green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
4.0 score
“litigant is not denied due process by either the "appearance" of partiality or by circumstances which might lead one to speculate as to a judge's impartiality. a litigant is denied due process if he is in fact treated unfairly.”
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982
2004
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited "but see"
Russell Earl Nichols v. George Sullivan
litigant is not denied due process by either the "appearance" of partiality or by circumstances which might lead one to speculate as to a judge's impartiality. a litigant is denied due process if he is in fact treated unfairly.
discussed
Cited "see"
Pompano-Windy City Partners, Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co.
In fact, the caselaw is consistent in holding that “a seller of options, like plaintiff, is not a purchaser.” Panek v. Bogucz, 718 F.Supp. 1228, 1231 (D.N.J.1989); accord Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194, 1196 (6th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 455 U.S. 909 , 102 S.Ct. 1256 , 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Cullather, 678 F.Supp. 601, 605-06 (E.D.Va.1987); cf. Mix v. E.F.
cited
Cited "see"
Bonelli v. Bonelli
See Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 301 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 , 102 S. Ct. 1256 , 71 L.
discussed
Cited "see"
Wesco Products Co. And Donald Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., and Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
(2×)
See Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 295 (7th Cir.1981), cert. den. 455 U.S. 909 , 102 S.Ct. 1256 , 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982).
discussed
Cited "see"
Mix v. EF Hutton & Co., Inc.
See Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194, 1196 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 , 102 S.Ct. 1256 , 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982) (“It is clear that an option writer sells the right to purchase [or sell] securities and is not purchasing anything.”); Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Cullather, 678 F.Supp. 601, 605-06 (E.D.
discussed
Cited "see"
Motor Carriers Labor Advisory Council v. Trucking Management, Inc.
The equal representation requirement was designed primarily to limit “possible abuse by union officers of the power which they might achieve if welfare funds were left solely to their sole control.” Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 426 , 79 S.Ct. 864, 868 , 3 L.Ed.2d 915 (1959); see National Stabilization Agreement of Sheetmetal Industry Trust Fund v. Commercial Roofing & Sheetmetal, 655 F.2d 1218 , 1223 & n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 , 102 S.Ct. 1256 , 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); Denver Metropolitan Association of Plumbing, Heating, Cooling Contractors v. Journeyman Pl…
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. John M. Murphy
(2×)
See Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 , 102 S.Ct. 1256 , 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982) (appearance of impropriety, and perhaps even actual impropriety, may not be raised for the first time on collateral attack); Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 , 97 S.Ct. 81 , 50 L.Ed.2d 88 (1976) (when the trial is “impeccably fair and just” an erroneous failure to recuse is harmless error), A judicial impropriety serious enough, and secret enough, to escape everyone’s notice before trial probably also would be serious en…
cited
Cited "see"
Pamela Lea Maier v. Verne Orr, Secretary of the Air Force
See Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 , 102 S.Ct. 1256 , 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
FOUNDATION INTERN. v. ET Ige Const.
(Emphasis added.) It has been held that communications regarding the content of orders would be vacated only if the process used by the judge was "fundamentally unfair." See In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 276 (11th Cir.1987) ("orders [drafted by a party litigant] will be vacated only if a party can demonstrate that the process by which the judge arrived at them was fundamentally unfair"); see also Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 296 (7th Cir.1981) ("A litigant is denied the fundamental fairness to which he [or she] is constitutionally entitled if the judge of his [or her] case is unfa…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Foundation International, Inc. v. E.T. Ige Construction, Inc.
(Emphasis added.) It has been held that communications regarding the content of orders would be vacated only if the process used by the judge was “fundamentally unfair.” See In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 276 (11th Cir.1987) (“orders [drafted by a party litigant] will be vacated only if a party can demonstrate that the process by which the judge arrived at them was fundamentally unfair”); see also Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 296 (7th Cir.1981) (“A litigant is denied the fundamental fairness to which he [or she] is constitutionally entitled if the judge of his [or her] ca…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Cronson v. Clark
But that alone would not be a sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 1585 ; see also Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 297 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 , 102 S.Ct. 1256 , 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Leff v. Cip Corp.
See also Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194, 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1256 , 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); Gilman v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Gutter
v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
No. 81-965.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 18, 1982.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
Citer courts: Tenth Circuit (1)
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.