 98 N.M. at 681, 652 P.2d at 231 (emphasis added).
examined Cited "see" Gambrel v. Marriott Hotel (4×)
N.M. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See New Mexico State Highway Comm’n v. Ferguson, 98 N.M. 680 , 652 P.2d 230 (1982); Gonzales v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 77 N.M. 61 , 419 P.2d 257 (1966) (statute is to be read and given effect as written; words used in the statute ought to be given their ordinary and usual meaning unless a different intent is clearly indicated).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
NEW MEXICO STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION and State of New Mexico, Petitioners,
v.
Betty FERGUSON, Guardian and Conservator of the Estate of Robert Lynne Schleuter, an Incapacitated and Protected Person, Santiage G. Chavez, Sr., Personal Representative of the Estate of David Chavez, Deceased, and Ruben Chavez, Respondents.
13743.
New Mexico Supreme Court.
Sep 27, 1982.
652 P.2d 230

Shaffer, Butt, Thornton & Baehr, Deborah S. Davis, Albuquerque, for petitioners.

Melvin L. Robins, Albuquerque, for respondents.

Thomas C. Esquibel, Dist. Atty., Los Lunas, for Valencia County Bd. of Com'rs.

John W. Cassell, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, amicus curiae.

OPINION

EASLEY, Chief Justice.

Respondents sued for personal injuries and wrongful death, alleging that petitioners'[*231] negligent design, construction, and maintenance of a state highway caused the vehicle in which respondents were riding to go off the road. Petitioners State of New Mexico (State) and New Mexico State Highway Commission (Commission) moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on grounds that notice under the Tort Claims Act had not been given within the statutory period. The trial court granted the motion.

The trial court dismissed defendant Valencia County based on the finding that the County had no duty to maintain the state highway. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the notice provision of the Act, Section 41-4-16, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp. 1982), was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order dismissing Valencia County and reversed the order dismissing the State and the Commission.

The Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that notice of the occurrence to the New Mexico State Police, as evidenced by a State Police report attached to respondents' answer to interrogatories, created "a condition of actual notice upon the governmental entities, defendants New Mexico State Highway Commission and the State of New Mexico." The State and the Commission petitioned for certiorari, and we granted.

We consider the question of whether an accident report prepared by the New Mexico State Police constitutes actual notice within the meaning of Section 41-4-16(B) to the State and to all state agencies. We hold that it does not.

We quote the reasoning relied on by the Court of Appeals in reaching its erroneous decision:

The notice statute, Section 41-4-16B, denies maintenance of suit if written notice has not been given as provided in Subsection A "unless the governmental entity had actual notice of the occurrence." "Governmental entity" is defined in Section 41-4-3B as "the state or any local [sic] body as defined in Subsection C and G of this section." Subsection G declares that "`state' or `state agency' means the state of New Mexico or any of its branches, agencies, departments, boards, instrumentalities, or institutions." The State Police Department and the State Highway Department fit the statutory description of "state" or "state agency." We hold that the clear language of the Act itself creates a condition of actual notice upon the governmental entities, defendants New Mexico State Highway Commission and the State of New Mexico, because at least one of the State's "branches, agencies, departments, boards, instrumentalities or institutions" had actual notice.

Ferguson v. New Mexico State Highway Commission, (1981), 98 N.M. 718, 652 P.2d 740 (Ct.App. 1981) (emphasis in original).

By the logic of this decision, notice to any of the state's "branches, agencies, departments, boards, instrumentalities or institutions" creates a condition of actual notice on the state or any state agency. This interpretation of the notice statute defies reason and common sense. The notice statute says "unless the governmental entity had actual notice of the occurrence." Section 41-4-16(B), N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp. 1982) (emphasis added). What governmental entity did the Legislature have in mind? The statute does not say "any" governmental entity, or "any" employee in state government. We are of the opinion that the statute means the particular agency that caused the alleged harm must have actual notice before written notice is not required.

The purpose of the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act is to ensure that the agency allegedly at fault is notified that it may be subject to a lawsuit. See Martinez v. City of Clovis, 95 N.M. 654, 625 P.2d 583 (Ct.App. 1980). We will construe a statute to give it its intended effect. Section 12-2-2, N.M.S.A. 1978; Wells v. County of Valencia, 98 N.M. 3, 644 P.2d 517 (1982).

We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues raised on appeal, and for any other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[*232] PAYNE, FEDERICI and RIORDAN, JJ., concur.

SOSA, Senior Justice, respectfully dissents and adopts the Court of Appeals opinion as his own.