Goulder v. Arizona Dept. of Transp., Motor Veh., 868 P.2d 997 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). · Go Syfert
Search
Goulder v. Arizona Dept. of Transp., Motor Veh., 868 P.2d 997 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2000 · …statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony. at p. 999 ✓
128 citation events (94 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lucille v. Dodge (arizctapp, 2000-05-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Lucille v. Dodge (4×) also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited "see"
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cristall v. Cristall
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Goulder v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HBA OF CENT. ARIZONA v. City of Mesa
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993). ¶ 8 Generally, ordinances that impose development fees are enacted pursuant to a municipality’s police powers — to promote the safety, health and general welfare of its residents. 8 Eugene MeQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25:136, at 591 (3d ed.2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Galloway
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993). ¶ 8 The Arizona Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1972 authorizes ADOSH to “cite employers for violating occupational safety and health standards, require remedial measures, assess monetary penalties, or petition the superior court for orders restraining unsafe conditions or practices.” de la Cruz v. State, 192 Ariz. 122, 124, ¶ 7 , 961 P.2d 1070, 1072 (App.1998) (citing A.R.S. §§ 23-417, 23-418, 23-419).
cited Cited as authority (rule) T.P. Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Arizona Department of Racing
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE EX REL. AZ. REG. OF CONT. v. Johnston
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Goulder v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993). ¶ 6 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-1138, The state has the right of subrogation to the extent of payments made from the residential contractors' recovery fund including the right to collect from a bond, cash payment or alternative to cash payment made pursuant to § 32-1152 or 32-1152.01.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re MH 2007-000937
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Goulder, 177 Ariz. at 416 , 868 P.2d at 999.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DIANA H. v. Rubin
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
It is well established that "[s]tatutory provisions are to be read in the context of related provisions and of the overall statutory scheme," and "[s]tatutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony." Goulder v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993), aff'd, 179 Ariz. 181 , 877 P.2d 280 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Ex Rel. Goddard v. WESTERN UNION FINANCIAL SERVICES INC.
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
“Statutory provisions are to be read in the context of the overall statutory scheme.” Prudential v. Estate of Rojo-Pacheco, 192 Ariz. 139, 148 , 962 *367 P.2d 213, 222 (App.1997) (quoting Goulder n Arizona Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Din, 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993)). ¶27 To interpret the statute as Western Union suggests would interject a needless inconsistency in the two sections of the statute that the plain wording of the statute neither supports nor requires.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Baugh
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 213 Ariz. 342, ¶ 6 , 141 P.3d 822, 824 (App.2006). ¶ 8 Furthermore, the legislature has explicitly provided in A.R.S. § 13-413 that “[n]o person in this state shall be subject to civil liability for engaging in conduct otherwise justified pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” “Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.” Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993), affd, 179 Ariz. 181 , 877 P.2d 280 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lyons v. State Board of Equalization
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.”). ¶ 9 Section 42-16254 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: A. If a taxpayer believes that the taxpayer’s property has been assessed improperly as a result of a property tax error, the taxpayer shall file a notice of claim with the appropriate tax officer, either personally or by certified mail, as follows: 1.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Washburn v. Pima County
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993), aff'd, 179 Ariz. 181 , 877 P.2d 280 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People's Choice TV Corp. v. City of Tucson (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416, 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993), affd, 179 Ariz. 181 , 877 P.2d 280 (1994).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Mead v. Holzmann (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
We further interpret section 4(a) in conjunction with other provisions of the Guidelines, see Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (1993), and in light of the Guidelines’ overall purpose.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Prudential v. Estate of Rojo-Pacheco
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
The goal is to achieve consistency among the related statutes.” Goulder v. Arizona Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High School District No. 82
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
“Statutory provisions are to be read in the context of related provisions and of the overall statutory scheme,” and “[t]he goal is to achieve consistency among the related statutes.” Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993), aff'd, 179 Ariz. 181 , 877 P.2d 280 (1994).
discussed Cited "see" State of Arizona v. William Peter Moran (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414 , 417, 868 P.2d 997 , 1000 (App.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Swift Transportation Co. v. Maricopa County (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (explaining that no construction is necessary when a statute’s meaning is plain and unambiguous). ¶ 15 Section 42-15105.1 directs the Assessor to notify a property owner “of any change in the valuation.” The relevant statutory scheme defines the term “valuation” as “the full cash value or limited property value that is determined for real or personal property, as applicable.” A.R.S. § 42-11001.15.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Western Union Financial Services, Inc. (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.”).
examined Cited "see" STATE EX REL. BRANNAN v. Williams (3×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder, 177 Ariz. at 416, 868 P.2d at 999 (stating goal of interpretation is to achieve consistency between statutes).
discussed Cited "see" Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.”); State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366 , 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989) (“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”).
examined Cited "see" Falcon v. Maricopa County (6×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony”). ¶ 11 For all these reasons, we agree with the Blauvelt court that a county board of supervisors serves as a county’s chief executive officer for purposes of Rule 4.1(i).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Leopoldo L. (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Tramp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993)(“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.”).
discussed Cited "see" Citadel Care Center v. Arizona Department of Revenue (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (explaining that statutory language should be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions of statute).
discussed Cited "see" Byers-Watts v. Parker (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Robert A. (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414 , 416, 868 P.2d 997 , 999 (App.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Tripati v. State
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 416, 868 P.2d at 999. ¶4 Section 31-201.01(F) provides that “[a]ny and all causes of action which may arise out of tort caused by the director, prison officers or employees of the department, within the scope of their legal duty, shall run only against the state.” Section 31-201.01(L) then states that “[a] person who is convicted of a felony offense and who is incarcerated ... may not bring a cause of action seeking damages or equitable relief from the state ... for injuries suffered while in the custody of the state ... unless the complaint alleges specific facts from which …
discussed Cited "see" Milner v. Colonial Trust Co. (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (1993) , aff'd, 179 Ariz. 181 , 877 P.2d 280 (1994). ¶ 9 Milner contends that the trial court interpreted A.R.S. § 3-1291 too broadly and that it should not be interpreted to mean that there can be no effective transfer of livestock ownership without a bill of sale.
discussed Cited "see" Bill Alexander Ford, Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Casa Ford, Inc.
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 *620 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993), aff'd, 179 Ariz. 181 , 877 P.2d 280 (1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Foust, 177 Ariz. 507, 512 , 869 P.2d 183, 188 (App.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Hayes v. Continental Insurance (2×)
Ariz. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goulder v. Arizona Dept. of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414, 416-417 , 868 P.2d 997, 999-1000 (Ct.App.1993).
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Samano (4×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
Larson v. Farley, 106 Ariz. 119 , 471 P.2d 731 (1970)); see also Goulder v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (the goal is to achieve consistency between the statutes).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Harry Frederick GOULDER, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION; James S. Creedon, Acting Director; and Judi E. Ross, Division Director, Real Parties in Interest, Defendants-Appellants.
1 CA-CV 91-0471.
Court of Appeals of Arizona.
Mar 1, 1994.
868 P.2d 997
Noyes.
Cited by 25 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 65%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Arizona (1)

Grant Woods, Arizona Atty. Gen. by Graham Alex Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for defendants-appellants.

Law Office of Mark N. Weingart by Mark N. Weingart, Tempe, for plaintiff-appellee.

[*415] OPINION

NOYES, Judge.

The question presented is whether an out-of-state DWI conviction is a conviction within the meaning of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (A.R.S.) section 28-445(A)(7), which provides for mandatory revocation of a driver's license on conviction of "a second charge of violating [A.R.S.] § 28-692, within a period of sixty months." We agree with the trial court's conclusion that an out-of-state DWI conviction is not a conviction of "section 28-692." We express disagreement with Parker v. Prins, 157 Ariz. 15, 17, 754 P.2d 344, 346 (App. 1988), the sole case relied on by Appellant Department of Transportation (Department).

I.

In April 1991, Appellee (Goulder) pleaded guilty to a charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI) in violation of A.R.S. section 28-692. A few days later, the Department notified Goulder by mail that his driver's license was revoked pursuant to A.R.S. section 28-445(A)(7), which provides:

A. The department shall, in addition to the grounds for mandatory revocation provided for in the uniform act regulating traffic on highways, forthwith revoke the license of a driver upon receiving a record of the driver's conviction of any of the following offenses, when the conviction has become final:
.....
7. Conviction, or forfeiture of bail not vacated, upon a second or subsequent charge of violating § 28-692, within a period of sixty months.[1]

(emphasis added).

The Department's theory was that the Arizona DWI conviction qualified as a "second or subsequent charge of violating § 28-692" because Goulder had been convicted of DWI in Nebraska in 1987.

Goulder filed a complaint in superior court for judicial review of the revocation pursuant to A.R.S. sections 28-451 and 12-901 to -914. The superior court reversed the mandatory revocation and remanded to the Department for a hearing pursuant to A.R.S. section 28-446, the permissive revocation statute. The Department appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. sections 12-120.21(A) and -901 to -914.

II.

The Department argues that the Nebraska DWI conviction is a conviction of violating "§ 28-692" because A.R.S. section 28-443(A) provides:

The department may suspend or revoke the license of a resident of this state ... upon receiving notice of the conviction of the person in another state of an offense therein which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of the person's driver's license.

This statute relates to a permissive license revocation; it has no applicability to the mandatory license revocation provisions of A.R.S. section 28-445(A)(7). The Department's failure to distinguish between the permissive and the mandatory license revocation statutes gains support from Parker v. Prins, in which Division Two of this Court held that a conviction from Wyoming was a "DWI conviction" for purposes of A.R.S. section 28-445(A)(7). 157 Ariz. at 17, 754 P.2d at 346. The Court stated in Parker:

Wyoming convicted Parker of DWI based on aiding and abetting. A.R.S. § 28-443 provides for license revocation for an offense which, "if committed in this state, would be grounds for ... revocation . .."; A.R.S. § 28-445 provides for mandatory revocation for conviction of a second or subsequent DWI conviction within a 60-month period. The Wyoming conviction constituted such an event, mandating revocation of Parker's license. A.R.S. § 28-1051.

Id. (emphasis added).

We conclude from the legislative history and from the plain language of relevant Arizona[*416] statutes that Parker's interpretation of A.R.S. section 28-445 is erroneous for the following four reasons.

A.

The first duty in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. See Chaparral Dev. v. RMED Int'l, Inc., 170 Ariz. 309, 311, 823 P.2d 1317, 1319 (App. 1991). "If the language is plain and unambiguous, then no construction is necessary and our duty is simply to apply that plain and unambiguous language." Id. We must follow the language of a statute if its clear meaning does not lead to an absurdity. See Arizona Civil Rts. Div. v. Hughes Air Corp., 139 Ariz. 309, 311, 678 P.2d 494, 496 (App. 1983).

Parker interprets A.R.S. section 28-445(A)(7) generically, to include any DWI conviction, but the statute refers specifically to an Arizona DWI conviction. "A recognized rule of statutory construction holds that an expression of one or more items of a class indicates the intent of the legislature to exclude all items of the same class not included." Greves v. Ohio State Life Ins. Co., 170 Ariz. 66, 74, 821 P.2d 757, 765 (App. 1991) (citing Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982)). That the statute includes Arizona's DWI statute specifically is indication of legislative intention to exclude out-of-state DWI convictions from that statute.

B.

Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony. See State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App. 1989). Other Arizona motor vehicle statutes clearly indicate an intention to include DWI convictions from other states. For example, A.R.S. section 28-443(A) confers on the Department discretionary authority to revoke a resident's license on notification of "the conviction of the person in another state of an offense therein which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of the person's driver's license." (emphasis added). Similarly, A.R.S. section 28-446(A)(7) confers on the Department discretionary authority to revoke a driver's license on evidence that the driver "[h]as committed an offense in another state which if committed in this state would be grounds for suspension or revocation." (emphasis added).

Another example is A.R.S. section 28-692.01(E), which provides enhanced punishment "[i]f a person is convicted of a second violation of § 28-692 or is convicted of a violation of § 28-692 and has previously been convicted of an act in another state which if committed in this state would be a violation of § 28-692 within a period of sixty months." (emphasis added). There is no such language in A.R.S. section 28-445(A)(7).

C.

When construing a statute, this Court may consider prior statutes relating to the same subject matter, as well as the development of a statute. See State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 271, 693 P.2d 921, 926 (1985). The historical notes to A.R.S. section 28-445(A)(7) indicate that a 1982 amendment substituted the words "violating § 28-692" for the words "driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Laws 1982, Ch. 234, § 2. This amendment is further evidence of a legislative intention to limit the mandatory revocation statute to violations of A.R.S. section 28-692 and to leave out-of-state DWI convictions for consideration under the permissive revocation statute, A.R.S. section 28-446.

D.

Statutory provisions are to be read in the context of related provisions and of the overall statutory scheme. See Grant v. Board of Regents, 133 Ariz. 527, 529, 652 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1982). The goal is to achieve consistency among the related statutes. See State v. Wilhite, 160 Ariz. 228, 230, 772 P.2d 582, 584 (App. 1989). Construing A.R.S. section 28-445(A)(7) in the manner argued by the Department, and in the manner summarily stated in Parker, would result in statutory redundancy: A person with an[*417] out-of-state DWI conviction within sixty months of an Arizona DWI conviction, or vice versa, would become subject to both the mandatory revocation provisions of A.R.S. section 28-445 and the permissive revocation provisions of A.R.S. section 28-446. It makes more sense to read these statutes as applying to different situations.

One reason the legislature may have limited mandatory driver's license revocation to a second or subsequent violation of A.R.S. "§ 28-692" is that, when the Department considers official records of an Arizona DWI conviction, there is no need for inquiry beyond the face of the records themselves. On the other hand, determining whether an out-of-state conviction is the same as an Arizona DWI conviction could involve questions of fact about other state laws and records. Because the Department must at times engage in factual inquiry regarding out-of-state convictions, it makes sense that the legislature gave the Department permissive authority to exercise discretion based on the facts and, where warranted, revoke a driver's license based on an out-of-state DWI conviction.

The statute with applicability to Goulder's Arizona DWI conviction is the permissive revocation statute, A.R.S. section 28-446, not the mandatory revocation statute, A.R.S. section 28-445.

III.

A.R.S. section 28-445(A)(7) does not include an out-of-state DWI conviction. It includes only what it says it includes: "[c]onviction, or forfeiture of bail not vacated, upon a second or subsequent charge of violating § 28-692, within a period of sixty months."

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

GARBARINO, P.J., and McGREGOR, J., concur.

1 A.R.S. section 28-445(A)(7) was amended, effective September 21, 1991, to delete the words "or subsequent" from the statute. See Laws 1991, Ch. 104, § 8.