In Re Green, 141 U.S. 325 (1891). · Go Syfert
In Re Green, 141 U.S. 325 (1891). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
105 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 35 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: LeBlanc v. Salem (ca1, 1999-11-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1904 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1904 1965 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) LeBlanc v. Salem (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
1st Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the act does not deprive any one of the right to sue where such right previously existed, but gives such right in certain cases....
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) J.L.B. Equities, Inc. v. Dumont
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1998 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
liability of receivers for acts done by them in the management of property placed in their custody by order of a court is official, and not personal
cited Cited as authority (rule) Riley v. Decoulos (In Re American Bridge Products, Inc.)
Bankr. D. Mass. · 2005 · confidence medium
Id. at 331-32 , 12 S.Ct. at 13 (emphasis added). 182 B.R. at 216 (footnote omitted). 318 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Schechter v. Illinois, Department of Revenue (In Re Markos Gurnee Partnership)
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 1995 · confidence medium
Id. at 331-2 , 12 S.Ct. at 13 (emphasis added).
examined Cited "see" Medical Development International v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See McNulta, 141 U.S. at 331-32 , 12 S.Ct. 11 (“If actions were brought against the receivership generally, or against the corporation by name, ‘in the hands of or ‘in the possession of a receiver, without stating the name of the individual, it would more accurately represent the character or status of the defendant.”), id. at 332 , 12 S.Ct. 11 (“Actions against the receiver are in law actions against the receivership....
cited Cited "see" Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Curiale
S.D.N.Y. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 332 , 12 S.Ct. 11, 13 , 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891).
cited Cited "see" Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Tsinos
E.D.N.Y · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327 , 12 S.Ct. 11 , 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891); Federal Deposit Ins.
discussed Cited "see" Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bernstein (2×)
E.D.N.Y · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 332 , 12 S.Ct. 11, 13 , 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891); Goff v. Will County Natl.
discussed Cited "see" Alfonso Valdes v. Jose M. Feliciano, Trustee
1st Cir. · 1959 · signal: accord · confidence high
Co., 1946, 328 U.S. 134, 138 , 66 S.Ct. 937, 941 , 90 L.Ed. 1132 ; accord, McNulta v. Lochridge, 1891, 141 U.S. 327 , 12 S.Ct. 11 , 35 L.Ed. 796 ; Kennison v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., D.C.Minn.1940, 38 F.Supp. 980 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Considine v. Murphy
Ga. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 327, 330 ( 12 SCt 11 , 35 LE 796) (1891) (discussing the “general and familiar principle of law” that receivers may not be sued without prior leave of the court that appointed them); Bugg v. Consolidated Grocery Co., 155 Ga. 550, 555 ( 118 SE 56 ) (1923) (explaining that “the general rule for generations has been that receivers are not subject to suits of any kind, unless the court which appointed him would grant leave for such suit to be entered”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Considine v. Murphy
Ga. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 327, 330 ( 12 SCt 11 , 35 LE 796) (1891) (discussing the “general and familiar principle of law” that receivers may not be sued without prior leave of the court that appointed them); Bugg v. Consolidated Grocery Co., 155 Ga. 550, 555 ( 118 SE 56 ) (1923) (explaining that “the general rule for generations has been that receivers are not subject to suits of any kind, unless the court which appointed him would grant leave for such suit to be entered”). 6 This rule, sometimes called the “Barton doctrine,” remains a matter of subject matter juris…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lassman v. Reilly (In Re Feeley)
Bankr. D. Mass. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
Although a bankruptcy trustee enjoys an immunity vis-a-vis third parties for actions within the scope of his official duties, see Ziegler v. Pitney, 139 F.2d 595, 596 (2d Cir.1943); see also McNulta, 141 U.S. at 332, 12 S.Ct. 11 , 35 L.Ed. 796 (applying this principle to a court-appointed receiver), that immunity neither extends to ultra vires acts, see Leonard v. Vrooman, 383 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir.1967), nor protects the trustee against claims for breach of fiduciary duty, see Mosser, 341 U.S. at 271, 274 , 71 S.Ct. 680 , 95 L.Ed. 927 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ex Parte Buder
SCOTUS · 1926 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare In re Green, 141 U. S. 325 ; Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U. S. 115 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ex Parte Buder
SCOTUS · 1926 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare In re Green, 141 U.S. 325 ; Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U.S. 115 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re GREEN
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 19, 1891.
141 U.S. 325
Mr. B. W. Perkins, on behalf of the petitioner, presented the petition, together with a brief by him in support of it.
Eield, Gray.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #48,895 of 633,719
Citer courts: First Circuit (1) · New Jersey Superior Court App … (1)
Mr. Justice Eield

. delivered the opinion of the court.

' It appears from the petition of the applicant, which he asks leave to file, that he has been disbarred, from .the practice of law as an attorney and .counsellor, in the courts of Colorado by order of the Supreme Coiirt of that State, and he prays for[*326] a writ of mandamus from this court commanding the judges of that court to restore him to his office and to vacate the order óf disbarment.

The ground of the disbarment, as shown by the petition and the opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado, to which it refers, was vituperative and denunciatory language used by the applicant in the pleadings in a suit brought in the Circuit Court of the United States respecting the conduct of a judge of the Superior Court of the city of Denver, Colorado, in certain proceedings had before him, and respecting the conduct of counsel therein, amounting to charges of corruption and bribery on their part in that suit, which the Supreme Court of the State found to be unwarranted by any evidence and prompted by the malice of the applicant. That court, so far as the charges against the judge of the Superior Court were concerned, evidently proceeded upon the- opinion that the obligation of attorneys and counsellors imposed upon them from their office was, among other things, to observe at all times, both in their manner and language, the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers; and. that insulting and defamatory language, prompted by malice, respecting their conduct in court, was a breach of that obligation, for which they could properly be disbarred. It declared that the attorney’s privilege does not permit him to enter the courts and spread- upon the judicial records charges of a shocking and felonious character against brother attorneys,- and against judges engaged in the administration of justice, upon mere rumors coupled with facts which should of themselves create no suspicion of official corruption in a just and fair mind. The applicant affirms that the order of disbarment was unwarranted, arbitrary, tyrannical and oppressive, and asks the interposition of this court by mandamus for his relief.

We cannot give him the aid he seeks by that writ,: whatever may be the ground upon which the state court proceeded, and in whatever light its action may be regarded. A writ of mandamus can only .be issued from this court in aid of its .appellate jurisdictión, except in a few enumerated cases, not embracing the one before us. The Judiciary Act of 1789,[*327] adopted at the first session of Congress, after declaring that the Supreme Court should "have appellate jurisdiction from the Circuit Courts and courts of the several States, in certain cases,. provided that it should have power to issue writs of mandamus in cases, warranted by the principles and usages of law, f< to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.” And the Revised Statutés (§ 688) reenacted this- provision in a modified form, without. removing the limitation as to the courts to which and the officers to. whom it may issue. If the applicant has any remedy in this court for his alleged grievance, upon which we express no opinion, it must be sought in another way.

Motion denied.

Mr. Justice Gray was absent at the time of the submission and decision of this case.