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Quoted verbatim 1×
54.5 score
“a guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises . . . .”
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000
2013
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Jason Donald Matakis v. State of Minnesota
a guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises . . . .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Joseph Robert Clay
“On demonstration that a plea agreement has been breached, the court may allow withdrawal of the plea.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Michael Lamontice Smith
(2×)
The supreme court later summarized the law by stating that, if a guilty plea “‘rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Matthew Michael Lewis
“When a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Devin Lee Arola Johnson
(3×)
Accordingly, if a guilty plea “‘rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Arthur Anthony Torgesen
(2×)
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Melissa Rae Guillette
(3×)
“In determining whether a plea agreement was violated, courts look to what the parties to the plea bargain reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Leroy Lamar Morris
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Abigail Rae Trulson
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Ricardo Kletschka
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
A. Kletschka contends that the mandatory-minimum statute does not apply on the ground that the state breached the parties’ plea agreement when it submitted the prior conviction to the district court at sentencing and requested a mandatory-minimum sentence. “‘[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S. Ct.…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jesse Lee Paskey v. State of Minnesota
(2×)
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jonathan Nicholas Turner v. State of Minnesota
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Brian Scott Poquette v. State of Minnesota
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. William James Chestnut
In order to determine whether the parties have honored a plea agreement, this court first looks to what the parties “reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Casey James Pederson
“The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Brittany Ann Vacko
“On demonstration that a plea agreement has been breached, the court may allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Aaron Arnold Lind-Pashina
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Christopher Timothy Poorker
If a plea agreement is breached, the defendant’s guilty plea is invalid and “the court may allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ignacio Olalde-Hernandez v. State of Minnesota
If a plea agreement is breached, the defendant’s guilty plea is invalid and the court “may allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Dean Ryan Kline
In order to determine whether the parties have honored a plea agreement, we first look to what the parties “reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
James Darnell Posey v. State of Minnesota
“The voluntariness 4 requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Danny Lee Zinski v. State of Minnesota
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000). 5 First, we address the issue of whether appellant was required to register in 1995 as a predatory offender based on his guilty plea to harassment.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Eric Peter Elijio
Voluntary “The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Robel Belay Kubrom v. State of Minnesota
(3×)
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robyn Lynn Hager v. State of Minnesota
The district court found that Hager’s claim that defense counsel made such a promise was not credible or supported by the record, and the district court concluded that Hager’s plea was voluntary. 6 The requirement that a plea be voluntary “insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Xavier Jerome Buckhanan v. State of Minnesota
State v. Robledo- Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. 2000). “[W]hat the parties agreed to at the time of the plea agreement is an issue of fact to be resolved by the district court.” Oldenburg v. State, 763 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Gerald Raymond Gustafson
Voluntariness The voluntariness requirement of a valid guilty plea “insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Lamar King
“The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Otis Elliot Woodson v. State of Minnesota
The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any “improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Jermale Jermar Kling
See James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 728-29 (Minn. 2005); State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn. 2000); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Steven Daniel Waldor v. State of Minnesota
“The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any 5 improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Thomas Joseph McManus
(2×)
The voluntariness requirement of a valid guilty plea “insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Cleveland
(2×)
Even when a defendant, prosecutor, and court agree on a sentence, the court cannot give the sentence effect if it is not authorized by law.’ ” Deserly , ¶ 16 (quoting United States v. Greatwalker, 285 F.3d 727, 729-30 (8th Cir. 2002)). “ ‘[A] plea agreement calling for an unauthorized sentence cannot be specifically enforced.’ ” Deserly , ¶ 16 (quoting State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Maurion Jameal Travis v. State of Minnesota
“The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Charles Chuck Jackson
The voluntariness requirement of a valid guilty plea “insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Evalyn Lia Bheaanu
“The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In re the Civil Commitment of Crosby
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Finnegan
(2×)
E.g., Doppler v. State, 771 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn.2009) (reviewing factual findings for clear error in postconviction appeal); Bonga v. State, 765 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.2009) (reviewing questions of law de novo in postconviction appeal); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674-75 (Minn.2000) (reviewing trial court’s factual findings for clear error and questions of law de novo in direct appeal). “[W]hen a constitutional right as fundamental as the right to be present at one’s own trial is implicated, the trial court has an obligation to safeguard that right.” Cassidy, 567 N.W.2d at 711 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Oldenburg v. State
See James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 730 (Minn.2005); State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 519-20 (Minn.2003); State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn.2000); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 672-73 (Minn.2000); State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 880 (Minn.1998); State v. Christopherson, 644 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn.App.2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Spann v. State
(2×)
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
James v. State
(10×)
also: Cited "see"
In Brown , we concluded that the record supported the postcon-viction court’s conclusion that “Brown understood the range of his sentence to be between [25 years’] probation and an executed double durational departure sentence [172 months].” 606 N.W.2d at 674.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Rhodes
(4×)
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
James v. State
(2×)
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Wukawitz
(5×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
In examining the voluntariness requirement, we noted in State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000), that “ ‘when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’ ” (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Wukawitz
See, e.g., State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Minn.2001); State v. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn.2001); State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn.2000); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Minn.2000); State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Minn.1998); State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317, 318-19 (Minn.1998). *854 The conditional-release statute provides that persons who commit certain criminal-sexual-conduct offenses are placed on a five- or ten-year conditional release after completing their imposed sentence: [W]hen a court sentences a person to prison for a violation of section 609.…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Christopherson
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Stephen W. SHAUGHNESSY, an Attorney at Law of the State of Minnesota
C0-90-95.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Feb 22, 2000.
Alan, Stringer.
Published
ORDER
There is currently pending before the court a March 15, 1999, petition for disciplinary action against respondent Stephen W. Shaughnessy, that has been heard by a referee appointed by the court and is awaiting the completion of briefing.
The court has been informed that respondent has become disabled, is incapable of assisting his counsel with his defense, is incapable of practicing law and is not expected to be able to return to practice, if at all, any time within the next 12 months.
Rule 28(c), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), authorizes this court, upon the allegation of a disability during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding, to, inter alia, stay the disciplinary proceedings and transfer the lawyer to disability inactive status.
The Director and respondent have submitted a stipulation to this court jointly recommending that the disciplinary proceedings be stayed and that respondent be transferred to disability inactive status until such time as it is shown that he is fit to resume the practice of law and assist in his defense.
The court accepts the parties’ stipulation.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Stephen W. Shaughnessy is transferred to disability inactive status without further proceedings, effective immediately, and may not be reinstated to active status unless and until it is shown that he is fit to resume the practice of law in a proceeding and under the conditions as provided in Rule 18, RLPR. All further disciplinary proceedings are stayed until such time as respondent may petition for reinstatement to the practice of law, and respondent need not file a brief in response to the Director’s brief until the proceedings are resumed.
BY THE COURT:
Alan C. Page Alan C. Page Associate Justice STRINGER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.