Minnesota & Montana Land & Improvement Co. v. Brasier, 45 P. 632 (Mont. 1896). · Go Syfert
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Minnesota & Montana Land & Improvement Co. v. Brasier, 45 P. 632 (Mont. 1896). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
25 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: City of Helena v. Community of Rimini (mont, 2017-06-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1901 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1901 1963 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Helena v. Community of Rimini (2×)
Mont. · 2017 · confidence medium
We have held that nonuse, in and of itself, is sufficient evidence to prove an intent to abandon. 79 Ranch, 204 Mont. at 432 , 666 P.2d at 218 (“[T]he evidence clearly shows at least forty years of continuous nonuse of the water rights . . . such a long period of nonuse is strong evidence of an intent to abandon the water rights.” (emphasis added)); Smith v. Hope Mining Co., 18 Mont. 432, 438 , 45 P. 632, 634 (1896) (“The nonuser [sic] of water for so long a period [9 years], and especially a period longer than the statute of limitations, is certainly very potent evidence, if it stood al…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Skelton Ranch, Inc. v. Pondera County Canal & Reservoir Co. (2×)
Mont. · 2014 · confidence medium
This Court has stated that nine years of non-use is “certainly very potent evidence, if it stood alone, of an intention to abandon.” Smith v. Hope Mining Co., 18 Mont. 432, 438 , 45 P. 632, 634 (1896).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heavirland v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Mont. · 2013 · confidence medium
Smith v. Hope Mining Co., 18 Mont. 432, 438 , 45 P. 632, 634 (1896) (nine years’ nonuse of a water right, when that period exceeded the statute of limitations, was “very potent evidence, if it stood alone, of an intention to abandon.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Axtell v. M.S. Consulting
Mont. · 1998 · confidence medium
See also 79 Ranch, Inc. v. Pitsch (1983), 204 Mont. 426, 431 , 666 P.2d 215, 217 (40 years); Holmstrom Land Co. v. Meagher County Newlan Creek Water District (1980), 185 Mont. 409, 424 , 605 P.2d 1060, 1069 (75 years); Smith v. Hope Mining Co. (1896), 18 Mont. 432, 438-39 , 45 P. 632, 634 (9 years). ¶30 Having set forth the applicable lav/ regarding the acquisition, transfer, and possible loss of water rights, we are prepared to apply the law to the facts of this case and determine whether there exist any genuine issues of material fact.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re the Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, Both Surface & Underground Within the Clark Fork River Drainage Area Above the Blackfoot River
Mont. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Smith v. Hope Mining Co. (1896), 18 Mont. 432 , 45 P. 632 (water rights for mining); Holstrom Land Co. v. Meagher County Newlan Creek Water District (1979), 185 Mont. 409 , 605 P.2d 1060 (water rights for irrigation); 79 Ranch, 666 P.2d 215 *347 (water rights for irrigation); In re Clark Fork River, 833 P.2d 1120 (municipal water rights).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re the Adjudication of the Existing Rights of Musselshell River Drainage
Mont. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Smith v. Hope Mining Co. (1896), 18 Mont. 432 , 45 P. 632 ; Moore v. Sherman (1916), 52 Mont. 542 , 159 P. 966 ; Thomas v. Ball (1923), 66 Mont. 161 , 213 P. 597 ; Shammel v. Vogl (1964), 144 Mont. 354 , 396 P.2d 103 ; Holmstrom Land Co. v. Meagher Cty.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
THE MINNESOTA AND MONTANA LAND AND IMPROVEMENT COMPANY
v.
BRASIER
Montana Supreme Court.
Jul 13, 1896.
45 P. 632
O. R. Middleton and O. F. Goddard, for Appellant., James R. Goss, for Respondent.
Pee.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
Pee Curiam.

This is an action of ejectment which was decided by the court without a jury upon an agreed statement of facts. Judgment was for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

The court rendered judgment for defendant on the ground that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The agreed statement of facts set forth that the defendant entered upon the land September 1, 1882, under a claim of title, claiming that it was exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a written instrument, judgment, or decree, and that defendant had been in quiet, peaceable, open, notorious, actual, exclusive and continued occupation of said lands, and that same have been protected by a substantial inclosure by defendant of the premises in question, and that the same have been usually cultivated and improved by said defendant, Brasier, ever since that time until the commencement of this action, and that he has held the same adversely to the plaintiff and to all other parties since the said 1st day of September, 1882. The action was commenced in 1893.

Sufficient time to constitute the period of the statute of limitations had therefore run since September 1, 1882. The statutes of limitation in regard to real estate were, at the time this action was commenced, §§ 29, 30, Code Civil Procedure 1887. The statutes providing what should be deemed to be adverse possessions were §§ 35 and 36 of the same Code. We will not quote them at this time. The only contention of plaintiff against the defense of the statute of limitations was that the defendant’s entry was not made under a paper title. But this contention is decided adversely to plaintiff in Mining Co. v. Powers, 3 Mont. 344. The question is there thoroughly discussed, and the authority of that case has never been questioned. See, also, Lamme v. Dodson, 4 Mont. 591, 2 Pac. 298. We shall therefore go no further than to cite the authority, and affirm the judgment of the district court.

Affirmed.