Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). · Go Syfert
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Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
210 citation events (106 in the last 25 years) across 37 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Austin (tenn, 2002-09-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Under fire — who is questioning this case
Citations from separate opinions of courts that could overrule this case. This is a warning signal, not a treatment change. The flag color above is unaffected.
Concurrence Dunn v. Madison (2017)
“Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 , 1046, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (memorandum respecting denial of certiorari).”
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Austin
Tenn. · 2002 · confidence medium
Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 , 115 S.Ct. at 1421 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of *486 certiorari).
examined Cited as authority (rule) People v. Simms (4×) also: Cited "see"
Ill. · 2000 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d at 305 , 115 S. Ct. at 1421-22 (Stevens, J., mem. op. on denial of cert.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Simms (2×)
Ill. · 2000 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d at 305, 115 S. Ct. at 1421-22 (Stevens, J., mem. op. on denial of cert .).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Barnett
Cal. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
On denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a memorandum expressing the view that Lackey’s claim, though novel, was “not without foundation.” ( 514 U.S. 1045 .) Justice Stevens, however, indicated there were questions concerning what portion of the 17-year delay should be considered in the analysis and whether some of the delay should be attributable to Lackey’s abuse of the system. (514 U.S. at p. 1047 [115 S.Ct. at p. 1422].) In closing, Justice Stevens remarked that the denial of certiorari was not a ruling on the merits and characterized Lackey’s cla…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Barnett
Cal. · 1998 · confidence medium
On denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a memorandum expressing the view that Lackey's claim, though novel, was "not without foundation." ( 514 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 .) Justice Stevens, however, indicated there were questions concerning what portion of the 17-year delay should be considered in the analysis and whether some of the *212 delay should be attributable to Lackey's abuse of the system. (514 U.S. at p. 1047, 115 S.Ct. at p. 1422.) In closing, Justice Stevens remarked that the denial of certiorari was not a ruling on the merits a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 557, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1135 Jose Jesus Ceja, an Individual v. Terry Stewart, Director of Arizona Department of Corrections Donald Wawrzaszek, Superintendent of Arizona State Prison (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Justices Stevens and Breyer have confirmed that his claim has merit, writing, "It is arguable that neither ground retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a sentence of death." Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 , 115 S.Ct. at 1421 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ceja v. Stewart (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Justices Stevens and Breyer have confirmed that his claim has merit, writing, “It is arguable that neither ground retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a sentence of death.” Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 , 115 S.Ct. at 1421 (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Smith
Mont. · 1996 · confidence medium
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a memorandum with the denial of certiorari, writing that Lackey's claim was "not without foundation." Lackey, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1421.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stafford v. State
Okla. Crim. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Lackey, _ U.S. at _, 115 S.Ct. at 1421, 131 L.Ed.2d at 304; Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. (Tx.) June 18, 1995); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. (Mont.) 1995), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 115 S.Ct. 1840 , 131 L.Ed.2d 846 (1995); Turner v. Jabe (unpublished) 1995 WL 324034 (4th Cir. (Va.) May 24, 1995). 20 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Duncan Peder McKenzie Jr. v. Rick Day, Director, Department of Corrections and Human Services (9×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
On that same day, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Lackey, Justice Stevens' memorandum discussing the viability of the Lackey claim was issued, with Justice Breyer noting his agreement that the claim was "important and undecided." --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1421.
cited Cited "see" Al-Baluchi v. Esper
D.C. Cir. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See id . at 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421 .
discussed Cited "see" Roybal v. Davis
S.D. Cal. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 998-99 (9th Cir.2010) (“[A] state court considering [Petitioner’s] Eighth Amendment claim at the time his conviction became final would not have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule sought was required by the Constitution.”) In support of his argument, Petitioner relies upon an 1890 United States Supreme Court decision stating that “when a prisoner sentenced by a court to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during that ti…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Sparks
La. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackey, 115 S.Ct. at 1422 (Stevens, J.) (There may be constitutional significance to the reasons for various delays and it may be appropriate to distinguish “among delays resulting from (a) a petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate exercise of his right to review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the State.”) Although this case had been pending for twenty-three years before defendant perfected his appeal in this Court, much of that delay was attributable to defendant’s litigation in multiple jur…
cited Cited "see" Gardner v. State
Utah · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (Stevens, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Emerson
Ill. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari ); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 , 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2763 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 391 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (discussing the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty for rape).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Grandmaison
1st Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
Id. at 710-11, 109 S.Ct. at 1447-48 ; see United States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1236-37 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (mail fraud generally includes incidental use of the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud).
discussed Cited "see" 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1320, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2038 William George Bonin v. Arthur Calderon, Warden, (Two Cases). William George Bonin v. Arthur Calderon, Warden
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 1465 (rejecting argument that death row prisoner failed to raise Lackey v. Texas, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995), claim in first habeas petition because it lacked merit).
discussed Cited "see" Bonin v. Calderon
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 1465 (rejecting argument that death row prisoner failed to raise Lackey v. Texas, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995), claim in first habeas petition because it lacked merit).
discussed Cited "see" Raleigh Porter v. Harry K. Singletary, Jr.
11th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackey v. Texas, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (Stevens, J.) (Memorandum respecting denial of certiorari on Eighth Amendment claim of petitioner who had spent 17 years on death row): Porter has not otherwise explained the. cause of the delays in his case.
cited Cited "see" Lackey v. Scott
W.D. Tex. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Memorandum Respecting Denial of Certiorari, Lackey v. Texas, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995).
discussed Cited "see" Porter v. State
Fla. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackey v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J. respecting denial of certiorari) (similar issue); Hitchcock v. State, 578 So.2d 685 (Fla. 1990), reversed on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 3020 , 120 L.Ed.2d 892 (1992).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Maria Alfaro v. Deborah Johnson
9th Cir. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id. at 1372 , 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 195 , 355 P.3d 384 ; see also Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (Stevens, J., mem. op. respecting denial of cert.).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Jones v. Chappell
C.D. Cal. · 2014 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (17 years of delay); Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.2010) (25 years of delay).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brice v. State
Del. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
Sometimes such an order reflects nothing more than a conclusion that a particular case may not constitute an appropriate forum in which to decide a significant issue.”) (citation omitted); see also Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (Mem.) (Stevens, J.) (“Often a denial of certio-rari on a novel issue will permit the state and federal courts to 'serve as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court.’ ”) (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 , 103 S.Ct. 2438 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1983)). 4 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Douglas Edward Gretzler v. Terry L. Stewart, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections
9th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (Stevens, J. dissenting from denial of certio-rari) where petitioner had been on death row 17 years.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Janecka v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Lackey v. Texas, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1421 , 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924 (4th Cir.1995); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1840 , 131 L.Ed.2d 846 (1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Willie Lloyd Turner v. John Jabe, Warden
4th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Lackey, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1421-22 (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting the denial of cer-tiorari) (discussing, for example, how the claim is supported by the plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), as well as the dissenting opinions of Lords Scarman and Bright-man in Riley, supra).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lackey
v.
Texas
No. 94-8262.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 27, 1995.
514 U.S. 1045
Breyer, Issue, Stevens, That, Undecided.
Cited by 157 opinions  |  Published

Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Memorandum of

Justice Stevens,

respecting the denial of certiorari.

Petitioner raises the question whether executing a prisoner who has already spent some 17 years on death row violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Though the importance and novelty of the question presented by this certiorari petition are sufficient to warrant review by this Court, those factors also provide a principled basis for postponing consideration of the issue until after it has been addressed by other courts. See, e. g., McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961 (1983) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).

Though novel, petitioner’s claim is not without foundation. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), this Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit capital punishment. Our decision rested in large part on the grounds that (1) the death penalty was considered permissible by the Framers, see id., at 177 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), and (2) the death penalty might serve “two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence,” id., at 183.

It is arguable that neither ground retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a sentence of death. Such a delay, if it ever occurred, certainly would have been rare in 1789, and thus the practice of the Framers would not justify a denial of petitioner’s claim. Moreover, after such an extended time, the acceptable state interest in retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe punishment already inflicted. Over a century ago, this Court recognized that “when a prisoner sentenced by a court to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the whole of it.” In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 172 (1890).[*1046] If the Court accurately described the effect of uncertainty in Medley, which involved a period of four weeks, see ibid., that description should apply with even greater force in the case of delays that last for many years.* Finally, the additional deterrent effect from an actual execution now, on the one hand, as compared to 17 years on death row followed by the prisoner’s continued incarceration for life, on the other, seems minimal. See, e. g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U. S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“[T]he deterrent value of incarceration during that period of uncertainty may well be comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step itself”). As Justice White noted, when the death penalty “ceases realistically to further these purposes, ... its imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 312 (1972) (opinion concurring in judgment); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 183 (“[T]he sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering”).

Petitioner’s argument draws further strength from conclusions by English jurists that “execution after inordinate delay would[*1047] have infringed the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments to be found in section 10 of the Bill of Rights 1689.” Riley v. Attorney General of Jamaica, [1988] 1 A. C. 719, 734, 3 All E. R. 469, 478 (R C. 1983) (Lord Scarman, dissenting, joined by Lord Brightman). As we have previously recognized, that section is undoubtedly the precursor of our own Eighth Amendment. See, e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 169-170; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 966 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

Finally, as petitioner notes, the highest courts in other countries have found arguments such as petitioner’s to be persuasive. See Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A. C. 1, 4 All E. R. 769 (R C. 1993) (en banc); id., at 32-33, 4 All E. R., at 785-786 (collecting cases).

Closely related to the basic question presented by the petition is a question concerning the portion of the 17-year delay that should be considered in the analysis. There may well be constitutional significance to the reasons for the various delays that have occurred in petitioner’s case. It may be appropriate to distinguish, for example, among delays resulting from (a) a petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate exercise of his right to review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the State. Thus, though English cases indicate that the prisoner should not be held responsible for delays occurring in the latter two categories, see id., at 33, 4 All E. R., at 786, it is at least arguable that some portion of the time that has elapsed since this petitioner was first sentenced to death in 1978 should be excluded from the calculus.

As I have pointed out on past occasions, the Court’s denial of certiorari does not constitute a ruling on the merits. See, e. g., Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U. S. 1184 (1995); Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U. S. 940, 942 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). Often, a denial of certiorari on a novel issue will permit the state and federal courts to “serve as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court.” McCray v. New York, 461 U. S., at 963. Petitioner’s claim, with its legal complexity and its potential for far-reaching consequences, seems an ideal example of one which would benefit from such further study.

Justice Breyer agrees with Justice Stevens that the issue is an important undecided one.

See also People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P. 2d 880, 894 (1972) (“The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only in the execution itself and the pain incident thereto, but also in the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution during which the judicial and administrative procedures essential to due process of law are carried out. Penologists and medical experts agree that the process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture”) (footnote omitted); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 288-289 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long wait between the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death”); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“In the history of murder, the onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon”); Suffolk County District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 673, 411 N. E. 2d 1274, 1287 (1980) (Braucher, J., concurring) (death penalty is unconstitutional under State Constitution in part because “[i]t will be carried out only after agonizing months and years of uncertainty”); id., at 675-686, 411 N. E. 2d, at 1289-1295 (Liacos, J., concurring).