green
Positive treatment
9.1 score
Treatment trajectory · 1926 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1926
1976
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fleming v. U-Haul Co.
(2×)
OCGA § 51-7-42; Page v. Citizens Banking Co., 111 *683 Ga. 73, 84 (4) ( 36 SE 418 ) (1900). 5 Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637, 640 (1) ( 5 SE 204 ) (1888). 6 Ventress v. Rosser, 73 Ga. 534, 541 (3) (1884). 7 Ga. Loan & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 116 Ga. 628, 630 ( 43 SE 27 ) (1902). 8 Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 (7) (a) ( 122 SE 252 ) (1924). 9 Hicks v. Brantley, 102 Ga. 264, 273 (2) ( 29 SE 459 ) (1897). 10 OCGA §§ 51-7-3; 51-7-43. 11 Compare Darnell v. Shirley, supra, 31 Ga. App. at 765 (5), where this Court, interpreting § 4440 of the Civil Code (1910), held that want of probable …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rowe v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Darnell v. Shirley, [ 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 (7) (a) ( 122 SE 252 )].” Hill v. Trend Carpet, 154 Ga. App. 446 (1) ( 268 SE2d 682 ).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
K-Mart Corp. v. Coker
Day Realty Assoc. v. McMillan, 247 Ga. 561, 562 ( 277 SE2d 663 ) (1981); Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 ( 122 SE 252 ) (1924).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Chastain v. Comolli
See Jones v. Walker, supra; Smith v. Ragan, 140 Ga. App. 33 ( 230 SE2d 89 ) (1976); Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 (8) ( 122 SE 252 ) (1923). 2.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
K Mart Corp. v. Griffin
Fisher v. Ky. Fried Chicken, 175 Ga. App. 542, 545 ( 333 SE2d 877 ) (1985); Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 ( 122 SE 252 ) (1924).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Perry v. Brooks
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“The return of an indictment by the grand jury investigating the alleged offense is . . . prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of the existence of . . . probable cause.” Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 (7a) ( 122 SE 252 ) (1924).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jones v. Walker
“In determining whether or not there was a total want of probable cause for a criminal prosecution alleged to have been maliciously carried on, the question is not whether the accused was actually guilty of the offense with which he was so charged, but the real question is whether the prosecutor had reasonable cause so to believe, — that is, whether the circumstances at the time of the prosecution were such as to create in the mind of the prosecutor a reasonable belief that there was probable cause for the prosecution.” Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 ( 122 SE 252 ) (1924).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Corbin v. First National Bank
"Want of probable cause is the gravamen of an action for malicious prosecution...” Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 ( 122 SE 252 ) (1924).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harmon v. Redding
"In determining whether or not there was a total want of probable cause for a criminal prosecution alleged to have been maliciously carried on, the question is not whether the accused was actually guilty of the offense with which he was so charged, but the real question is whether the prosecutor had reasonable cause so to believe, — that is, whether the circumstances at the time of the prosecution were such as to create in the mind of the prosecutor a reasonable belief that there was probable cause for the prosecution.” Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 ( 122 SE 252 ).
discussed
Cited "see"
Wilson v. Thurman
See Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ). “ ‘Where, as in this case, there is no evidence whatever of any fraudulent conduct or improper motive on the part of [defendants Thurman and Lodge], and it appears from the uncontradicted evidence that [plaintiff] was . . . indicted by the grand jury investigating it, and that there were some slight circumstances pointing to his guilt, though not enough to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, a finding that the prosecution was malicious is without any evidence to support it.’ Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764 (9) ( 122 S…
discussed
Cited "see"
Barber v. H & H Muller Enterprises, Inc.
(2×)
Although not expressly provided by statute, the malice "`"contemplated by law in an action for malicious prosecution is the same as in an action for malicious arrest."'" (Emphasis supplied.) Worn v. Warren, 191 Ga. App. 448, 449 (1) ( 382 SE2d 112 ); accord Melton v. LaCalamito, 158 Ga. App. 820, 824 (2) (c) ( 282 SE2d 393 ), citing Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764 (2) ( 122 SE 252 ).
cited
Cited "see"
Troup County Electric Membership Corp. v. Traylor
See Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 765 ( 122 SE 252 ); American Plan Corp. v. Beckham, 125 Ga. App. 416, 417 (4) ( 188 SE2d 151 ); Ayala v. Sherrer, 135 Ga. App. 431, 434 ( 218 SE2d 84 ).
cited
Cited "see"
Coxon v. Lady Jane Shop, Inc.
See Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764 (1), 765 (7) ( 122 SE 252 ); Hill v. Trend Carpet, 154 Ga. App. 446 (1) ( 268 SE2d 682 ).
cited
Cited "see"
Sirmans v. Peterson
See further, in this connection, Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764 ( 122 S. E. 252 ); Norman v. Young, 35 Ga. App. 221 ( 132 S. E. 414 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
LAWSON
v.
State
v.
State
15187.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Mar 6, 1924.
Max E. Land, for plaintiff in error., J. B. Wall, solicitor-general, J esse Grantham, contra.
Bloodworth, Broyles, Luke.
Published
Luke, J.
Lawson was convicted of violating the prohibition statute. The conviction was authorized by the evidence. In fact, when the officers were searching his premises and just before locating several gallons of beer and part of an apparatus for the manufacture of whisky, the defendant, according to the testimony of one witness said to him, “I have got a little outfit here, but I haven’t used it in God knows when.” The grounds of the motion for a new trial which have the approval of the trial judge are without substantial merit. Eor no reason pointed out did the court err in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
Broyles, G. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.