green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
5.9 score
“where plaintiffs rely on confidential personal sources but also on other facts, they need not name their sources as long as the latter facts provide an adequate basis for believing that the defendants' statements were false”
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001
2013
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
In Re Keithley Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation
where plaintiffs rely on confidential personal sources but also on other facts, they need not name their sources as long as the latter facts provide an adequate basis for believing that the defendants' statements were false
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.
few federal statutes can meet such an exacting standard
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Leemon v. Burns
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
a complaint alleging a violation of section 10(b) must satisfy the particularity requirement of rule 9(b) as well as the pleading requirements of the pslra.
discussed
Cited "see"
Bay Harbour Management LLC v. Carothers
See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir.2000) (“[AJllegations that defendants should have anticipated future events and made certain disclosures earlier than they actually did do not suffice to make out a claim of securities fraud.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
cited
Cited "see"
Steed Finance LDC v. Nomura Securities International, Inc.
See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
Jones v. City of St. Louis
See Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000). [2] During oral argument, plaintiff conceded that, as an individual with property in the vehicle, he was not owed pre-deprivation process prior to the towing of the vehicle. [3] Among Chapter 17.56's provisions is an important one of which plaintiff did not avail himself.
cited
Cited "see"
David K. Kalan v. City of St. Francis
See Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008 , 1014 n. 7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
cited
Cited "see"
Florida State Board of Administration v. Green Tree Financial Corp.
See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 , 311 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000); Hollín v. Scholastic Corp. (In re Scholastic Corp. Sec.
discussed
Cited "see"
In Re Netsolve, Inc. Securities Litigation
(2×)
See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2nd Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
In Re Independent Energy Holdings PLC Securities Litigation
See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 313 (2d Cir.) (holding that plaintiffs need not reveal confidential sources at the pleading stage), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
cited
Cited "see"
In Re Baker Hughes Securities Litigation
See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir.2000), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000); In re Advanta Corp. Sec.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Quintana v. Lightner
Complete preemption “ ‘recharacterizes’ preempted state law claims as ‘arising under’ federal law for the purposes of ... making removal available to the defendant.” McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 516 (5th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, Arana, 338 F.3d at 440 n. 11; see also Johnson v. Baylor University, 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
McSperitt v. Hartford Life Insurance
Complete preemption “ ‘recharacterizes’ preempted state law claims as ‘arising under’ federal law for the purposes of ... making removal available to the defendant.” McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 516 (5th Cir.1998); see also Johnson v. Baylor University, 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP
See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir.) (“[A]llegations of GAAP violations or accounting irregularities, standing alone, are insufficient to state a securities fraud claim.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000); Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.1999) (“Allegations of a violation of GAAP provisions or SEC regulations, without corresponding fraudulent intent, are not sufficient to state a securities fraud claim.”); Chill v. Gen.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Baylor University Medical Center v. Epoch Group, L.C.
Complete-preemption “ ‘recharacterizes’ preempted state law claims as ‘arising under’ federal law for the purposes of ... making removal available to the defendant.” McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 516 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Johnson v. Baylor University, 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Erlandson v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston
Complete preemption “ ‘recharacterizes’ preempted state law claims as ‘arising under’ federal law for the purposes of ... making removal available to the defendant.” McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 516 (5th Cir.1998); see also Johnson v. Baylor University, 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Baylor University Medical Center v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield
Complete preemption “ ‘recharacterizes’ preempted state law claims as ‘arising under’ federal law for the purposes of ... making removal available to the defendant.” McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 516 (5th Cir.1998); see also Johnson v. Baylor University, 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In Re Mercator Software, Inc. Securities Litigation
See Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir.2001); see also Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir.) (interpreting the Reform Act as effectively raising the pleading standard to that previously existing in the Second Circuit and no higher), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000); Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that the Reform Act heightened the re *148 quirement for pleading scienter to the level used by the Second Circuit).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Amy Kohls v. Beverly Enterprises Wisconsin, Inc. D/B/A Maple Manor Healthcare
The substantive right provided in § 2614(a)(1), however, “shall [not] be con strued to entitle any restored employee to ... any right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave.” § 2614(a)(3)(B); see also Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1017-18 (7th Cir.2000), reh’g en banc denied, 217 F.3d 492 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 , 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Kohls, Amy v. Beverly Enter WI Inc
The substantive right provided in sec. 2614(a)(1), however, "shall [not] be con strued to entitle any restored employee to . . . any right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave." sec. 2614(a) (3)(B); see also Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 2000), reh’g en banc denied, 217 F.3d 492 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 567 , 148 L.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Hart v. Internet Wire, Inc.
The Force of Alleged Reckless Behavior A 10(b) plaintiff who relies on a recklessness theory is not relieved of the burden to plead and prove fraudulent intent; “recklessness” for 10b-5 purposes is conduct that is “equivalent to willful fraud.” Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir.1978); see also Novak v. Kasaks 216 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir.2000) (Recklessness is found in information that contradicted their public statements in “a state of mind approximating actual intent, and not merely a heightened form of negligence”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 567…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
IDT Corp. v. eGlobe Inc.
The PSLRA also mandates that a complaint alleging securities fraud “specify each statement alleged to have been misleading” and “the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u — 4(b)(1); see also Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000) (for a detailed discussion of pre- and post-PSLRA pleading standards). eGlobe attacks IDT’s fourth cause of action primarily on the ground that it fails to allege fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. eGlobe maintains that while its ac…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
In Re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation
See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 567 , 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000) (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Miller
v.
Texas
v.
Texas
No. 00-453.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 27, 2000.
Published
Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.