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Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Orozco
(2×)
See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614 , 625 P.2d 123 (1981); but cf. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992) (Virginia statute requiring all convicted felons to submit blood samples for DNA analysis for future law enforcement purposes is valid under Fourth Amendment); State v. Olivas, 122 Wash.2d 73 , 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (rejecting Fourth Amendment-based challenge to Washington statute requiring blood samples for DNA analysis of certain convicted offenders). [4] Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in par…
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Raines
(2×)
See Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 (holding that, while more invasive than fingerprinting, that a blood test to obtain DNA was still a minor intrusion), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 , 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992); Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560 (upholding the Oregon DNA collection law prior to, as previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit's Kincade opinion, which, although it impliedly overruled Rise , subsequently was vacated by the Ninth Circuit, that, as stated previously, has yet to render a decision on rehearing en banc, and stating “[t]hat the gathering of DNA information requires the drawing of …
cited
Cited "see"
Deblasio v. Johnson
See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 , 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992).
discussed
Cited "see"
Commonwealth v. Ragan
See Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877 , 884-85 & n. 13 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 , 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992) (citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 , 111 S.Ct. 2491 , 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) for the proposition that, in cases involving offenses on a ladder, a violation of federal due process that occurs when a trial court refuses to charge the offense at the bottom rung, is harmless, provided that the jury returns a guilty verdict for an offense higher up rather than for an intermediate offense which was also charged).
discussed
Cited "see"
Turner v. Commonwealth
(2×)
See Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877 , 885 n. 13 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 , 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992) (declining to apply Matthews, recognizing that Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 , 111 S.Ct. 2491 , 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), had overruled it).
discussed
Cited "see"
Kitze v. Commonwealth
(2×)
See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 , 310 n. 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 , 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992). 1 Similarly, a potential contempt violation for failure to abide by the trial court’s sentencing order, which could lead to a reimposition of any suspended jail time and a revocation of parole and probation rights, is prospective.
discussed
Cited "see"
Rise v. Oregon
See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992). 3 Oregon’s statute, narrower than Virginia’s, applying only to certain classes of felons, bears a rational relationship to the public’s interest in identifying and prosecuting murderers and sexual offenders.
discussed
Cited "see"
Rise v. State of Oregon
See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992). 3 Oregon's statute, narrower than Virginia's, applying only to certain classes of felons, bears a rational relationship to the public's interest in identifying and prosecuting murderers and sexual offenders.
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Olivas
See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 L.Ed.2d 378 , 113 S.Ct. 472 (1992).
discussed
Cited "see"
Thomas C. Ramseur v. Howard C. Beyer, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, Robert Del Tufo, New Jersey Attorney General
(2×)
See Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877, 889 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992). 95 The analysis I am suggesting finds support in our case law in which in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 , following federal convictions, we limit remedies for constitutional violations to the problem at hand but go no further.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Dial v. Vaughn
(2×)
Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 , 94 S.Ct. 2532 , 41 L.Ed.2d 383 (1974); see also Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 , 113 S.Ct. 472 , 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992) (stating that parole eligibility is a facet of the sentence imposed).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jones
v.
Murray, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections
v.
Murray, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections
No. 92-5870.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 9, 1992.
Cited by 3 opinions | Published
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.