State v. Pace, 447 S.E.2d 186 (S.C. 1994). · Go Syfert
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State v. Pace, 447 S.E.2d 186 (S.C. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
48 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: John M. Burgess v. Katherine C. Hunter (scctapp, 2022-02-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John M. Burgess v. Katherine C. Hunter
S.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (finding an issue preserved for appellate review even though the attorney failed to object because the tone and tenor of the trial court's remarks rendered an objection futile and the trial court made the prejudicial remarks about the attorney's gender on the record and in front of the jury). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Sherley
S.C. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Therefore, we hold Sherley failed to preserve this issue for appellate review, and we affirm his conviction and sentence pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Smith, 337 S.C. 27, 32 , 522 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1999) ("A ruling in limine is not final; unless an objection is made at the time the evidence is offered and a final ruling procured, the issue is not preserved for review."); State v. Wiles, 383 S.C. 151, 156 , 679 S.E.2d 172, 175 (2009) ("There is an exception to this general rule when a ruling on the motion in limine is made 'immediately prior to the intro…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Davis (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
State v. Pace , 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (citing Canon 3, CJC, Rule 501, SCACR).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Thomason
S.C. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994).
discussed Cited "see" Langford v. Stirling (2×)
D.S.C. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (finding appellant did not waive an objection by not presenting it to circuit court because it would have been futile to do so). 7 trial." S.C.
discussed Cited "see" Langford v. Stirling (2×)
D.S.C. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (finding appellant did not waive an objection by not presenting it to circuit court because it would have been futile to do so). 7 trial." S.C.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Gaskins (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (holding, where the tone and tenor of the trial judge's remarks concerning defense counsel's gender and conduct were such that any objection would have been futile, defense counsel's failure to raise an objection did not amount to waiver of the issue of the propriety of the judge's comments concerning defense counsel).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Langford (2×)
S.C. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (finding appellant did not waive an objection by not presenting it to circuit court because it would have been futile to do so). .
examined Cited "see" State v. Covert (4×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (finding “[a]s to counsel’s failure to raise an objection, the tone and tenor of the trial judge’s remarks concerning her gender and conduct were such that any objection would have been futile.”); State v. Higgenbottom, 344 S.C. 11 , 542 S.E.2d 718 (2001) (employing the futility doctrine).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Passmore (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (finding “[a]s to counsel’s failure to raise an objection, the tone and tenor of the trial judge’s remarks concerning her gender and conduct were such that any objection would have been futile.”); State v. Higgenbot *585 tom, 344 S.C. 11 , 542 S.E.2d 718 (2001) (employing futility doctrine).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Pauling (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
While we recognize the foregoing as the general rule, we allow this rule to be relaxed “where the tone and tenor of the trial judge’s remarks are such that any objection would have been futile.” State v. Thomason , 355 S.C. 278, 289 , 584 S.E.2d 143, 148 (Ct. App. 2003); see also State v. Pace , 316 S.C. 71 , 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (“As to counsel’s failure to raise an objection, the tone and tenor of the trial judge’s remarks concerning her gender and conduct were such that any objection would have been futile.”).
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Humphries (4×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See State v. Wilson, 337 S.C. 629 , 524 S.E.2d 411 (Ct.App.1999), rev'd on other grounds by, State v. Wilson, 345 *440 S.C. 1, 545 S.E.2d 827 (holding that a contemporaneous objection to the introduction of testimonial evidence was not required to preserve the issue for appellate review where the trial court made its final evidentiary ruling following an in camera hearing); see also State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 447 S.E.2d 186 (1994) (excusing the failure to make a contemporaneous objection where the judge's comments are such that any objection would be futile).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Jones (2×)
S.C. · 2001 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 447 S.E.2d 186 (1994)(new trial ordered where judge’s comments on counsel’s age and gender impugned counsel’s credibility in jury’s eyes); State v. Simmons, 267 S.C. 479 , 229 S.E.2d 597 (1976)(new trial where judge threatened defense counsel with jail because conduct affected jury’s view of counsel’s credibility).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. McDaniel (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
So long as the judge had an opportunity to rule on an issue, and did so, it was “not incumbent upon defense counsel to harass the judge by parading the issue before him again.” Dunn v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 S.C. 43, 46 , 426 S.E. (2d) 756, 758 (1993); see also State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71 , 447 S.E. (2d) 186 (1994) (counsel’s failure to object did not waive issue where trial judge’s remarks were such that any objections would have been futile).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The STATE, Respondent
v.
Beondi Clifford PACE, Petitioner
24108.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jul 5, 1994.
447 S.E.2d 186
Chief Atty. Daniel T. Stacey, of SC Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for petitioner., Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, and Asst. Atty. Gen. Rakale B. Smith, Columbia; Solicitor Charles Molony Condon, North Charleston, for respondent., Sue C. Erwin, of South Carolina Women Lawyers Ass’n, for amicus curiae.
Chandler, Finney, Toal, Moore, Bristow.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
Per Curiam:

We granted certiorari to review Petitioner’s (Pace) conviction for grand larceny as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. [1]

We reverse.

FACTS

At trial, defense counsel asked Mr. Brown, a witness for the prosecution, “Do you have a criminal record?” The judge sus[*73] tained the prosecution’s objection, stating the question was “highly improper,” then sent the jury to its room.

In camera, the judge chastised defense counsel that such a broad question amounted to a “fishing expedition,” since counsel had no knowledge of any prior record against Mr. Brown. [2] During his admonishment of counsel, the judge continuously referred to her as a “nice girl” and a “pretty girl.” Thereafter, evidence was introduced establishing Mr. Brown’s prior conviction for petty larceny, a crime of moral turpitude for which he could be impeached.

Upon the jury’s return to the courtroom, the judge made the following statement:

The Court: All right. Now let me say what happened in this last thing and I’m going to let it calm down here. But, the question was asked, does he have a criminal record. Counsel had admitted that she did not know, it was a pitch in the dark, which is improper. And she’s sorry, she’s apologized to the Court.
However, I ask — because the procedure is always, I think he’s entitled to know that she doesn’t have that information. So the Public Defender’s normally, what they have to do is ask the Solicitor because they got the computer. It don’t take but two or five minutes. So all they got to do is ask. Whatever, ask me and I’ll see they got it there ain’t no question about it. Because they’re entitled to know. And as it turns out I think we can stipulate, is this agreeable? I hate to fuss at a pretty girl, fuss at an old man, but a pretty girl I hate to fuss. But it was a kind of below the belt shot. But she was doing the best, she thought. But anyhow as she gains experience — if they don’t give it to her all she does have to do is ask me, and I certainly will. And she hasn’t asked the Solicitor, anyhow. It was a shot in the dark which implies wrongdoing.
* * * * * *
So don’t hold it against her, she’s a nice girl. I was young once myself, I put it to plain inexperience or whatever, but you’ll get over it as you learn. So don’t hold it against her. She’s a nice girl.

[*74] The Court of Appeals, although holding that these comments were inappropriate, concluded no prejudicial error resulted. Moreover, as a procedural ground, the Court noted counsel’s failure to object at trial to the judge’s comments. We granted certiorari.

ISSUE

Is Pace entitled to a new trial based upon the comments made by the trial judge concerning defense counsel?

DISCUSSION

Pace contends that the remarks in question deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.

The trial judge must act with absolute impartiality in the performance of judicial duties. Canon 3 of Rule 501, SCACR. Reference by a trial judge to an attorney’s age, gender, or competence are improper and constitute reversible error upon a showing of prejudice to the defendant. State v. Mitchell, 261 S.C. 452, 200 S.E. (2d) 448 (1973) (Justices Brailsford and Bussey, dissenting); State v. Simmons, 267 S.C. 479, 229 S.E. (2d) 597 (1976).

Here, the judge commented to the jury upon the attorney’s age and gender. As the dissent stated in State v. Mitchell, supra, “[t]he remarks of the court tended to impugn the credibility of counsel and to diminish him and his defense of appellant in the eyes of the jury.” 261 S.C. at 461, 200 S.E. (2d) at 453. Prejudice to Pace is evident on this record since his attorney’s credibility was crucial to his defense of alibi. We hold that these remarks undermined counsel’s ability to effectively represent her client and constituted reversible error.

As to counsel’s failure to raise an objection, the tone and tenor of the trial judge’s remarks concerning her gender and conduct were such that any objection would have been futile. Accordingly, we find no waiver of this issue. Cf Dunn v. Charleston Coca-Cola Bottling, — S.C. —, 426 S.E. (2d) 726 (1993).

We reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

/s/ A. Lee Chandler A.C.J. /s/ Ernest A. Finney. Jr. A.J. [*75] /s/ Jean H. Toal A.J. /s/ James E. Moore A.J. /s/ Walter J. Bristow. Jr. A.A.J.
1

State v. Pace, — S.C. —, 425 S.E. (2d) 73 (Ct. App. 1992).

2

See State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 253 S.E. (2d) 103 (1979).