green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 9×
25.5 score
G Cite
cited 6× by 6 distinct cases ·
…ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the legislature . . . .
⚠ not in text
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Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999
2012
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Hegarty v. Hudson
legislature is free to make inefficacious or even unwise policy choices. the correction of these policy choices is not a judicial function as long as the legislative choices do not offend the constitution.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
People of Michigan v. Tyler Maurice Tate
ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the legislature . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
People of Michigan v. Tyler Maurice Tate
ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the legislature . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
People of Michigan v. Demariol Dontaye Boykin
ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the legislature . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
People of Michigan v. Demariol Dontaye Boykin
ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the legislature . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
People of Michigan v. Demariol Dontaye Boykin
ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the legislature . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
People of Michigan v. Tyler Maurice Tate
ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the legislature . . . .
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Stand up for Democracy v. Secretary of State
ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the legislature .... when a legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent in a statute, . .. the proper role of a court is simply to apply the terms of the statute ....
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
People v. Acosta-Baustista
because our judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the legislature, our obligation is, by examining the statutory language, to discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Usf Ins. & Gua. Co. v. McCa
The correction of these policy choices is not a judicial function as long as the legislative choices do not offend the constitution.'" Id. at 159, 599 N.W.2d 102 , adopting as its own the language of Judge Young's dissent in People v. McIntire, 232 Mich.App. 71, 126 , 591 N.W.2d 231 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mahaday v. Cason
(2×)
It is true that Michigan statutory immunity — under M.C.L.A. § 780.702 as it existed before 1999 and under a fair reading of the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of analogous language in People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147 , 599 N.W.2d 102, 106 (1999) — provided immunity from prosecution for self-incriminated offenses even if the testimony was false.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Decker v. Flood
The correction of these policy choices is not a judicial function as long as the legislative choices do not offend the constitution.' " Id. at 159, 599 N.W.2d 102 , adopting as its own the language of Judge Young's dissent in People v. McIntire, 232 Mich.App. 71, 126 , 591 N.W.2d 231 (1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Thousand
“When a legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent in a statute, the statute speaks for itself and there is no need for judicial construction; the proper role of a court is simply to apply the terms of the statute to the circumstances in a particular case.” Id. at 153 (citation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Robinson v. City of Detroit
In his words, Justice Brickley brought to the cases "unwavering objectivity and reason, unconstrained by any predetermined notions." 461 Mich. at 1204, n. 4, 597 N.W.2d 837 .
cited
Cited "see"
King v. Reed
See People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147, 155-158 , 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999).
cited
Cited "see"
People v. Javens
See People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147 , 156 n. 2, 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999) (citation omitted).
cited
Cited "see"
Daenzer v. Wayland Ford, Inc.
See People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147 , 157-58 n. 4, 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999). 8 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Stone v. State
See People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147, 156, n. 2 , 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999). [38] See, generally, Civil Service Comm. v. Auditor General, 302 Mich. 673, 686-688 , 5 N.W.2d 536 (1942) (holding that Legislature could not impose unconstitutional conditions in appropriations bill for Michigan Civil Service). [39] See OAG, 1971-1972, No. 4732, pp. 72-73 (December 29, 1971). [40] See Const. 1963, art. 9, § 24 ("The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or …
discussed
Cited "see"
Lickfeldt v. Department of Corrections
See Cady v. Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 509 , 286 N.W. 805 (1939) (`Courts cannot substitute their opinions for that of the legislative body on questions of policy')." [ McIntire, supra at 153 , 599 N.W.2d 102 , adopting the dissenting opinion of now Justice Young in People v. McIntire, 232 Mich.App. 71 , 591 N.W.2d 231 (1998).] Like the Court in McIntire, supra, I will not condone the majority's decision to read beyond the clear text of M.C.L. § 750.193 to find "an unexpressed legislative intent" that the MDOC is required to terminate a sentence once the maximum term has been served.
cited
Cited "see"
People v. Maffett
See People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147, 155-159 , 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Johnigan
NOTES [1] People v. Starr, 457 Mich. 490, 494 , 577 N.W.2d 673 (1998). [2] Id. at 495 , 577 N.W.2d 673 . [3] Id. at 496 , 577 N.W.2d 673 . [4] MRE 404(b). [5] Starr, supra at 500-501 , 577 N.W.2d 673 . [6] Id. at 501-502 , 577 N.W.2d 673 . [7] Id. [8] Id. [9] Id. [10] People v. Ackerman, 257 Mich.App. 434, 448-449 , 669 N.W.2d 818 (2003). [11] People v. Kelly, 231 Mich.App. 627, 640-641 , 588 N.W.2d 480 (1998). [12] People v. Babcock (Appendix), 469 Mich. 247, 272 , 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003). [13] Id. [14] Id. at 273 , 666 N.W.2d 231 . [15] Id. [16] Id. at 274 , 666 N.W.2d 231 . [17] Id. at 272 , …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Gregory R. BULGER, Defendant-Appellant.
v.
Gregory R. BULGER, Defendant-Appellant.
112694, COA No. 209031.
Michigan Supreme Court.
Aug 17, 1999.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
Citer courts: Michigan Supreme Court (6) · Michigan Court of Appeals (2)
On the Court's own motion, we ORDER that this case be reargued and resubmitted to the Court at the October 1999 Session, and we DIRECT the parties to file supplemental briefs. Appellant's supplemental brief will be due on or before September 7, 1999, and appellee's supplemental brief will be due on or before September 28, 1999. The supplemental briefs shall address the following questions:
(1) Do Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), when considered together, indicate that there is a constitutional right to "meaningful access" to the appellate process?
(2) Does the concept of "meaningful access to the appellate process," in this context, require that indigent defendants have appointed counsel on a first appeal, regardless of whether the appeal is of right or discretionary?
(3) If "meaningful access to the appellate process" does not require that indigent defendants be given counsel for a discretionary first appeal, what is necessary to guarantee" meaningful access" to uncounseled indigent defendants who have no right of first appeal, and does MCR 6.005(H)(4), in conjunction with MCR 6.311(C), fulfill this standard?
(4) Is the concept of "meaningful access to the appellate process" grounded in the equal protection clause, the due process clause, or both?
(5) Is the concept of "meaningful access to the appellate process" the kind of fundamental right that implicates equal protection concerns over distinctions between indigent and moneyed defendants, and do the differences between guilty plea appeals and appeals from trial-based convictions represent the kind of reasoned distinction that would permit the courts to treat indigent and moneyed defendants differently in allowing for the assistance of counsel in discretionary first appeals?
The Court invites briefs amicus curiae from the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, the Michigan Attorney General, the Michigan Association of Counties, the Michigan Appellate Assigned Counsel System, the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan, and the Michigan Defender Offices. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of these questions may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.