green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
20.7 score
G Cite
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986
2006
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Peo v. Bachmann
simply because the defendant became upset when she learned that the victim had died was not a sufficient basis for the trial court ' s conclusion that her statement was involuntary.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Peo v. Bachmann
simply because the defendant became upset when she learned that the victim had died was not a sufficient basis for the trial court ' s conclusion that her statement was involuntary.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Peo v. Eden
Id. at ¶ 16. ¶ 27 As to the second prong, “[a] ‘voluntary’ waiver . . . is one that ‘was not extracted by threats or violence, promises, or undue influence.’” Id. at ¶ 18 (quoting People v. Smith, 716 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Colo. 1986)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Paul Alex LAVADIE
Only the second prong of this analysis is at issue now. ¶27 A waiver is voluntary if it is "not extracted by threats or violence, promises, or undue influence." Davis , ¶ 18 , 352 P.3d at 955 ( quoting People v. Smith , 716 P.2d 1115, 1118 ( Colo. 1986 ) ) . ¶28 A waiver is knowing and intelligent if the record clearly shows that the defendant understood the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments, the possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in their mitigation, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding o…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Interest of A.W.
See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 100 (10th Cir.1980) (holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation that could be heard by police officer situated in hallway outside motel room door, without the aid of any listening device); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 329-32 (2d Cir.1980); People v. Smith, 716 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Colo.1986) (holding that defendant who was accompanied to telephone by jailhouse personnel does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone communications); People v. Hart, 787 P.2d 186, 187-88 (Colo.App.19…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Gennings
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2418 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); People v. Smith, 716 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Colo.1986); People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230, 235 (Colo.1982).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Branch
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 401 , 98 S.Ct. at 2418 ; People v. Smith, 716 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Colo.1986); People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230, 235 (Colo.1982).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Zamora
People v. A. W., 982 P.2d 842, 848 (Colo.1999) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 ); see People v. Smith, 716 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Colo.1986) (defendant who was accompanied to telephone by jailhouse personnel does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone communications); cf. People v. Hart, 787 P.2d 186, 187-88 (Colo.App.1989) (defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy where police officers, who were lawfully situated in an adjacent motel room, could hear his conversation without the aid of any listening device).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Humphrey
(2×)
See People v. Smith, 716 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Colo.1986) ("Simply because the defendant became upset when she learned the victim had died was not a sufficient basis for the trial court's conclusion that her statement was involuntary.") (citing Raffaelli, 647 P.2d at 230 ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Davis
Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94 ; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel). 118 A "voluntary" waiver, like any voluntary statement, is one that "was not extracted by threats or violence, promises, or undue influence." People v. Smith, 716 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Colo.1986) (defining "voluntary statement" in the context of admissibility).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Thomas P. THORNTON
v.
'The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado
v.
'The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado
No. 85SC463.
Supreme Court of Colorado.
Apr 21, 1986.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Judy Fried, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for petitioner., Norman S. Early, Jr., Dist. Atty., Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., Donna Skinner Reed, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for respondent.
Cited by 2 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Colorado Court of Appeals (2)
PER CURIAM.
We granted certiorari to consider the decision of the court of appeals in People v. Thornton, 712 P.2d 1095 (Colo.App.1985), which affirmed the conviction of the defendant, Thomas P. Thornton, on six counts of securities fraud. Subsequent to our order granting certiorari, the People, relying on our opinion in People v. Riley, 708 P.2d 1359 (Colo.1985), have confessed error in this case. The People’s confession of error is based on the trial court’s instruction to the jury that good faith is not a defense to the charge of securities fraud. Although the defendant did not petition this court for certiorari on the propriety of the trial court’s instruction, the People, pointing out that at trial the defendant did raise an objection to the giving of the good faith instruction, urge us to reverse in the interests of justice.
We accept the People’s confession of error and accordingly reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the court of appeals with directions to return the case to the district court for a new trial.