green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
4.6 score
“jury's failure to decide an issue will be treated as an implied acquittal only where the jury's verdict necessarily resolves an issue in the defendant's favor.”
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Commonwealth v. Ray
jury's failure to decide an issue will be treated as an implied acquittal only where the jury's verdict necessarily resolves an issue in the defendant's favor.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. McDermott
See United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 85 (4th Cir.) ("The jury's failure to check a predicate act does not constitute an implied acquittal of that act."), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 513 (1995); Schiro v. Farley, 114 S.Ct. 783, 792 (1994) (although in some circumstances, jury silence is tantamount to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, "[t]he failure to return a verdict does not have collateral estoppel effect ... unless the record establishes that the issue was actually and necessarily decided in the defendant's favor.").
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Terwilliger
Put differently, courts will ‘‘imply an acquittal [if] a convic- tion of one crime logically excludes guilt of another crime.’’ Commonwealth v. Carlino, supra, 449 Mass. 78 ; compare Terry v. Potter, supra, 111 F.3d 458–60 (declining to follow Second Circuit’s decision in Follette and appearing to limit implied acquittals to lesser included offenses, and holding that jury’s guilty verdict of murder under ‘‘wanton murder’’—or reckless—statu- tory alternative, ‘‘can be interpreted’’ as implied acquit- tal as to intentional murder alternative on which jury was si…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Nelson v. State
See, e.g., Dalton v. State, 216 Ga.App. 411 , 454 S.E.2d 554 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 986 , 116 S.Ct. 513 , 133 L.Ed.2d 422 (1995); State v. Casal, 410 So.2d 152, 155 (Fla.1982), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 821 , 103 S.Ct. 50 , 74 L.Ed.2d 56 (1982), and cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 637 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983) (lawful under Fourth Amendment).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Love v. Morton
See, e.g., United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 83 (4th Cir.) ("[A] defendant impliedly consents to a mistrial if the defendant had an opportunity to object to the mistrial but fails to do so.”), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 513 , 133 L.Ed.2d 422 (1995); United States v. Nichols, 977 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.1992) ("When the defendant ... does not object timely to the declaration of a mistrial, his double jeopardy claim may be vitiated by his consent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 833 , 114 S.Ct. 106 , 126 L.Ed.2d 72 (1993); United States v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6, 9…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Paul Henry Fells
When an offense is begun in one district and completed in another, venue is proper in any district in which the offense was “begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (a); see also, United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, 158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 513 , 133 L.Ed.2d 422 (1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Hansen
v.
Mississippi
v.
Mississippi
No. 94-9617.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 27, 1995.
Cited by 2 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Kentucky (1)
Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.