State v. Cook, 678 P.2d 987 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). · Go Syfert
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State v. Cook, 678 P.2d 987 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Berry v. State (nev, 2009-07-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Berry v. State
Nev. · 2009 · confidence medium
Modem authorities define “lewd” as pertaining to sexual conduct that is “[o]bscene or indecent; tending to moral impurity or wantonness,” Black’s Law Dictionary 927 (8th ed. 2004), “evil, wicked” or “sexually unchaste or licentious,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 715 (11th ed. 2003), and “[p]reoccupied with sex and sexual desire; lustful,” The American Heritage Dictionary of *282 the English Language 1035 (3d ed. 1996). 5 Other jurisdictions considering vagueness challenges to statutes worded similar to NRS 201.210 have upheld those statutes reasoning that the…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Averyt (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See State v. Crisp, 175 Ariz. 281, 282-83 , 855 P.2d 795, 796-97 (App.1993) (appellate court will presume the validity of an ordinance unless it clearly appears otherwise); see also State v. Cook, 139 Ariz. 406, 408 , 678 P.2d 987, 989 (App.1984) (under the rules of construction there is a presumption in favor of constitutionality).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Crisp (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Cook, 139 Ariz. 406, 408 , 678 P.2d 987, 989 (App.1984).
examined Cited "see, e.g." People v. Superior Court (4×)
Cal. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence medium
For example, the Georgia Supreme Court held a local ordinance prohibiting loitering for the purpose of prostitution was valid, saying, “The ordinance does not forbid loitering in public places, including legal ‘window shopping.’ Rather, it is strictly limited to loitering in a public place for specific, illegal purposes.” (Lambert v. City of Atlanta (1978) 242 Ga. 645, 646 [ 250 S.E.2d 456, 457 ], italics added.) Similarly, an Arizona court upheld an ordinance prohibiting loitering for the purpose of begging, explaining “that the proscription of the act of loitering, when combined wi…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The STATE of Arizona, Appellant,
v.
Linda Nayda COOK, Appellee.
2 CA-CR 3429.
Court of Appeals of Arizona.
Mar 13, 1984.
678 P.2d 987
Birdsall.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published

[*407] Frederick S. Dean, Tucson City Atty. by Frank W. Kern, III, Tucson, for appellant.

Kelly C. Knop, Tucson, for appellee.

OPINION

BIRDSALL, Chief Judge.

This appeal is from the judgment of the superior court in Pima County affirming the dismissal of the criminal charge against Linda Nayda Cook. The dismissal was based on a finding that Tucson City Code § 11-28(3) was void for vagueness and therefore unconstitutional. We hold the statute is not void for vagueness and is constitutional and reverse.

[*408] The statute in question declared it to be a misdemeanor to be "in or near any thoroughfare or any public place for the purpose of inducing, enticing, or procuring another to commit an act of lewdness, fornication or unlawful sexual intercourse."

We begin by recognizing the presumption in favor of constitutionality. Klensin v. City of Tucson, 10 Ariz. App. 399, 459 P.2d 316 (1969); State ex rel. DeConcini v. Gatewood, 10 Ariz. App. 274, 458 P.2d 368 (1969). We next note that a statute is not vague if it is sufficiently clear to give a citizen notice of the conduct which is prohibited. State v. Darby, 123 Ariz. 368, 599 P.2d 821 (App. 1979); State v. Carruth, 132 Ariz. 368, 645 P.2d 1282 (App. 1982).

The instant statute proscribes the act of being in or near a thoroughfare or public place combined with the purpose of inducing, enticing or procuring another to commit a certain act or acts. This court's decision in State ex rel. Williams v. City Court of Tucson, 21 Ariz. App. 489, 520 P.2d 1166 (1974) is in point. In Williams the statute said a person is guilty of loitering when he loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging. The act, "loitering", was combined with the specific intent to beg.

There is nothing vague in the language of the statute. All of the words have generally accepted meanings.

To induce is to lead on; to move by persuasion or influence.

To entice is to draw on by arousing hope or desire; tempt; lure.

To procure is to get possession of; to get and make available for promiscuous sexual intercourse.

Lewdness is the state of being sexual unchaste or licentious.

Fornication is sexual intercourse other than between married persons.

All of these definitions come from Webster, Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1965).

The ordinance clearly prohibits solicitation in a public place for prostitution. It is not vague. It is not void. It is not unconstitutional.

Reversed and remanded to the Tucson City Court.

HATHAWAY and HOWARD, JJ., concur.