green
Positive treatment
4.6 score
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
Kelli Lyn Metz, and v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and Cross-Appellee
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 states in pertinent part that: (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 9 ."In this circuit, a change in relevant case law by the United States Supreme Court warrants relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6)." Adams v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d at…
discussed
Cited "see"
Robert R. Wisdom Nancy J. Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, of Poplar Bluff Jerry F. McLane Jerry Dorton Joey McLane
See American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., 763 F.Supp. 1473, 1497 (D.Minn.1991) (finding no private right of action under extortion statute which is “purely criminal in nature”), affd and remanded, American Computer Trust Leasing v. Boerboom Int’l, Inc., 967 F.2d 1208 , 1214 (8th Cir.) (“[W]e affirm the district court’s order in all respects.”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 956 , 113 S.Ct. 414 , 121 L.Ed.2d 338 (1992); Peterson v. Philadelphia Stock Exch., 717 F.Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.Pa.1989) (finding no legislative intent from the statute or its legislative history…
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Brown
Under rule 60(b)(6), the court can relieve a party from “a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... any ... reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Generally, only “extraordinary situations” justify relief under rule 60(b)(6), particularly those in which relief from judgment “is appropriate to accomplish justice.” Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir.1958); see Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 962 F.2d 1528 , 1533 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 956 , 113 S.Ct. 414 , 121 L.Ed.2d 337 (1992).
discussed
Cited "see"
Masepohl v. American Tobacco Co., Inc.
See American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., 763 F.Supp. 1473, 1486 (D.Minn.1991), aff'd, 967 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 956 , 113 S.Ct. 414 , 121 L.Ed.2d 338 (1992).
discussed
Cited "see"
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah
See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 642 F.2d 578, 584-85 (D.C.Cir.1980) (district court has ‘no power to reconsider issues laid to rest’ on prior appeal).” Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 962 F.2d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 956 , 113 S.Ct. 414 , 121 L.Ed.2d 337 (1992).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Telles
See People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178, 1190 (Cal.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 414 (1992).
discussed
Cited "see"
Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.
A telephone conversation, however, is a wire communication. 28 Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527 , 1534 & n. 14 (5th Cir.1994), appeal pending, No. 93-4829 (1994); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir.1980) (same); Axselle, 604 F.2d at 1334 (“We feel it clear that the telephone communication in question here was a wire communication within the meaning of the Act.”); United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 349 (10th Cir.1974) (“The subject telephone conversation clearly qualified as a ‘wire communication’ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1).”); Hall, 488 F.2d at …
discussed
Cited "see"
Karara v. University of Denver
See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 962 F.2d 1528 , 1533 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 414 (1992); Van Skiver, 952 at 1244 (quoting Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir.1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Saldana v. State
(2×)
See People v. Otto, 2 Cal.4th 1088 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 596 , 831 P.2d 1178 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 414 , 121 L.Ed.2d 338 (1992) (holding in a murder case, improper wire tapping of telephone calls between the victim's wife and her lover, recorded by the victim before his death, required reversal for suppression).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Capell
See, e.g., Scheib, 22 F.3d at 151 (citing Anonymous for proposition that a custodial parent may tape a minor child's telephone conversations). [11] See note 8. [12] The court first distinguished the action from one involving spouses, stating that interspousal wiretapping was "qualitatively different from a custodial parent tapping a minor child's conversations within the family home." The court did not offer any explanation as to the nature of that "qualitative difference." [13] Neither Newcomb nor Heggy attempted to distinguish or, for that matter, mentioned another Tenth Circuit decision, Un…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Colorado Interstate Corporation Colorado Interstate Gas Company v. The Cit Group/equipment Financing, Inc.
See, e.g., American Computer v. Jack Farrell Implement, 763 F.Supp. 1473 , 1484 n. 9 (D.Minn.1991), aff'd, 967 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 414 , 121 L.Ed.2d 338 (1992); Philadelphia Sav.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Benning
v.
Iowa
v.
Iowa
No. 92-509.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 2, 1992.
Published
Sup. Ct. Iowa. Cer-tiorari denied.